l*******2
发帖数: 1 | 1 不是为了塔利班，而是准备在中亚死磕中国。美军一撤，阿富汗肯定投共 LOL
Can the West stop China in Central Asia?
James Durso, opinion contributor 3 hrs ago
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They say money can't buy happiness, and that may be true for Central Asia.
U.S. president Joe Biden recently suggested that democratic countries set up
an infrastructure fund to counter China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
The U.S. previously criticized BRI as a way to use "debt-trap diplomacy" to
extend China's influence over developing countries, but it hasn't been able
to dissuade borrowers from dealing with China.
There's been pushback against the "debt-trap diplomacy" concept and recent
research has shown the Chinese are tough negotiators and can cancel a loan
if a borrower takes an adverse political stand, but there's no "smoking gun"
evidence of a predatory program behind China's loans.
There is an existing infrastructure fund for Asia, the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB) but the U.S. declined to join it in 2015 - when a man
named Joe Biden was vice-president. Washington was concerned the AIIB would
compete with the World Bank and extend China's influence - and it tried
unsuccessfully to persuade allies like the UK, Canada, and Australia to not
join.
The U.S. has criticized China's lending policies, and refused to join the
AIIB, but has supported lending to Central Asia through the U.S.
International Development Finance Corporation, the World Bank, and the other
multilateral development banks (MDB), such as the Asian Development Bank,
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Islamic
Development Bank. The questions are, then: Is Biden's mooted project new
money or repackaged old money? Will the money be another funding option or
just an alternative to Chinese loans?
The United States Strategy for Central Asia 2019-2025 has as an objective to
"Support and strengthen the sovereignty and independence of the Central
Asian States." One way to honor this commitment is to ensure the states have
flexibility and discretion in working with lenders to ensure the lending
satisfies all parties' priorities and is spent efficiently and effectively.
The Central Asian governments can respond to Biden and force the pace by
approaching the lenders with their regional plan for the lenders' money,
which can highlight overlaps and inefficiencies, and recommend where money
can be reprogrammed. This will have to take account of lender preferences,
such as the Scandinavians' interest in women's issues or the U.S. interest
in health. This will also acknowledge that many issues such as water and air
quality, or public health, don't stop at one country's borders.
As to the money, if it is an option to Chinese funds it will give the states
the opportunity to shop around to country lenders or the MDBs to get the
best terms. The states can use this to create external constituencies for
their success and also give their officials exposure to a range of lenders
in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. If the money is a take-
it-or-leave-it alternative to China, Western lenders may find the locals
will pass.
Researchers at Ghent University found that development assistance from the
European Union often "fails to have a significant impact" while aid from
China "is more pervasive, and has a tangible impact on the ground" but that
is "offset by the negative implications of its increased involvement,
including deepening economic and financial dependency." So, the Central
Asian leaders are likely keeping a weather eye on China, but regional polls
indicate that "Russia enjoys evident dominance in public opinion, China is
in a relatively well-regarded second place, and the U.S. comes in decidedly
last." Thus, the local leaders have public support for "shopping around" so
long as they ensure that sovereignty and independence are respected by the
lenders.
The last will collide with the Western view that Chinese (and Russian) funds
are "bad" and a dose of Western support will set things right. The local
view is that, as they are finally independent since their absorption by the
Russian Empire in the early 1800s, they won't trade bosses in Moscow for
bosses in Washington, Beijing, or Brussels.
The U.S. tends to view Central Asia only in relation to other issues:
stabilizing Afghanistan, blunting China's BRI, checking Russia in the "near
abroad." Since America won't likely change its spots, and has big bills to
pay for domestic and infrastructure programs, it should stop wasting time
regretting the Belt and Road not taken. China's leaders think Central Asia
holds "extremely great geopolitical strategic value," so Beijing made a bet
and will reap the rewards.
The wise choice for America is to be the "financial balancer" and ensure
there's always a competitive financing option available to what it considers
predatory lending, and that Russia, Turkey, and China (and eventually Iran)
can't exclude any third party from investing in Central Asia.
The U.S. should also continue to support the Central Asia 5 plus 1 (C5 +1)
process - but it will be dollars on the ground that matter most.
It's usually a bad idea to follow the example of Communists, but as they
deal with Western complaints about China's infrastructure investments, local
officials should recall the core consideration of Afghanistan's Reds: Does
that ideology come with electricity?
James Durso (@james_durso) is the Managing Director of Corsair LLC, a supply
chain consultancy. He was a professional staff member at the 2005 Defense
Base Closure and Realignment Commission and the Commission on Wartime
Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Mr. Durso served as a U.S. Navy officer
for 20 years and specialized in logistics and security assistance. His
overseas military postings were in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and he served in
Iraq as a civilian transport advisor with the Coalition Provisional
Authority. He served afloat as Supply Officer of the submarine USS SKATE (
SSN 578). |
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