m*******t
发帖数: 37 | 1 据美国《国际先驱论坛报》4月19日刊发文章，题目是：中国在改变其核武立场？文章
说，本周发布的中国国防白皮书引起了我们注意，因为它未提及绝不首先使用核武器的
承诺。那些明确的承诺是北京过去半世纪所宣称的核政策的基础，但这次白皮书对此模
棱两可。
从最开始的1998年到2011年，中国每一部国防白皮书均明确并无条件写入“不首先使用
核武”的承诺。
不首先使用一直是中国核武政策声明不可或缺的组成部分，但如今，这一实行长达半世
纪的政策，或许正在走向终结。而其他证据也显示，中国可能正在重估自己的核战略。
自1964年中国首次核武试验后，即公开向全世界宣布不首先使用核武器，不对无核国家
使用核武器，不扩散核武器，主张世界上拥有核武器的国家全面彻底销毁核武器。
这种原则一直坚持到现在。这是世上最强有力的不首先使用核武的保证，美国就从未表
明同样立场。中国是核裁军积极的推动者，也是唯一宣布不首先使用核武器的国家。
但是，中国这样做只是一厢情愿，没有任何国家积极响应。当年中国之所以做出绝不首
先使用核武器的庄严承诺，可能是有多方面考虑的：
一是中国不搞美苏那样的核讹诈，核武器只是用来保障和平的；
二是中国当时的常规军力十分庞大，足以保障中国在没有核威慑下的胜利，因此几乎用
不着核武器来遏制战争；
三是当时中国的周边国家和地区中，日本和台湾以及韩国都有先进的科技能力，中国做
出这样的承诺就是意在安抚他们不要紧张，中国不会对他们使用核武器，从而使其消除
紧随中国之后发展核武器的想法；
四是告诫那些与中国友好的国家，中国的核武器不是用来打仗的，别指望惹出事来找中
国帮忙，中国的核武器不会被任何国家绑架；
五是在美苏极大核优势的情况下，中国要打消他们顾虑，并没有和他们进行核对抗的想
法。
但时间已过去50年了，威胁世界的东西方冷战也早已经结束，新的世界形势正处在大调
整时期。特别是目前，在反恐战争结束以后，美国正在实施战略重返亚太，将会把其战
略重点转移到亚太特别是中国周边地区。
为此，现实也逼迫中国必须适应新的世界局势。如今，在最新的国防白皮书中，没有像
历年那样重申“不首先使用核武”的承诺，显然，中国的总体安全战略正在调整。那么
，中国是出于什么样的考虑放弃这种承诺呢？
首先，还是上边提到的，美国实施战略重返亚太，积极拉拢中国周边国家围堵中国、反
导部署到中国家门口、60%军力部署到亚太等，都使中国感受到了空前的战略压力；
其二，在美国的鼓动下，北约组织积极东扩，目前已经与中国周边的蒙古、韩国、日本
、巴基斯坦等国建立了“和平伙伴关系国”，今后还有可能会与菲律宾、马来西亚、泰
国等建立这种合作；
其三，日本的咄咄逼人姿态使中国倍感压力，作为一个二战战败国，竟能够耀武扬威的
向联合国安理会常任理事国高调叫板，并且公然欲抢占中国的固有领土钓鱼岛，这实在
是旷古罕闻！如果没有美国的公开支持和暗中唆使，谁能想到竟然会出现这种局势，不
要说中国是核大国，就是作为一个平常国家也不能忍受这样的危险挑衅；
其四，现在印度已经成为事实上的核大国，其积极发展核武器的主要目的就是对付中国
，如今其三位一体核打击力量正在成型，对中国的威胁越来越大，对于这种威胁中国再
也不能以不首先使用核武器来应对；
其五，对于中国来说，周边安全环境可以说是世界核大国中最险恶的，目前周边俄罗斯
、朝鲜、印度、巴基斯坦、伊朗均已成为拥核国家，美国虽然远隔一个大洋，但事实上
也是等同于中国的核邻国，在这么多拥核国家中，难保没有突发核事件，中国必须有先
发制人的核打击能力才能确保自己的安全；
其六，中国作为当今世界事实上的两极之一，再像早前那样不出头已经十分不合适，而
且现实来看，继续保持最低规模的核威慑和不首先使用核武器已经毫无意义！
综上所述，中国早就应该抛弃“不首先使用核武”的承诺，至少在十年前就应该这样做
。当然现在也不晚，因为美国的“再平衡”战略还正在进行中，很多计划实施的针对中
国的遏制战略还没有最终成型。
或许中国这次不再承诺“不首先使用核武”，也是意在告诫美国或日本，当中国意识到
美日的反导系统威胁到自己的战略安全时，中国有可能会采取先发制人的核打击策略，
以确保自己的国家战略利益！
文章仅代表作者观点，并不代表网站观点和对其真实性负责，目的在于传递信息。 | p********a
发帖数: 6437 | | g*********g
发帖数: 1139 | 3 赞一下
【在 m*******t 的大作中提到】
: 据美国《国际先驱论坛报》4月19日刊发文章，题目是：中国在改变其核武立场？文章
: 说，本周发布的中国国防白皮书引起了我们注意，因为它未提及绝不首先使用核武器的
: 承诺。那些明确的承诺是北京过去半世纪所宣称的核政策的基础，但这次白皮书对此模
: 棱两可。
: 从最开始的1998年到2011年，中国每一部国防白皮书均明确并无条件写入“不首先使用
: 核武”的承诺。
: 不首先使用一直是中国核武政策声明不可或缺的组成部分，但如今，这一实行长达半世
: 纪的政策，或许正在走向终结。而其他证据也显示，中国可能正在重估自己的核战略。
: 自1964年中国首次核武试验后，即公开向全世界宣布不首先使用核武器，不对无核国家
: 使用核武器，不扩散核武器，主张世界上拥有核武器的国家全面彻底销毁核武器。
| b*******8
发帖数: 37364 | | y**********a
发帖数: 824 | 5 已经被驳回了，众索南散了吧。
On April 16th the Information Office in the State Council of the People’s
Republic of China released its newest edition of its defense white paper.
As usual, this document attracted immediate media attention and triggered
wide-ranging discussions on the intentions and capabilities of the Chinese
armed forces. One speculation has been that China might consider changes to
its long-held no first use (NFU) nuclear policy (See James Acton, “Is
China Changing Its Position on Nuclear Weapons?”), as the white paper has
for the first time failed to reiterate China’s pledge not to use nuclear
weapons first.
A careful reading of this year’s white paper and a study of all such papers
since 1998 might easily explain this conspicuous absence of a key phrase
most frequently repeated in Chinese official documents on defense and
nuclear policy.
First, unlike previous editions which all have the title “China’s National
Defense”, the latest edition has the specific title: “The Diversified
Employment of China’s Armed Forces”, indicating that the white paper’s
format may have changed from a comprehensive elaboration to a more focused
discussion on a specific subject. Major General Chen Zhou, a senior
researcher and a key author of the white paper, explained in an interview
that this is the first white paper that adopts a thematic approach, so that
the subject can be dealt with more thoroughly. Compared with previous
editions, this year’s white paper has no section on “National Defense
Policy”, which usually carries the nuclear policy and the statement of the
NFU commitment.
Second, in the section on the “Building and Development of China’s Armed
Forces”, the force structure, missions and roles of the PLA Second
Artillery Force are specified, stating that its nuclear component is “
responsible for deterring other countries from using nuclear weapons against
China, and carrying out nuclear counterattacks.” This is in full
conformity with China’s NFU policy. In the section on “Defending National
Sovereignty, Security and Territorial Integrity”, the preparedness of the
Second Artillery Force “in peacetime”, “under a nuclear threat”, and “
under a nuclear attack” are respectively described, and the alert posture
of the Second Artillery Force is also in full compliance with China’s NFU
nuclear policy. It is safe to say that the latest white paper provides more
detailed information on how the PLA Second Artillery Force carries out the
Nation’s NFU policy.
In addition, the most recent re-affirmation of the NFU policy by a Chinese
head of state was made by former President Hu Jintao at the March 2012
Nuclear Summit in Seoul. And it has been reiterated in all necessary policy
documents and official statements since. There is no sign that China is
going to change a policy it has wisely adopted and persistently upheld for
half a century.
However, speculations on a possible change to the NFU policy have not been
conjured up without reason. Calls for a policy change on the official NFU
pledge are repeatedly heard in the Chinese media (including social media
such as weibo). The concerns over the NFU commitment stem from two basic
facts:
1) The Ballistic Missile Defense systems that the United States and
its allies have deployed, or are planning to deploy, are capable of
intercepting residue Chinese nuclear weapons launched for retaliation after
it has already been attacked, thus potentially negating the deterrence
effect of the Chinese nuclear arsenal.
2) The United States is developing a series of conventional strategic
strike capabilities. Once deployed, they could have the capability to strike
China’s nuclear arsenal and make China’s NFU policy redundant.
So far, no nuclear states have made it official policy to strike with
strategic conventional capabilities against the nuclear weapons of another
nuclear weapon state, although such capabilities are being developed for the
declared purpose of neutralizing the WMD capabilities of nuclear
proliferators. The cold war position of only using nuclear weapons against
nuclear weapons still seems valid. However, the US Congress has passed the
2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which President Obama signed
into law on Jan 2nd. It requests a report from the Commander of US
Strategic Command by August 15th; to describe the alleged Chinese
underground tunnel networks and to review the US capability to “neutralize
” such networks with “conventional and nuclear forces.” It seems to
imply that a conventional strike against the Chinese nuclear weapon system
is an option.
For nearly half a century, China’s NFU pledge has served as the cornerstone
of its nuclear policy, and any change has required careful review and
thorough debate. It is better for China and the rest of the world for China
to uphold its NFU policy, rather than discredit such a commitment. To
alleviate China’s concerns, a constructive approach would be to assure the
policy through nuclear policy dialogues, to establish a multilateral NFU
agreement among all the nuclear weapon states, and to consider limiting or
even prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in a legally binding
international agreement.
Major General Yao Yunzhu is the director of China-America Defense Relations,
Academy of Military Science. | y**********a
发帖数: 824 | 6 已经被驳回了，众索南散了吧。
On April 16th the Information Office in the State Council of the People’s
Republic of China released its newest edition of its defense white paper.
As usual, this document attracted immediate media attention and triggered
wide-ranging discussions on the intentions and capabilities of the Chinese
armed forces. One speculation has been that China might consider changes to
its long-held no first use (NFU) nuclear policy (See James Acton, “Is
China Changing Its Position on Nuclear Weapons?”), as the white paper has
for the first time failed to reiterate China’s pledge not to use nuclear
weapons first.
A careful reading of this year’s white paper and a study of all such papers
since 1998 might easily explain this conspicuous absence of a key phrase
most frequently repeated in Chinese official documents on defense and
nuclear policy.
First, unlike previous editions which all have the title “China’s National
Defense”, the latest edition has the specific title: “The Diversified
Employment of China’s Armed Forces”, indicating that the white paper’s
format may have changed from a comprehensive elaboration to a more focused
discussion on a specific subject. Major General Chen Zhou, a senior
researcher and a key author of the white paper, explained in an interview
that this is the first white paper that adopts a thematic approach, so that
the subject can be dealt with more thoroughly. Compared with previous
editions, this year’s white paper has no section on “National Defense
Policy”, which usually carries the nuclear policy and the statement of the
NFU commitment.
Second, in the section on the “Building and Development of China’s Armed
Forces”, the force structure, missions and roles of the PLA Second
Artillery Force are specified, stating that its nuclear component is “
responsible for deterring other countries from using nuclear weapons against
China, and carrying out nuclear counterattacks.” This is in full
conformity with China’s NFU policy. In the section on “Defending National
Sovereignty, Security and Territorial Integrity”, the preparedness of the
Second Artillery Force “in peacetime”, “under a nuclear threat”, and “
under a nuclear attack” are respectively described, and the alert posture
of the Second Artillery Force is also in full compliance with China’s NFU
nuclear policy. It is safe to say that the latest white paper provides more
detailed information on how the PLA Second Artillery Force carries out the
Nation’s NFU policy.
In addition, the most recent re-affirmation of the NFU policy by a Chinese
head of state was made by former President Hu Jintao at the March 2012
Nuclear Summit in Seoul. And it has been reiterated in all necessary policy
documents and official statements since. There is no sign that China is
going to change a policy it has wisely adopted and persistently upheld for
half a century.
However, speculations on a possible change to the NFU policy have not been
conjured up without reason. Calls for a policy change on the official NFU
pledge are repeatedly heard in the Chinese media (including social media
such as weibo). The concerns over the NFU commitment stem from two basic
facts:
1) The Ballistic Missile Defense systems that the United States and
its allies have deployed, or are planning to deploy, are capable of
intercepting residue Chinese nuclear weapons launched for retaliation after
it has already been attacked, thus potentially negating the deterrence
effect of the Chinese nuclear arsenal.
2) The United States is developing a series of conventional strategic
strike capabilities. Once deployed, they could have the capability to strike
China’s nuclear arsenal and make China’s NFU policy redundant.
So far, no nuclear states have made it official policy to strike with
strategic conventional capabilities against the nuclear weapons of another
nuclear weapon state, although such capabilities are being developed for the
declared purpose of neutralizing the WMD capabilities of nuclear
proliferators. The cold war position of only using nuclear weapons against
nuclear weapons still seems valid. However, the US Congress has passed the
2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which President Obama signed
into law on Jan 2nd. It requests a report from the Commander of US
Strategic Command by August 15th; to describe the alleged Chinese
underground tunnel networks and to review the US capability to “neutralize
” such networks with “conventional and nuclear forces.” It seems to
imply that a conventional strike against the Chinese nuclear weapon system
is an option.
For nearly half a century, China’s NFU pledge has served as the cornerstone
of its nuclear policy, and any change has required careful review and
thorough debate. It is better for China and the rest of the world for China
to uphold its NFU policy, rather than discredit such a commitment. To
alleviate China’s concerns, a constructive approach would be to assure the
policy through nuclear policy dialogues, to establish a multilateral NFU
agreement among all the nuclear weapon states, and to consider limiting or
even prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in a legally binding
international agreement.
Major General Yao Yunzhu is the director of China-America Defense Relations,
Academy of Military Science. |
|
