a*******g
发帖数: 3500 | 5 An extremely detailed analysis of the situation right in the wake of the
attack on the refinery in the Rostov region.
Ukraine struck a blow at an oil refinery in the Rostov region. The
refinery was hit with a drone that acted as a loitering munition.
Apparently, it was a UAV of the Ukrainian assembly UKR SPEC Systems PD-1 -
Ukraine has once again demonstrated that it is a formidable adversary, and
the end of hostilities is still far away.
What does this situation tell us?
First. The Armed Forces of Ukraine demonstrated the possibility of
delivering successful strikes against Russia's critical infrastructure. It
cannot be said that this blow was unexpected. For the past two months,
Ukrainian UAVs have been systematically shelling military and civilian
targets in the Rostov, Bryansk and Belgorod regions. Rocket strikes were
carried out on energy supply facilities, including the Kursk nuclear power
plant. Probably, strikes against critical infrastructure facilities were
carried out in order to reveal the capabilities and patterns of actions of
the Russian air defense forces.
Over the months of daily attacks on the border areas, the enemy not only
studied, but also studied the Russian side, collecting information and real
opportunities for a real strike.
Second. Do not think that this is the pinnacle of Ukraine's capabilities.
The Armed Forces of Ukraine have loitering ammunition, Turkish-made medium
strike UAVs, and their own developments.
At the stage of negotiations is the issue of the transfer of heavy strike
systems, such as the MQ-1C Gray Eagle. Such machines, and most importantly,
the accompanying weapons, will allow strikes deep into Russian territory.
The heavy Turkish UAV Bayraktar Akinci, the fruit of Ukrainian-Turkish
cooperation, has similar capabilities. It was the Ukrainian AI-450
turboprop engines that made it possible to lift a heavy UAV into the sky.
Third. How can Russia respond? First of all, the destruction of the
military potential of Ukraine and the tight protection of critical
infrastructure.
But do not overestimate the possibilities of protection and build them into
a cargo cult. Electronic warfare systems are not a panacea, plus their
capabilities cannot be fully used in areas with civilian objects.
The creation of a layered air defense around strategic objects creates a
confident focal, but not continuous frontal defense. It is impossible to
completely control the entire airspace.
Fourth. The Armed Forces of Ukraine have all the capabilities to conduct
complex, interspecific operations, including various instruments of war and
types of troops.
One, two, three threats the Russian defense is able to repel. But what
will happen during the implementation of a complex operation, which includes
strikes by UAVs, guided missiles, loitering ammunition, and the actions of
sabotage groups.
From one pickup truck, you can launch a swarm of guided munitions, which,
if they don’t hit, then provide a load for any air defense system. And
these are not some supernova technologies, but ammunition that Ukraine is
able to create on its own, based on the same PD-1 or commercial drones.
An acute threat now is the expanding sabotage war in Russia. The GUR sends
sabotage groups to Russian territory almost on a daily basis, and this
creates an acute, non-illusory danger to all strategic infrastructure
facilities.
It is not necessary to use a heavy UAV with guided missiles to hit a PNZ or
a nuclear power plant, a swarm of drones or launching guided / unguided
missiles from a pickup truck is quite enough. The Armed Forces of Ukraine
have shown that they have carefully studied the experience of ISIS and the
Syrian conflict in general. It is likely that the teachers were the same.
The strike on the Rostov PNZ showed that it is too early to write off
Ukraine, and the Armed Forces of Ukraine are far from exhausting their
potential.
All of the above fully applies to Sevastopol. The only thing to remember
is that the base of the Black Sea Fleet is much more tightly protected from
the air than the plant in the Rostov region.
War is a path of deceit, where any lull is deceptive. It is necessary to
actively prepare for more acute threats from Ukraine, which will certainly
be implemented.
: 不是， 有的说是在阿里买的便宜的无人机
【在 p****n 的大作中提到】
: 不是， 有的说是在阿里买的便宜的无人机
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