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The two countries seem determined to reach a deal on disputed islands that
has eluded them for decades.
For decades, every sign Russia and Japan had made progress in talks on
disputed territories and a post-World War II peace treaty turned out to be a
false alarm. This time may be different: Both Russian President Vladimir
Putin and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe need a deal more than their
predecessors did.
Putin and Abe met in Singapore last week and agreed to speed up talks on a
peace treaty their two countries negotiated after World War II but the
Soviet Union refused to sign. The talks will be based on a joint declaration
the Soviet Union and Japan signed in 1956, since abandoned by both sides,
that required the Soviet Union to hand over to Japan the island of Shikotan
and the Habomai islets once a peace treaty was signed. In recent years,
Japan has insisted on the handover of two more islands, Etorofu (Iturup) and
Kunashiri (Kunashir), and Russia has refused to cede any territory at all.
Both sides have strong misgivings about a compromise based on the 1956
declaration. For Japan, it would mean losing the leverage to claim much
bigger territory (Etorofu and Kunashiri account for 93 percent of the land
area of the disputed islands). For Russia, a deal is important (symbolically
for the most part) to make sure no U.S. military bases are placed on
Shikotan and Habomai, something Abe reportedly promised to Putin but may be
unable to rule out under existing Japanese commitments to the U.S.
Besides, the return of any of the islands, seized by the Soviet Union in the
final days of World War II, is extremely unpopular in today’s Russia. Over
the years, polls have consistently shown that 70 percent to 90 percent of
Russians reject such a handover. Putin’s predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, was at
several points close to ceding some territory to Japan, but he always
stepped back, fearing a powerful backlash from Communist and nationalist
rivals.
Now, both Abe and Putin really want to put the matter behind them.
Abe’s primary interest is his legacy. If he can keep his job until the next
scheduled election in 2021, he would be the longest-serving Japanese prime
minister. But economic growth, spurred by his generous stimulus policies,
has started to slow this year, and his tenure isn’t assured. He needs an
important win to stay in power and ensure his place in history. A deal with
Russia, though it would face some domestic opposition, could be perceived as
such a victory when confidence in Abe’s foreign policy is flagging:
Japanese voters are more open to a compromise than Russians.
Putin’s interest is both economic and geopolitical. A deal with Japan would
potentially open the flow of Japanese investment to Russia’s Far East, a
vast, underdeveloped region where Russia needs to counterbalance a growing
Chinese influence. Improving relations with Japan would also help Putin in
his search for alternatives to cooperation with the West. He knows by now
that U.S. economic sanctions and weaker European restrictions are here to
stay, so he’s working feverishly to buttress other partnerships in the
Middle East and Asia. On Monday, Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip
Erdogan watched a Russian natural gas pipeline make landfall in Turkey;
Japan, too, is a potential customer for Russian pipeline gas, but giant
projects like building a delivery system are unimaginable without a peace
treaty.
Putin is playing for high stakes, and Shikotan and Habomai, a little more
than 100 square miles of inhospitable land with a population of about 2,000,
wouldn’t be a huge loss by comparison, except politically. The Russian
social networks are rife with speculation about a possible handover, and the
comments aren’t flattering to Putin. “How loudly we ‘took’ Crimea and
how quietly we’re giving up the islands” is a typical sentiment. Putin is
being accused of selling Russian land because his regime has mishandled
Russia’s windfall from high oil prices in the 2000s.
In recent months, however, Putin appears to have made peace with his falling
approval rating. He disregarded public opinion as he pushed through a
highly unpopular retirement-age increase. The absence of serious protests
must have persuaded him he can make unpopular decisions during what is,
according to the Russian constitution, his last term in power unless he
wants to attempt a comeback after a six-year break.
This doesn’t mean he won’t drive a hard bargain on the islands. On Sunday,
Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov said accepting the 1956 declaration
as a basis for negotiations doesn’t mean “an automatic transfer of any
territories.” Russia will likely discuss handing over the islands without
losing sovereignty, on the basis of a lease or a joint governance deal.
There will also be demands for firm guarantees that the U.S. will keep away
from the islands and that certain Japanese investment projects and energy
deals will follow the peace treaty.
Whether Abe can live with any of the Russian demands is uncertain: He can
kick the can down the road if the deal doesn’t look like a clear win. But,
knowing how difficult it can be, the Japanese prime minister has agreed to
speed up the talks and hold additional meetings with Putin. It’s still
likely that they’ll produce another dud — but less likely than on any
previous occasion during Putin’s long rule.
This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board
or Bloomberg LP and its owners. |
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