l**t
发帖数: 6971 | 1 【 以下文字转载自 SanFrancisco 讨论区 】
发信人: lopt (好好学习天天向上), 信区: SanFrancisco
标 题: 韩国两家航空公司的飞机千万不能坐！
发信站: BBS 未名空间站 (Sat Jul 13 03:05:44 2013, 美东)
这个是我在Yahoo News的comments看到的。一个在韩国两家航空公司教了五年的美国飞
行教官写的。基本就是讲，这两家公司的飞行员普遍不具备基本飞行技能，训练和考试
偷奸耍滑。摔飞机才是正常的。这次旧金山机场趁天气好维修自动助降的仪器，韩亚飞
行员就原形毕露了。
=====================================================
After I retired from UAL as a Standards Captain on the –400, I got a job as
a simulator instructor working for Alteon (a Boeing subsidiary) at Asiana.
When I first got there, I was shocked and surprised by the lack of basic
piloting skills shown by most of the pilots. It is not a normal situation
with normal progression from new hire, right seat, left seat taking a decade
or two.
One big difference is that ex-Military pilots are given super-seniority and
progress to the left seat much faster. Compared to the US, they also upgrade
fairly rapidly because of the phenomenal growth by all Asian air carriers.
By the way, after about six months at Asiana, I was moved over to KAL and
found them to be identical. The only difference was the color of the
uniforms and airplanes.
I worked in Korea for 5 long years and although I found most of the people
to be very pleasant, it’s a minefield of a work environment ... for them
and for us expats.
One of the first things I learned was that the pilots kept a web-site and
reported on every training session. I don’t think this was officially
sanctioned by the company, but after one or two simulator periods, a
database was building on me (and everyone else) that told them exactly how I
ran the sessions, what to expect on checks, and what to look out for.
For example; I used to open an aft cargo door at 100 knots to get them to
initiate an RTO and I would brief them on it during the briefing. This was
on the B-737 NG and many of the captains were coming off the 777 or B744 and
they were used to the Master Caution System being inhibited at 80 kts.
Well, for the first few days after I started that, EVERYONE rejected the
takeoff. Then, all of a sudden they all “got it” and continued the takeoff
(in accordance with their manuals). The word had gotten out. I figured it
was an overall PLUS for the training program.
We expat instructors were forced upon them after the amount of fatal
accidents (most of the them totally avoidable) over a decade began to be
noticed by the outside world. They were basically given an ultimatum by the
FAA, Transport Canada, and the EU to totally rebuild and rethink their
training program or face being banned from the skies all over the world.
They hired Boeing and Airbus to staff the training centers. KAL has one
center and Asiana has another. When I was there (2003-2008) we had about 60
expats conducting training KAL and about 40 at Asiana. Most instructors were
from the USA, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand with a few stuffed in from
Europe and Asia.
Boeing also operated training centers in Singapore and China so they did
hire some instructors from there.
This solution has only been partially successful but still faces ingrained
resistance from the Koreans. I lost track of the number of highly qualified
instructors I worked with who were fired because they tried to enforce “
normal” standards of performance.
By normal standards, I would include being able to master basic tasks like
successfully shoot a visual approach with 10 kt crosswind and the weather
CAVOK. I am not kidding when I tell you that requiring them to shoot a
visual approach struck fear in their hearts ... with good reason.
Like this Asiana crew, it didnt’ compute that you needed to be a 1000’ AGL
at 3 miles and your sink rate should be 600-800 Ft/Min.
But, after 5 years, they finally nailed me. I still had to sign my name to
their training and sometimes if I just couldn’t pass someone on a check, I
had no choice but to fail them. I usually busted about 3-5 crews a year and
the resistance against me built. I finally failed an extremely incompetent
crew and it turned out he was the a high-ranking captain who was the Chief
Line Check pilot on the fleet I was teaching on.
I found out on my next monthly trip home that KAL was not going to renew my
Visa. The crew I failed was given another check and continued a fly while
talking about how unfair Captain Brown was.
Any of you Boeing glass-cockpit guys will know what I mean when I describe
these events. I gave them a VOR approach with an 15 mile arc from the IAF.
By the way, KAL dictated the profiles for all sessions and we just
administered them. He requested two turns in holding at the IAF to get set
up for the approach.
When he finally got his nerve up, he requested “Radar Vectors” to final.
He could have just said he was ready for the approach and I would have
cleared him to the IAF and then “Cleared for the approach” and he could
have selected “Exit Hold” and been on his way. He was already in LNAV/VNAV
PATH. So, I gave him vectors to final with a 30 degree intercept.
Of course, he failed to “Extend the FAF” and he couldn’t understand why
it would not intercept the LNAV magenta line when he punched LNAV and VNAV.
He made three approaches and missed approaches before he figured out that
his active waypoint was “Hold at XYZ.” Every time he punched LNAV, it
would try to go back to the IAF ... just like it was supposed to do.
Since it was a check, I was not allowed (by their own rules) to offer him
any help. That was just one of about half dozen major errors I documented in
his UNSAT paperwork. He also failed to put in ANY aileron on takeoff with a
30-knot direct crosswind (again, the weather was dictated by KAL).
This Asiana SFO accident makes me sick and while I am surprised there are
not more, I expect that there will be many more of the same type accidents
in the future unless some drastic steps are taken.
They are already required to hire a certain percentage of expats to try to
ingrain more flying expertise in them, but more likely, they will eventually
be fired too.
One of the best trainees I ever had was a Korean/American (he grew up and
went to school in the USA) who flew C-141’s in the USAF. When he got out,
he moved back to Korea and got hired by KAL. I met him when I gave him some
training and a check on the B-737 and of course, he breezed through the
training. I give him annual PCs for a few years and he was always a good
pilot. Then, he got involved with trying to start a pilots union and when
they tired to enforce some sort of duty rigs on international flights, he
was fired after being arrested and JAILED!
The Koreans are very very bright and smart so I was puzzled by their
inability to fly an airplane well. They would show up on Day 1 of training (
an hour before the scheduled briefing time, in a 3-piece suit, and shined
shoes) with the entire contents of the FCOM and Flight Manual totally
memorized.
But, putting that information to actual use was many times impossible.
Crosswind landings are also an unsolvable puzzle for most of them. I never
did figure it out completely, but I think I did uncover a few clues. Here is
my best guess.
First off, their educational system emphasizes ROTE memorization from the
first day of school as little kids. As you know, that is the lowest form of
learning and they act like robots.
They are also taught to NEVER challenge authority and in spite of the flight
training heavily emphasizing CRM/CLR, it still exists either on the surface
or very subtly. You just can’t change 3000 years of culture.
The other thing that I think plays an important role is the fact that there
is virtually NO civil aircraft flying in Korea. It’s actually illegal to
own a Cessna-152 and just go learn to fly.
Ultra-lights and Powered Hang Gliders are Ok. I guess they don’t trust the
people to not start WW III by flying 35 miles north of Inchon into North
Korea.
But, they don’t get the kids who grew up flying (and thinking for
themselves) and hanging around airports. They do recruit some kids from
college and send then to the US or Australia and get them their tickets.
Generally, I had better experience with them than with the ex-Military
pilots.
This was a surprise to me as I spent years as a Naval Aviator flying
fighters after getting my private in light airplanes. I would get
experienced F-4, F-5, F-15, and F-16 pilots who were actually terrible
pilots if they had to hand fly the airplane. What a shock!
Finally, I’ll get off my box and talk about the total flight hours they
claim. I do accept that there are a few talented and free-thinking pilots
that I met and trained in Korea. Some are still in contact and I consider
them friends. They were a joy!
But, they were few and far between and certainly not the norm.
Actually, this is a worldwide problem involving automation and the auto-
flight concept. Take one of these new first officers that got his ratings in
the US or Australia and came to KAL or Asiana with 225 flight hours.
After takeoff, in accordance with their SOP, he calls for the autopilot to
be engaged at 250’ after takeoff. How much actual flight time is that?
Hardly one minute.
Then he might fly for hours on the autopilot and finally disengage it (MAYBE
?) below 800’ after the gear was down, flaps extended and on airspeed (
autothrottle). Then he might bring it in to land. Again, how much real “
flight time” or real experience did he get. Minutes! Of course, on the 777
or 747, it’s the same only they get more inflated logbooks.
So, when I hear that a 10,000 hour Korean captain was vectored in for a 17-
mile final and cleared for a visual approach in CAVOK weather, it raises the
hair on the back of my neck. | m********6
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