u****n
发帖数: 7521 | 1 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/5_myths_about_the_chinese_communist_party?page=0,0
Richard McGregor: 5 Myths About the Chinese Communist Party
In Foreign Policy, Richard McGregor,former Beijing bureau chief of the
Financial Times and author of The Party: The Secret World of China’s
Communist Rulers Richard McGregor: 5 Myths About the Chinese Communist Party
, debunks five myths about the Chinese communist Party, including:
- “China Is Communist in Name Only.”
- “The Party Controls All Aspects of Life in China.”
- “The Internet Will Topple the Party.”
- “Other Countries Want to Follow the China Model.”
- “The Party Can’t Rule Forever.” | z***c
发帖数: 2959 | 2 "China Is Communist in Name Only."
Wrong.
If Vladimir Lenin were reincarnated in 21st-century Beijing and managed to
avert his eyes from the city's glittering skyscrapers and conspicuous
consumption, he would instantly recognize in the ruling Chinese Communist
Party a replica of the system he designed nearly a century ago for the
victors of the Bolshevik Revolution. One need only look at the party's
structure to see how communist -- and Leninist -- China's political system
remains.
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Sure, China long ago dumped the core of the communist economic system,
replacing rigid central planning with commercially minded state enterprises
that coexist with a vigorous private sector. Yet for all their
liberalization of the economy, Chinese leaders have been careful to keep
control of the commanding heights of politics through the party's grip on
the "three Ps": personnel, propaganda, and the People's Liberation Army.
The PLA is the party's military, not the country's. Unlike in the West,
where controversies often arise about the potential politicization of the
military, in China the party is on constant guard for the opposite
phenomenon, the depoliticization of the military. Their fear is
straightforward: the loss of party control over the generals and their
troops. In 1989, one senior general refused to march his soldiers into
Beijing to clear students out of Tiananmen Square, an incident now seared
into the ruling class's collective memory. After all, the army's crackdown
on the demonstrations preserved the party's hold on power in 1989, and its
leaders have since worked hard to keep the generals on their side, should
they be needed to put down protests again.
As in the Soviet Union, the party controls the media through its Propaganda
Department, which issues daily directives, both formally on paper and in
emails and text messages, and informally over the phone, to the media. The
directives set out, often in detail, how news considered sensitive by the
party -- such as the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo --
should be handled or whether it should be run at all.
Portraits of a Rising
Military Power
Photos of the PLA and its rivals.
Perhaps most importantly, the party dictates all senior personnel
appointments in ministries and companies, universities and the media,
through a shadowy and little-known body called the Organization Department.
Through the department, the party oversees just about every significant
position in every field in the country. Clearly, the Chinese remember Stalin
's dictate that the cadres decide everything.
Indeed, if you benchmark the Chinese Communist Party against a definitional
checklist authored by Robert Service, the veteran historian of the Soviet
Union, the similarities are remarkable. As with communism in its heyday
elsewhere, the party in China has eradicated or emasculated political rivals
, eliminated the autonomy of the courts and media, restricted religion and
civil society, denigrated rival versions of nationhood, centralized
political power, established extensive networks of security police, and
dispatched dissidents to labor camps. There is a good reason why the Chinese
system is often described as "market-Leninism."
Party
【在 u****n 的大作中提到】
: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/5_myths_about_the_chinese_communist_party?page=0,0
: Richard McGregor: 5 Myths About the Chinese Communist Party
: In Foreign Policy, Richard McGregor,former Beijing bureau chief of the
: Financial Times and author of The Party: The Secret World of China’s
: Communist Rulers Richard McGregor: 5 Myths About the Chinese Communist Party
: , debunks five myths about the Chinese communist Party, including:
: - “China Is Communist in Name Only.”
: - “The Party Controls All Aspects of Life in China.”
: - “The Internet Will Topple the Party.”
: - “Other Countries Want to Follow the China Model.”
| z***c
发帖数: 2959 | 3 "The Party Controls All Aspects of Life in China."
Not anymore. No question, China was a totalitarian state under Mao Zedong's
rule from 1949 until his death in 1976. In those bad old days, ordinary
workers had to ask their supervisors' permission not only to get married,
but to move in with their spouses. Even the precise timing for starting a
family relied on a nod from on high.
Since then, the Chinese Communist Party has recognized that such intensive
interference in people's personal lives is a liability in building a modern
economy. Under the reforms kick-started by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s,
the party has gradually removed itself from the private lives of all but the
most recalcitrant of dissidents. The waning in the 1980s and 1990s of the
old cradle-to-grave system of state workplaces, health care, and other
social services also dismantled an intricate system of controls centered on
neighborhood committees, which among other purposes were used for snooping
on ordinary citizens.
The party has benefited hugely from this shift, even if many young people
these days have little knowledge of what the party does and consider it
irrelevant to their lives. That suits party leaders perfectly. Ordinary
people are not encouraged to take an interest in the party's internal
operations, anyway. Powerful party organs like the Organization and
Propaganda Departments do not have signs outside their offices. They have no
listed phone numbers. Their low profile has been strategically smart,
keeping their day-to-day doings out of public view while allowing the party
to take full credit for the country's rapid economic growth. This is how
China's grand bargain works: The party allows citizens great leeway to
improve their lives, as long as they keep out of politics.
"The Internet Will Topple the Party."
Nope. Bill Clinton famously remarked a decade ago that the efforts of
Chinese leaders to control the Internet were doomed, akin to "nailing Jell-O
to a wall." It turns out the former president was right, but not in the way
he thought. Far from being a conveyor belt for Western democratic values,
the Internet in China has largely done the opposite. The "Great Firewall"
works well in keeping out or at least filtering Western ideas. Behind the
firewall, however, hypernationalist netizens have a much freer hand.
The Chinese Communist Party has always draped itself in the cloak of
nationalism to secure popular support and played up the powerful narrative
of China's historical humiliation by the West. Even run-of-the-mill foreign-
investment proposals are sometimes compared to the "Eight Allied Armies"
that invaded and occupied Beijing in 1900. But when such views bubble up on
the Internet, the government often skillfully manages to channel them to its
own ends, as when Beijing used an online outburst of anti-Japanese
sentiment to pressure Tokyo after a Chinese fishing-boat captain was
arrested in Japanese waters. Such bullying tactics may not help China's
image abroad, but they have reinforced support at home for the party, which
the state media is keen to portray as standing up to foreign powers.
Through its Propaganda Department, the party uses a variety of often
creative tactics to ensure that its voice dominates the web. Not only does
each locality have its own specially trained Internet police to keep a lid
on grassroots disturbances, the department has also overseen a system for
granting small cash payments to netizens who post pro-government comments on
Internet bulletin boards and discussion groups. Moreover, the dominant
national Internet portals know that their profitable business models depend
on keeping subversive content off their sites. If they consistently flout
the rules, they can simply be shut down.
"Other Countries Want to Follow the China Model."
Good Luck. Of course, many developing countries are envious of China's rise.
Which poor country wouldn't want three decades of 10 percent annual growth?
And which despot wouldn't want 10 percent growth and an assurance that he
or she would meanwhile stay in power for the long haul? China undoubtedly
has important lessons to teach other countries about how to manage
development, from fine-tuning reforms by testing them in different parts of
the country to managing urbanization so that large cities are not overrun by
slums and shantytowns.
Moreover, China has done this while consciously flouting advice from the
West, using the market without being seduced by its every little charm. For
years, foreign bankers trekked to Beijing to sell the gospel of financial
liberalization, telling Chinese officials to float their currency and open
their capital account. Who could blame China's leaders for detecting the
evident self-interest in such advice and rejecting it? China's success has
given rise to the fashionable notion of a new "Beijing Consensus" that
eschews the imposition of free markets and democracy that were hallmarks of
the older "Washington Consensus." In its place, the Beijing Consensus
supposedly offers pragmatic economics and made-to-order authoritarian
politics.
But look closer at the China model, and it is clear that it is not so easily
replicated. Most developing countries do not have China's bureaucratic
depth and tradition, nor do they have the ability to mobilize resources and
control personnel in the way that China's party structure allows. Could the
Democratic Republic of the Congo ever establish and manage an Organization
Department? China's authoritarianism works because it has the party's
resources to back it up.
"The Party Can't Rule Forever."
Yes it can. Or at least for the foreseeable future. Unlike in Taiwan and
South Korea, China's middle class has not emerged with any clear demand for
Western-style democracy. There are some obvious reasons why. All three of
China's close Asian neighbors, including Japan, became democracies at
different times and in different circumstances. But all were effectively U.S
. protectorates, and Washington was crucial in forcing through democratic
change or institutionalizing it. South Korea's decision to announce
elections ahead of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, for example, was made under
direct U.S. pressure. Japan and South Korea are also smaller and more
homogeneous societies, lacking the vast continental reach of China and its
multitude of clashing nationalities and ethnic groups. And needless to say,
none underwent a communist revolution whose founding principle was driving
foreign imperialists out of the country.
China's urban middle class may wish for more political freedom, but it hasn'
t dared rise up en masse against the state because it has so much to lose.
Over the last three decades, the party has enacted a broad array of economic
reforms, even as it has clamped down hard on dissent. The freedom to
consume -- be it in the form of cars, real estate, or well-stocked
supermarkets -- is much more attractive than vague notions of democracy,
especially when individuals pushing for political reform could lose their
livelihoods and even their freedom. The cost of opposing the party is
prohibitively high. Hence the hotbeds of unrest in recent years have mostly
been rural areas, where China's poorest, who are least invested in the
country's economic miracle, reside. "Workers of the world unite! You have
nothing to lose except your mortgages" doesn't quite cut it as a
revolutionary slogan.
All this is why some analysts see splits within the party as a more likely
vehicle for political change. Like any large political organization, the
Chinese Communist Party is factionalized along multiple lines, ranging from
local fiefdoms (exemplified on the national stage by the "Shanghai Gang"
under former President Jiang Zemin) to internal party networks (like the
senior cadres tied to the Communist Youth League through Jiang's successor
Hu Jintao). There are also clear policy disputes over everything from the
proper pace of political liberalization to the extent of the private sector'
s role in the economy.
But highlighting these differences can obscure the larger reality. Since
1989, when the party split at the top and almost came asunder, the cardinal
rule has been no public divisions in the Politburo. Today, top-level
cooperation is as much the norm as debilitating factional competition. Xi
Jinping, the heir apparent, is set to take over at the next party congress
in 2012. Assuming his likely deputy, Li Keqiang, follows with the usual five
-year term, China's top leadership seems set until 2022. For the Chinese,
the United States looks increasingly like a banana republic by comparison.
The idea that China would one day become a democracy was always a Western
notion, born of our theories about how political systems evolve. Yet all
evidence so far suggests these theories are wrong. The party means what it
says: It doesn't want China to be a Western democracy -- and it seems to
have all the tools it needs to ensure that it doesn't become one. | z***c
发帖数: 2959 | 4 这段好：
The party has benefited hugely from this shift, even if many young people
these days have little knowledge of what the party does and consider it
irrelevant to their lives. That suits party leaders perfectly. Ordinary
people are not encouraged to take an interest in the party's internal
operations, anyway. Powerful party organs like the Organization and
Propaganda Departments do not have signs outside their offices. They have no
listed phone numbers. Their low profile has been strategically smart,
keeping their day-to-day doings out of public view while allowing the party
to take full credit for the country's rapid economic growth. This is how
China's grand bargain works: The party allows citizens great leeway to
improve their lives, as long as they keep out of politics.
s
modern
,
the
【在 z***c 的大作中提到】
: "The Party Controls All Aspects of Life in China."
: Not anymore. No question, China was a totalitarian state under Mao Zedong's
: rule from 1949 until his death in 1976. In those bad old days, ordinary
: workers had to ask their supervisors' permission not only to get married,
: but to move in with their spouses. Even the precise timing for starting a
: family relied on a nod from on high.
: Since then, the Chinese Communist Party has recognized that such intensive
: interference in people's personal lives is a liability in building a modern
: economy. Under the reforms kick-started by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s,
: the party has gradually removed itself from the private lives of all but the
| u****n
发帖数: 7521 | 5 他认为TG能够永远统治，打了Gordon Chang一个大耳光啊。 | z***c
发帖数: 2959 | 6 in foreseeable future
这文章写得很好，言简意赅。
Xi Jinping, the heir apparent, is set to
take over at the next party congress in 2012. Assuming his likely deputy, Li
Keqiang, follows with the usual
five-year term, China's top leadership seems set until 2022. For the Chinese
, the United States looks increasingly like a banana republic by comparison.
他认为TG能够永远统治，打了Gordon Chang一个大耳光啊。
【在 u****n 的大作中提到】
: 他认为TG能够永远统治，打了Gordon Chang一个大耳光啊。
| p******u
发帖数: 14642 | 7 "nailing Jell-O to a wall."
我眼搓看了两次才发现不是
"nailing j-lo against the wall."
还郁闷咋这么黄，这么暴力涅。。。 | p******u
发帖数: 14642 | 8 话说，丫竟然说土共不是有名无实，让卡亚克内牛满面、情何以堪啊 | u****n
发帖数: 7521 | 9 什么意思？没看明白。
【在 p******u 的大作中提到】
: "nailing Jell-O to a wall."
: 我眼搓看了两次才发现不是
: "nailing j-lo against the wall."
: 还郁闷咋这么黄，这么暴力涅。。。
| m**********o
发帖数: 2272 | 10 j-lo=jeniffer lopez
【在 u****n 的大作中提到】
: 什么意思？没看明白。
| p******u
发帖数: 14642 | 11 j-lo是个大屁股性感拉丁美女啊，5-10年前很红的
【在 u****n 的大作中提到】
: 什么意思？没看明白。
| D**o
发帖数: 2653 | 12 拉丁美女里面最丑的一个
【在 p******u 的大作中提到】
: j-lo是个大屁股性感拉丁美女啊，5-10年前很红的
| c*****t
发帖数: 10738 | 13 very good observations. but it already implicitly pointed out that TG's
power to maintain control highly depend on the fast economic growth. | u****n
发帖数: 7521 | 14 这个人的观察靠谱吗？好像想法跟一般中国人有些不同。
【在 c*****t 的大作中提到】
: very good observations. but it already implicitly pointed out that TG's
: power to maintain control highly depend on the fast economic growth.
|
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