a*****h
发帖数: 201 | 1 Xi Jinping and the Chinese dream
The vision of China’s new president should serve his people, not a
nationalist state
N 1793 a British envoy, Lord Macartney, arrived at the court of the Chinese
emperor, hoping to open an embassy. He brought with him a selection of gifts
from his newly industrialising nation. The Qianlong emperor, whose country
then accounted for about a third of global GDP, swatted him away: “Your
sincere humility and obedience can clearly be seen,” he wrote to King
George III, but we do not have “the slightest need for your country’s
manufactures”. The British returned in the 1830s with gunboats to force
trade open, and China’s attempts at reform ended in collapse, humiliation
and, eventually, Maoism.
China has made an extraordinary journey along the road back to greatness.
Hundreds of millions have lifted themselves out of poverty, hundreds of
millions more have joined the new middle class. It is on the verge of
reclaiming what it sees as its rightful position in the world. China’s
global influence is expanding and within a decade its economy is expected to
overtake America’s. In his first weeks in power, the new head of the
ruling Communist Party, Xi Jinping, has evoked that rise with a new slogan
which he is using, as belief in Marxism dies, to unite an increasingly
diverse nation. He calls his new doctrine the “Chinese dream” evoking its
American equivalent. Such slogans matter enormously in China (see article).
News bulletins are full of his dream. Schools organise speaking competitions
about it. A talent show on television is looking for “The Voice of the
Chinese Dream”.
Countries, like people, should dream. But what exactly is Mr Xi’s vision?
It seems to include some American-style aspiration, which is welcome, but
also a troubling whiff of nationalism and of repackaged authoritarianism.
The end of ideology
Since the humiliations of the 19th century, China’s goals have been wealth
and strength. Mao Zedong tried to attain them through Marxism. For Deng
Xiaoping and his successors, ideology was more flexible (though party
control was absolute). Jiang Zemin’s theory of the “Three Represents”
said the party must embody the changed society, allowing private businessmen
to join the party. Hu Jintao pushed the “scientific-development outlook”
and “harmonious development” to deal with the disharmony created by the
yawning wealth gap.
Now, though, comes a new leader with a new style and a popular photogenic
wife. Mr Xi talks of reform; he has launched a campaign against official
extravagance. Even short of detail, his dream is different from anything
that has come before. Compared with his predecessors’ stodgy ideologies, it
unashamedly appeals to the emotions. Under Mao, the party assaulted
anything old and erased the imperial past, now Mr Xi’s emphasis on national
greatness has made party leaders heirs to the dynasts of the 18th century,
when Qing emperors demanded that Western envoys kowtow (Macartney refused).
But there is also plainly practical politics at work. With growth slowing,
Mr Xi’s patriotic doctrine looks as if it is designed chiefly to serve as a
new source of legitimacy for the Communist Party. It is no coincidence that
Mr Xi’s first mention of his dream of “the great revival of the Chinese
nation” came in November in a speech at the national museum in Tiananmen
Square, where an exhibition called “Road to Revival” lays out China’s
suffering at the hands of colonial powers and its rescue by the Communist
Party.
Dream a little dream of Xi
Nobody doubts that Mr Xi’s priority will be to keep the economy growing—
the country’s leaders talk about it taking decades for their poor nation to
catch up with the much richer Americans—and that means opening up China
even more. But his dream has two clear dangers.
One is of nationalism. A long-standing sense of historical victimhood means
that the rhetoric of a resurgent nation could all too easily turn nasty. As
skirmishes and provocations increase in the neighbouring seas (see Banyan),
patriotic microbloggers need no encouragement to demand that the Japanese
are taught a humiliating lesson. Mr Xi is already playing to the armed
forces. In December, on an inspection tour of the navy in southern China, he
spoke of a “strong-army dream”. The armed forces are delighted by such
talk. Even if Mr Xi’s main aim in pandering to hawks is just to keep them
on side, the fear is that it presages a more belligerent stance in East Asia
. Nobody should mind a confident China at ease with itself, but a country
transformed from a colonial victim to a bully itching to settle scores with
Japan would bring great harm to the region—including to China itself.
The other risk is that the Chinese dream ends up handing more power to the
party than to the people. In November Mr Xi echoed the American dream,
declaring that “To meet [our people’s] desire for a happy life is our
mission.” Ordinary Chinese citizens are no less ambitious than Americans to
own a home (see article), send a child to university or just have fun (see
article). But Mr Xi’s main focus seems to be on strengthening the party’s
absolute claim on power. The “spirit of a strong army”, he told the navy,
lay in resolutely obeying the party’s orders. Even if the Chinese dream
avoids Communist rhetoric, Mr Xi has made it clear that he believes the
Soviet Union collapsed because the Communist Party there strayed from
ideological orthodoxy and rigid discipline. “The Chinese dream”, he has
said, “is an ideal. Communists should have a higher ideal, and that is
Communism.”
A fundamental test of Mr Xi’s vision will be his attitude to the rule of
law. The good side of the dream needs it: the economy, the happiness of his
people and China’s real strength depend on arbitrary power being curtailed.
But corruption and official excess will be curbed only when the
constitution becomes more powerful than the party. This message was spelled
out in an editorial in a reformist newspaper on January 1st, entitled “The
Dream of Constitutionalism”. The editorial called for China to use the rule
of law to become a “free and strong country”. But the censors changed the
article at the last minute and struck out its title. If hat is the true
expression of Mr Xi’s dream, then China still has a long journey ahead.
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21577070-vision-chinas-ne | T*****y
发帖数: 18592 | | p********o
发帖数: 8012 | 3 这件龙袍设计不错呀，花了不少心思PS，比版上水平高！ | g******o
发帖数: 4042 | 4 龙袍中间偏下的建筑物是帝国大厦和威利斯塔？
什么意思？要占领美利坚？ | p********o
发帖数: 8012 | 5 好像左下角还有辽宁号和间15，呵呵，老外在琢磨什么很值得玩味啊，哈哈
【在 g******o 的大作中提到】
: 龙袍中间偏下的建筑物是帝国大厦和威利斯塔？
: 什么意思？要占领美利坚？
| n***c
发帖数: 7400 | | w********e
发帖数: 8594 | 7 帮大家总结一下吧。事先声明总结里面有戏剧化的私货。Reader discretion is
advised.
“中国滿清的时候做的梦不对（自大梦,霸权梦），所以过去几个世纪倒了大霉。”
“倒了大霉的中国堕落到毛主义。而毛主义居然是一剂鸡血，救活了中国。现在成了暴
发户”
“但是作为过来人的洋大人认为暴发户急需一个梦。要不然，暴发户会死得很快。”
“习总的梦就是重新搞滿清的自大梦（军事霸权加欺负小国）。” 这就是习总为什么
穿着皇袍嘛。
Punch line...........
“那你这暴发户就等着再倒几个世纪的大霉吧。”
我的问题是：洋大人的梦是什么？难道不是“老子天下第一”，不是“吃香的喝辣的”
？英大帝国无论做着多么高尚的梦，为什么堕落得比暴发户还快？
【在 T*****y 的大作中提到】
: 尼玛，全是洋文
: 俺不看了
| c*****g
发帖数: 21627 | 8 尼玛，大阴蒂国贩卖鸦片，搞霸权主义，还责怪是别人的不对了
Chinese
gifts
country
【在 a*****h 的大作中提到】
: Xi Jinping and the Chinese dream
: The vision of China’s new president should serve his people, not a
: nationalist state
: N 1793 a British envoy, Lord Macartney, arrived at the court of the Chinese
: emperor, hoping to open an embassy. He brought with him a selection of gifts
: from his newly industrialising nation. The Qianlong emperor, whose country
: then accounted for about a third of global GDP, swatted him away: “Your
: sincere humility and obedience can clearly be seen,” he wrote to King
: George III, but we do not have “the slightest need for your country’s
: manufactures”. The British returned in the 1830s with gunboats to force
|
|
