r*****g
发帖数: 9999 | 1 先说好俺不是game theory大牛，不许拍砖。
比如有参加auction的有两个人，一个按照1st price auction来bid，另一个按照2nd
price auction来bid，我的感觉是最后的结果（who is the winner and how much is
the payment）应该等同于两个人都按照1st price或2nd price auciton来bid的情形。
也就是说谁的true valuation高谁赢，payment都是等于2nd highest bidder's true
valuation。如果参加auction的有多人，而且有多个item，结果是否仍然是一样的呢？
这个问题可能没什么现实意义，我在网上大概找了一下居然没有什么文献，这种
auction有没有什么特定的名字？哪里能找到一些结论性的东西？
thx！ |
g****h
发帖数: 99 | 2 "参加auction的有两个人，一个按照1st price auction来bid，另一个按照2nd
price auction来bid"
How??
is
【在 r*****g 的大作中提到】
: 先说好俺不是game theory大牛，不许拍砖。
: 比如有参加auction的有两个人，一个按照1st price auction来bid，另一个按照2nd
: price auction来bid，我的感觉是最后的结果（who is the winner and how much is
: the payment）应该等同于两个人都按照1st price或2nd price auciton来bid的情形。
: 也就是说谁的true valuation高谁赢，payment都是等于2nd highest bidder's true
: valuation。如果参加auction的有多人，而且有多个item，结果是否仍然是一样的呢？
: 这个问题可能没什么现实意义，我在网上大概找了一下居然没有什么文献，这种
: auction有没有什么特定的名字？哪里能找到一些结论性的东西？
: thx！
|
r*****g
发帖数: 9999 | |
r*****g
发帖数: 9999 | 4 就是说按照1st price auction来bid的那个人expect赢了的话付自己bid的钱，按照2nd
price auction来bid的人expect赢了的话付比自己低的那个人的bid。
Scenario 1, one 1st price bidder (with lower true value), one 2nd price
bidder(with higher true value), 1 item. The 2nd price bidder bids his/her
true value and the 1st price bidder bids as much as he/she can afford trying
to win the item. The 2nd price bidder wins, and pays the second highest bid
, which is the 1st price bidder's true value.
Scenario 2, one 1st price bidder (with higher true value
【在 g****h 的大作中提到】
: "参加auction的有两个人，一个按照1st price auction来bid，另一个按照2nd
: price auction来bid"
: How??
:
: is
|
g****h
发帖数: 99 | 5 Good to do some thought experiments, but I got a different answer.
Do not forget: Under the first-price scheme, buyers have an incentive to
hide their true values.
Let me give you an example. We both are interested in bidding a vase. Its
true value to me is 100 and its true value to you is 110.
We both are utility maximizer.
1)Under the first price auction:
I bid $90. In case I win the auction, I pay $90 and get $10 surplus.
You bid $100, expecting to get $10 surplus as well.
So you win and pay |
r*****g
发帖数: 9999 | 6 恩，mm解释的很好，多谢。
【在 g****h 的大作中提到】
: Good to do some thought experiments, but I got a different answer.
: Do not forget: Under the first-price scheme, buyers have an incentive to
: hide their true values.
: Let me give you an example. We both are interested in bidding a vase. Its
: true value to me is 100 and its true value to you is 110.
: We both are utility maximizer.
: 1)Under the first price auction:
: I bid $90. In case I win the auction, I pay $90 and get $10 surplus.
: You bid $100, expecting to get $10 surplus as well.
: So you win and pay
|
