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发帖数: 16928 | 1 都是吃人血馒头。
Protests as Strategic Games: Experimental Evidence from Hong Kong's
Antiauthoritarian Movement
Abstract
Social scientists have long viewed the decision to protest as strategic,
with an individual's participation a function of their beliefs about others
’ turnout. We conduct a framed field experiment that recalibrates
individuals’ beliefs about others’ protest participation, in the context
of Hong Kong's ongoing antiauthoritarian movement. We elicit subjects’
planned participation in an upcoming protest and their prior beliefs about
others’ participation, in an incentivized manner. One day before the
protest, we randomly provide a subset of subjects with truthful information
about others’ protest plans and elicit posterior beliefs about protest
turnout, again in an incentivized manner. After the protest, we elicit
subjects’ actual participation. This allows us to identify the causal
effects of positively and negatively updated beliefs about others’ protest
participation on subjects’ own turnout. In contrast with the assumptions of
many recent models of protest participation, we consistently find evidence
of strategic substitutability. We provide guidance regarding plausible
sources of strategic substitutability that can be incorporated into
theoretical models of protests. |
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