o***o
发帖数: 194 | 1 Back in August 2018, long before WeWork's historic implosion, we discussed
how WeWork's EBITDA is "whatever you want it to be" thanks to the company's
bizarre pro forma addbacks, which transformed a $933MM net loss and a $193
million adjusted EBITDA loss, into a "positive" $233 million "community-
adusted" EBITDA for 2017, and a net loss of about $1.9 billion using
standard accounting, to a $467 million "profit" in 2018.
This is what we said:
Here, for the first time we saw not just one adjustment to adjusted EBITDA,
but an adjustment to the adjustment to the adjustment, and it was called "
Community Adjusted EBITDA", which by the miracles of non-GAAP "accounting",
pushed the company's EBITDA from negative $193 million to positive $233
million.
We made this observation in the context of Moody's inexplicably scrapping
its B3 credit rating on WeWork. Commenting on this, we said:
It wasn't clear why Moody's - the rating agency with the lowest opinion of
the office space leasing company - withdrew its rating, but it could be an
indication that finally rating agencies are getting tired of the bizarre -
and in this case, ridiculous - adjustments that companies increasingly come
up with to lipstick their pig, and present their company in a far better
light than reality.
Fast forward to today, when the topic of WeWork's community-adjusted EBITDA
has once again come up after the WSJ reported that in the weeks before its
now failed attempt to go public, the SEC had "ordered WeWork to remove the
measure, before the company offered to substantially change it."
Specifically, according to a WSJ report on the "wrangling" that was taking
place between WeWork and the SEC over whether or not to include the
grotesque EBITDA adjustment, which the company had since renamed to the less
jarring "contribution margin", as the IPO loomed, "the SEC zeroed in on how
WeWork framed its heavy losses, particularly through a bespoke
profitability metric called “contribution margin,” a version of which had
formerly been known as “community-adjusted Ebitda.” The agency had first
ordered WeWork to remove the measure, before the company offered to
substantially change it."
Demonstrating just how seriously corporations takes the SEC, however, the
day before WeWork had hoped to start the roadshow to peddle its IPO to
investors, the metric was still mentioned in its revised prospectus more
than 100 times (WeWork supposedly planned to amend the filing before
starting the roadshow — but instead shelved the IPO, as investors
questioned the company’s worth and its corporate governance.)
There are two key points here: the first, of course, is that WeWork was
hoping to mislead investors (all of whom were sophisticated enough to know
the garbage that "community-adjusted" anything is) by keeping this massive
pro forma adjustment; the second is that WeWork appears to be openly defying
the SEC's instructions on cleaning up its prospectus - something it
obviously couldn't do if it hoped to deflect attention from the company's
massive losses.
"It’s highly unusual to have issues that are so important still being
disputed while they are out there marketing the stock to investors,” said
Minor Myers, a law professor at the University of Connecticut who reviewed
the correspondence at the Journal’s request. As WeWork was battling the SEC
over its metrics, its advisers were “figuring what they can sell using
these numbers,” Mr. Myers added.
The WSJ also reports that WeWork’s resistance to removing the metric was
directed by Mr. Neumann himself, who had "previously boasted about the
metric to reporters and investors, to show how the company’s core business
was profitable."
Of course, the core business wasn't profitable as demonstrating previously
just how dismal WeWork's real bottom line was:
Furthermore, if WeWork was "profitable" along any metric, it would not have
scrapped its IPO and demanded a SoftBank bailout.
It wasn't just the community-adjusted EBITDA that was a concern for the SEC:
among other issues the SEC targeted was what the WeWork prospectus called
“illustrative annual economics.” The agency questioned how the company had
arrived at some rosy numbers. “Please explain to readers and tell us how
your assumed workstation utilization rate of 100% is realistic,” its letter
said. In reply, WeWork agreed to drop the illustrative economics section
from the prospectus.
The bottom line, as the WSJ summarizes, "WeWork’s liberal use of customized
metrics that don’t comply with generally accepted accounting principles,
or GAAP, was central to its wrangling with the SEC, according to people
close to the process. The draft prospectus WeWork filed in December cited at
least six non-GAAP metrics; by the time it issued the prospectus in August,
the tally had fallen."
Yet even after the back and forth with the SEC, and the IPO debacle, WeWork
refused to change its way: on Friday, after markets closed, WeWork published
a slide deck from Oct. 11—long after the company's self-annointed messiah,
Adam Neumann resigned, that showed financial results including a “location
contribution margin” that appeared to be a renamed version of the metric
at the center of its dispute with the SEC.
In short, once you start lying to the investing public in how you
misrepresent your business, it is virtually impossible to stop, unless you
are SoftBank of course in which case you just assume everyone is an idiot as
Masa Son's financial juggernaut did with these two slides.
However, it is not our intention here to focus on WeWork's fake financials -
we did that last August. Instead, it's to point out that there is never
just one cockroach. In fact, when it comes to non-GAAP adjustments, and "
fake numbers", one can say that everyone is a cockroach: as the WSJ points
out, nearly all big companies now use at least one non-GAAP financial metric
. Last year, 97% of S&P 500 companies used non-GAAP metrics, up from 59% in
1996, according Audit Analytics.
Which begs the question: in the aftermath of the WeWork fiasco, which relied
exclusively on non-GAAP, "community" adjustments to make its financials
appear respectable even though fundamentally they were a disaster, is every
financial report - and with 97% out of all companies using non-GAAP metrics
one can be excused to use the term "ever" - nothing but fake financial news,
and when the veil is finally lifted, as was the case with We Work, what
will happen to all those trillions in market capitalization built upon "one-
time", "non-recurring" addbacks and pro forma, adjusted, recasted and
otherwise fake foundations? | d**s
发帖数: 4741 | | o***o
发帖数: 194 | 3 97%的标准普尔公司，都使用WeWork相同的非美国通用会计准则欺诈方法 | o***o
发帖数: 194 | 4 就是用会计欺诈欺骗股民，SEC默许
【在 d**s 的大作中提到】
: wework将刺破这轮高科技泡沫？
| o***o
发帖数: 194 | | o***o
发帖数: 194 | 6 这个会计手法牛逼，97%标准普尔公司都在使用
Back in August 2018, long before WeWork's historic implosion, we discussed
how WeWork's EBITDA is "whatever you want it to be" thanks to the company's
bizarre pro forma addbacks, which transformed a $933MM net loss and a $193
million adjusted EBITDA loss, into a "positive" $233 million "community-
adusted" EBITDA for 2017, and a net loss of about $1.9 billion using
standard accounting, to a $467 million "profit" in 2018. | o***o
发帖数: 194 | 7 However, it is not our intention here to focus on WeWork's fake financials -
we did that last August. Instead, it's to point out that there is never
just one cockroach. In fact, when it comes to non-GAAP adjustments, and "
fake numbers", one can say that everyone is a cockroach: as the WSJ points
out, nearly all big companies now use at least one non-GAAP financial metric
. Last year, 97% of S&P 500 companies used non-GAAP metrics, up from 59% in
1996, according Audit Analytics.
Which begs the question: in the aftermath of the WeWork fiasco, which relied
exclusively on non-GAAP, "community" adjustments to make its financials
appear respectable even though fundamentally they were a disaster, is every
financial report - and with 97% out of all companies using non-GAAP metrics
one can be excused to use the term "ever" - nothing but fake financial news,
and when the veil is finally lifted, as was the case with We Work, what
will happen to all those trillions in market capitalization built upon "one-
time", "non-recurring" addbacks and pro forma, adjusted, recasted and
otherwise fake foundations? | o***o
发帖数: 194 | 8 WeWork刺破了米国上市公司普遍的会计造假黑幕
会计准则数字不好看，可以用非美国通用会计准则修正成需要的任何数字 | o***o
发帖数: 194 | | H******g
发帖数: 402 | 10 不是GAAP可以是FASB 准则。但是community adjusted 似乎两者都不是 | | | b***y
发帖数: 14281 | 11 wework，uber，这都是美国经济最真实的写照。
★ 发自iPhone App: ChinaWeb 1.1.5
【在 o***o 的大作中提到】
: Back in August 2018, long before WeWork's historic implosion, we discussed
: how WeWork's EBITDA is "whatever you want it to be" thanks to the company's
: bizarre pro forma addbacks, which transformed a $933MM net loss and a $193
: million adjusted EBITDA loss, into a "positive" $233 million "community-
: adusted" EBITDA for 2017, and a net loss of about $1.9 billion using
: standard accounting, to a $467 million "profit" in 2018.
: This is what we said:
: Here, for the first time we saw not just one adjustment to adjusted EBITDA,
: but an adjustment to the adjustment to the adjustment, and it was called "
: Community Adjusted EBITDA", which by the miracles of non-GAAP "accounting",
| o***o
发帖数: 194 | 12 看看读者评论：
Today reminds me of late 2000... first Enron, then WorldCom, global crossing
, pets.com and the avalanche. The problem back then was non GAAP accounting
as well. Today really is a wework market. All based on fantasy and non gaap
numbers. Remember all gaap stands for is generally accepted accounting
principles, it's not like it's that conservative.
Everything is fake, everybody knows it and pretends it isn’t.
The printing is real. Nobody cares about this non-GAAP garbage, all that
matters is the printing that fuels it.
the fact that regulators allowed this shows that there are no regulators...
the market is a fraud... better to bet on horses that look nice
I recall seeing jobs that wanted accountants with GAAP and non GAAP
experience... at once I understood the fraud was very large and deep... what
a ******* joke...
I own two different stocks, supposedly reputable companies not FAANG or "
momentum", both are going up nicely based on non-GAAP earnings, for one the
GAAP is about 1/3 lower, for the other GAAP earnings are negative.
Of course negative is very fashionable these days, but I still don't know
wtf is going on.
What lifted US stocks to 1929 levels in 1929?
Margin lending and share buybacks.
What lifted US stocks to 1929 levels in 2019?
Margin lending and share buybacks.
As long as US companies keep doing share buybacks things should be OK,
otherwise it’s all going to fall off the edge of a cliff. | z*****2
发帖数: 39 | | c****g
发帖数: 37081 | 14 鳖国比米帝落后100年。
老将倭杂屁獭魍鹜咪咪泼熊 | k**0
发帖数: 1 | | r******t
发帖数: 8967 | 16 Uber 解决了大农村的打车问题。释放了生产力，还是很不错的。 | r******t
发帖数: 8967 | 17 We work这种重资产模式其实和共享单车一个路数的。新瓶装旧酒 | k*****k
发帖数: 1 | 18 尼玛，股市是不是玩欺骗投资人的游戏？
标准普尔97%的公司，里面到底有多少是GAAP不好，靠non-GAAP变成好看的数字的？ | k*****k
发帖数: 1 | 19 京东好像也玩这个把戏，尼玛
东首次在美国通用会计准则下（GAAP）实现全年盈利，净利润为人民币1.168亿元（约
合1800万美元），而基于非美国通用会计准则（Non-GAAP），净利润为人民币50亿元（
约合8亿美元）。
那到底京东2017年利润是1.168亿元，还是50亿元呢？这个美国通用会计准则（GAAP）
和非美国通用会计准则（Non-GAAP）又是个什么鬼呢？ | k*****k
发帖数: 1 | 20 百度也玩，看来利用Non-GAAP美化数字，是尼玛潜规则了
11月7日，百度发布了截至9月30日的第三季度未经审计财报
在美国通用会计准则下（GAAP），百度第三季度净亏损64亿元，同比下降151.41%；在
非美国通用会计准则下（Non-GAAP），第三季度百度净利润达44亿元。 | | | o***o
发帖数: 194 | 21 这是普遍现象，SEC默许的欺骗
【在 k*****k 的大作中提到】
: 百度也玩，看来利用Non-GAAP美化数字，是尼玛潜规则了
: 11月7日，百度发布了截至9月30日的第三季度未经审计财报
: 在美国通用会计准则下（GAAP），百度第三季度净亏损64亿元，同比下降151.41%；在
: 非美国通用会计准则下（Non-GAAP），第三季度百度净利润达44亿元。
| s**p
发帖数: 2771 | 22
【在 o***o 的大作中提到】
: 97%的标准普尔公司，都使用WeWork相同的非美国通用会计准则欺诈方法
| t*****g
发帖数: 311 | 23 We work比共享单车差远了。
理论上，共享单车只要使用频率足够高，很快就可以收回成本，租金收入随使用频率增
长而增长，理论上限是个高毛利生意。
而we work就是个分租的二房东而已，可以收取的租金只和办公位数量有关，和使用频
率并没有关系。一个传统的二房东收租行业被吹成了IT高科技，孙正义脑子里简直全是
屎。
: We work这种重资产模式其实和共享单车一个路数的。新瓶装旧酒
【在 r******t 的大作中提到】
: We work这种重资产模式其实和共享单车一个路数的。新瓶装旧酒
| t******x
发帖数: 55 | 24 Non-GAAP是政府允许的合法造假托市行为，和政府不许的非法造假不一样
没有Non-GAAP，可能公司季度报表没法持续增长，就和中国情况一样，甚至是下降
那样投资人对股市的信心就没了，政府不会允许的。
合法造假和非法造假，区别大了 | t******x
发帖数: 55 | 25 中国和美国造假手法还是区别很大
中国是原始简单，有些数字不公布，觉得就是有猫腻
美国是法制社会，造假也要合法。
所以搞出一个规则，让大家在规则里面造假，知情人不说破，大家心里明白
法则社会就是不一样 | t*****g
发帖数: 311 | 26 中国上市公司的做账也是两套，一套给税务，一套给股市。所以才会出现做假账虚增几
百亿假利润的情况。
以后就应该和税务联网，只允许用同一会计准则，相信这样没人傻逼到虚增几百亿利润
要交税务上百亿税。
: 中国和美国造假手法还是区别很大
: 中国是原始简单，有些数字不公布，觉得就是有猫腻
: 美国是法制社会，造假也要合法。
: 所以搞出一个规则，让大家在规则里面造假，知情人不说破，大家心里明白
: 法则社会就是不一样
【在 t******x 的大作中提到】
: 中国和美国造假手法还是区别很大
: 中国是原始简单，有些数字不公布，觉得就是有猫腻
: 美国是法制社会，造假也要合法。
: 所以搞出一个规则，让大家在规则里面造假，知情人不说破，大家心里明白
: 法则社会就是不一样
| t******x
发帖数: 55 | 27 谁说美国财务制度严格的？
故意搞的很复杂，让大家看不懂，便于造假才是真的
【在 t*****g 的大作中提到】
: 中国上市公司的做账也是两套，一套给税务，一套给股市。所以才会出现做假账虚增几
: 百亿假利润的情况。
: 以后就应该和税务联网，只允许用同一会计准则，相信这样没人傻逼到虚增几百亿利润
: 要交税务上百亿税。
:
:
: 中国和美国造假手法还是区别很大
:
: 中国是原始简单，有些数字不公布，觉得就是有猫腻
:
: 美国是法制社会，造假也要合法。
:
: 所以搞出一个规则，让大家在规则里面造假，知情人不说破，大家心里明白
:
: 法则社会就是不一样
|
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