c*******g 发帖数: 695 | 1 I think this is not true......
以下文字转载自 Statistics 讨论区 】
发信人: jhsph07 (银杏 - 愚公), 信区: Statistics
标 题: 大药厂今后不会发展R&D了吧
发信站: BBS 未名空间站 (Wed Oct 13 12:14:44 2010, 美东)
都在谈论vitual pharm呢, 公司就留下CxO (CEO, CFO, ...), 销售部门, 几打MD, 和
一些监控CRO的同志. 剩下的全外包. 看看LILY, Sanofi, 都朝这方向去了.
Biostat都在被狂裁.
以后的方向在CRO和中小型biotech了. | L******r 发帖数: 522 | 2 完全vitual可能性个人觉得不是那么高,但是R&D规模大幅度减小,从目前看,确实是
趋势,也符合经济学原理:
1。大药厂规模大了以后,感觉就象国营企业,每个人都只是个巨大机器上可有可无的
螺丝钉,这本身就极大地抑制了人的责任感和创造性。人的本性决定了真正smart的人
,在现在VC很成熟的情况下,如果真的有好的idea,会自己出来搞startup,搞对了,
几年就可以退休,为啥要在大公司慢慢混?
2。传统的blockbuster领域,现在越来越饱和,FDA要求越来越高,development,
clinical成本越来越高,现在新药的开发都在向难度更高,风险更高,patient pool越
来越小的领域发展,传统的大药厂铺开一大摊,收获几个blockbuster就能吃饱的模式
,前期成本投入已经超过收获的预期。继续搞下去,只会越来越糟糕,市场也不认同。
这种例子太多,就不用举了。
3。身在这个行业的人,基本都不会否认,中小的biotech,单位成本更低,效率更高,
浪费更少,决策更灵活,这种management上的优势,是规模决定的,大公司再怎么改,
如果一大摊子人,那屁股就决定了脑袋,层层上报,个人难以承担风险和责任,注定了
效率低下。
4。融资优势。中小biotech,可以不断通过股市融资。每一个公司拿到的钱有限,但是
成千上万个,拿到的就很可观,而且这些都是投资者的钱,去做风险性的研究,搞砸了
拍屁股走人就是。而大药厂投入的,都是多年攒下的老本,搞砸了,公司和管理层就要
面临巨大压力,这种状况,决定了大药厂没办法豁出去了干,好的做不出来,做得出来
的,风险低,回报自然也低。
药物的发展,宏观看,从人类平均寿命就可以看出还有多少潜力。当人的平均寿命只有
40,50的时候,发展空间自然很大,当人类平均寿命达到80,还有多少潜力可挖,自然
一目了然。现在药物发展就象一片草原,以前水草茂盛,自然老鼠恐龙什么的都可以生
存,现在沙漠化了,死的首先就是恐龙,而老鼠反而能生存下来。大药厂想生存下来,
必须消减规模,恐龙是做不下去了,最好的结果就是身强力壮点,做个老鼠头目。
个人观点就是将来越来越多的R&D会被outsource,至少是到低成本的地方,一些大药厂
在美国仍会保留一些核心的或者非常有特点的高端的研发。大药厂越来越象investment
group,留下一批独具慧眼的对新药新方向敏感的人,去从中小biotech license药,
milestone的模式,让风险降低,同样的钱,以前只能搞十个candidates,现在可以搞
100个,那种成功机会更大,成本相对更低,一目了然。然后就是利用销售方面的优势
,去销售,这种优势,是中小biotech不可能有的,前期养不起那么多人。
简单说,大药厂将来就是investment + marketing,研发由中小biotech来做,研发成
本和风险向社会转嫁(IPO,..)。这种社会分工,我个人认为是合理并符合经济学原理
的。
【在 c*******g 的大作中提到】![](/moin_static193/solenoid/img/up.png) : I think this is not true...... : 以下文字转载自 Statistics 讨论区 】 : 发信人: jhsph07 (银杏 - 愚公), 信区: Statistics : 标 题: 大药厂今后不会发展R&D了吧 : 发信站: BBS 未名空间站 (Wed Oct 13 12:14:44 2010, 美东) : 都在谈论vitual pharm呢, 公司就留下CxO (CEO, CFO, ...), 销售部门, 几打MD, 和 : 一些监控CRO的同志. 剩下的全外包. 看看LILY, Sanofi, 都朝这方向去了. : Biostat都在被狂裁. : 以后的方向在CRO和中小型biotech了.
| s*******c 发帖数: 179 | 3 在前期的discovery research阶段,外包的可能性不大。到了development阶段以后都
可以外包,而且回报还会比较高。毕竟CRO的人力成本低,效率也比较高。不仅是研发
,其实在销售上,大公司也已经裁了很多人了,而且会继续裁人,现在有很多新的销售
和推销手段,不在仅仅依赖人了。
这个太理想化了。一个新药从开始到前期动物实验结果出来也要有5-8年吧。就算结果
好,能不能被人买还是问题呢。
【在 L******r 的大作中提到】![](/moin_static193/solenoid/img/up.png) : 完全vitual可能性个人觉得不是那么高,但是R&D规模大幅度减小,从目前看,确实是 : 趋势,也符合经济学原理: : 1。大药厂规模大了以后,感觉就象国营企业,每个人都只是个巨大机器上可有可无的 : 螺丝钉,这本身就极大地抑制了人的责任感和创造性。人的本性决定了真正smart的人 : ,在现在VC很成熟的情况下,如果真的有好的idea,会自己出来搞startup,搞对了, : 几年就可以退休,为啥要在大公司慢慢混? : 2。传统的blockbuster领域,现在越来越饱和,FDA要求越来越高,development, : clinical成本越来越高,现在新药的开发都在向难度更高,风险更高,patient pool越 : 来越小的领域发展,传统的大药厂铺开一大摊,收获几个blockbuster就能吃饱的模式 : ,前期成本投入已经超过收获的预期。继续搞下去,只会越来越糟糕,市场也不认同。
| L******r 发帖数: 522 | 4 前期的discovery research阶段,现在也正在大幅度外包,Lilly, Sanofi近期就是在
做这件事情,记得还有另外一个很大的deal,忘记是哪个公司,也是把research从头到尾
外包。在J&J,Pfizer认识的一些朋友同学,很多,尤其是做小分子的,全部被砍掉,
很多时候就留个manager或者director.
以前CRO还不够强大,现在CRO已经可以从头做到尾,discovery阶段外包不奇怪,看样子会
越来越多. 不过其实这种趋势对个人影响我觉得没想象那么大,就是以前替big pharma
干,现在替CRO,startup干,压力大些,待遇差些,工作稳定性也差些. 其实就是类似从国营的大锅饭,到自负盈亏的私有制那种转变的感觉.
销售确实也是在大砍,那种sales representative天天去敲医生的门,给医生整个办公室买午饭,包办旅游...已经在慢慢淘汰了.
Eli Lilly to outsource half of research by 2010
Sanofi-Aventis (France) (SASY.PA) Sells Two CMC Sites, Revamps R&D With $1.2
- 2.2 Billion Covance Inc. (CVD) Deal
9/30/2010
PRINCETON, N.J., Sept. 30 /PRNewswire-FirstCall/ -- Covance Inc. (NYSE: CVD)
today announced the signing of definitive agreements with sanofi-aventis (
EURONEXT: SAN and NYSE: SNY) for Covance to become sanofi-aventis' R&D
partner. Over the next ten years, Covance expects to provide drug
development services to sanofi-aventis, with estimated payments ranging from
approximately $1.2 billion to $2.2 billion. Sanofi-aventis will sell their
Porcheville, France and Alnwick, United Kingdom sites and facilities to
Covance for approximately $25 million and Covance will maintain employment
on these sites for at least the next five years. The transaction is expected
to be completed before the end of the year.
"A key strategy for sanofi-aventis is to transform its R&D model and
discover new medicines through the use of novel technologies and innovative
partnerships," declared Marc Cluzel, M.D., PhD, Executive Vice-President,
Research & Development, sanofi-aventis. "This alliance with Covance will
help us preserve hundreds of valuable jobs in Porcheville and Alnwick, while
driving our R&D efficiency for the benefit of the patients."
【在 s*******c 的大作中提到】![](/moin_static193/solenoid/img/up.png) : 在前期的discovery research阶段,外包的可能性不大。到了development阶段以后都 : 可以外包,而且回报还会比较高。毕竟CRO的人力成本低,效率也比较高。不仅是研发 : ,其实在销售上,大公司也已经裁了很多人了,而且会继续裁人,现在有很多新的销售 : 和推销手段,不在仅仅依赖人了。 : : 这个太理想化了。一个新药从开始到前期动物实验结果出来也要有5-8年吧。就算结果 : 好,能不能被人买还是问题呢。
| s*****l 发帖数: 1844 | 5 Are you kidding me? Discovery research is already outsourced, and is the
easiest part to outsource. Small molecules systhesis and bioactivity test,
early phase animal study, raw material systhesis, etc. are good examples. So
far most of the big pharma's sites in China are doing at least some
research.
Development part is more difficult to outsource because regulation is much
more strict. Development part is to make DS, DP for clinical trials, and the
quality of the product is much more critical than early phase discovery.
Most development part needs cGMP. In addition, China is not so good at
formulation, scale up process etc. in general, therefore, development part
is in a better situation than discovery part for now, as far as outsource is
considered.
【在 s*******c 的大作中提到】![](/moin_static193/solenoid/img/up.png) : 在前期的discovery research阶段,外包的可能性不大。到了development阶段以后都 : 可以外包,而且回报还会比较高。毕竟CRO的人力成本低,效率也比较高。不仅是研发 : ,其实在销售上,大公司也已经裁了很多人了,而且会继续裁人,现在有很多新的销售 : 和推销手段,不在仅仅依赖人了。 : : 这个太理想化了。一个新药从开始到前期动物实验结果出来也要有5-8年吧。就算结果 : 好,能不能被人买还是问题呢。
| w******y 发帖数: 8040 | 6 You are right.
But when we talk about outsourcing, we do not mean outsourcing to China/
India
per se.
D is of course in much better position than R, however, D is outsourcing
as well.
So
the
is
后都
研发
销售
结果
【在 s*****l 的大作中提到】![](/moin_static193/solenoid/img/up.png) : Are you kidding me? Discovery research is already outsourced, and is the : easiest part to outsource. Small molecules systhesis and bioactivity test, : early phase animal study, raw material systhesis, etc. are good examples. So : far most of the big pharma's sites in China are doing at least some : research. : Development part is more difficult to outsource because regulation is much : more strict. Development part is to make DS, DP for clinical trials, and the : quality of the product is much more critical than early phase discovery. : Most development part needs cGMP. In addition, China is not so good at : formulation, scale up process etc. in general, therefore, development part
| w********g 发帖数: 447 | 7 Drug-Research Sector Shaking Up As Big Pharma Adjusts Strategy
By Jennifer Cummings
Of DOW JONES NEWSWIRES
NEW YORK (Dow Jones)--Things are shaking up in the clinical-research
industry as major pharmaceutical companies increasingly establish long-term
relationships with a small pool of large contract-research organizations, or
CROs.
In a recent example of this trend, GlaxoSmithKline PLC (GSK, GSK.LN) told
Dow Jones Friday that it is negotiating contracts to enter "strategic
relationships" with Parexel International Corp. (PRXL) and Pharmaceutical
Product Development Inc. (PPDI), following the drug maker's announcement in
June that it was moving from working with 30 CROs down to just a few.
Other large pharmaceutical companies moving in a similar direction include
Merck & Co. (MRK) and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (BMY).
Contract-research organizations, which plan and administer research trials
on behalf of drug makers and medical-device companies, have expanded
significantly over the past decade, strengthened as health-care companies
increasingly look to cut down on costs by outsourcing research.
As Parexel, Pharmaceutical Product Development and the other top five CROs
capture an increasing share of the research market, their mid-sized peers
are under pressure to find ways to stay competitive.
"They've got to come up with a clear strategy to either get big relatively
quickly or find a unique offering that distinguishes them from the
competition," said James Miller, founder and president of the research firm
PharmSource Information Services. "Their traditional way of competing is
disappearing."
Currently about 25% of clinical trials are outsourced to CROs and, over the
next decade, that level is expected to rise to 60% or 70%, said Kara Murphy,
a partner in the health-care practice of consulting firm Bain & Co.
Lately, instead of hiring research firms to handle single trials, drug
makers are often entering into long-term contracts with CROs that encompass
a wide array of services. These agreements streamline the negotiating
process, cutting down on costs for both sides, and give the CROs better
visibility on their revenue.
Parexel, which on Monday said it entered into a multi-year strategic
relationship with Eli Lilly Co. (LLY), already has a large-scale strategic
relationship Bristol-Myers and is working on a deal with U.K-based Glaxo.
The other top CROs--Covance Inc. (CVD), Ireland-based Icon PLC (ICLR, IJF.DB
) and privately held Quintiles Transnational Corp.--are also involved in
strategic relationships with big pharma companies. The top five CROs control
about 50% of the global market, according to estimates from Wells Fargo.
It's generally agreed that small CROs will remain competitive, in part
because they can still appeal to the small to mid-sized drug makers.
However, mid-sized players, such as Kendle International Inc. (KNDL) and
privately held PRA International and PharmaNet Development Group Inc., are
in a tough position.
Mid-sized CROs "are likely too big to be seen as specialty niche players and
too small to become broad global vendors to the largest pharma," Robert W.
Baird analyst Eric Coldwell said.
Aside from merging with each other, mid-sized CROs can also try to grow
organically via infusions of capital from private-equity sources, Wells
Fargo analyst Greg Bolan said, a move that can offer more appeal to
potential clients.
By growing via private equity, the CROs' "culture would be more cohesive and
their therapeutic expertise would be better defined," Bolan said.
Private-equity firms have already taken an interest in the CRO industry. In
August, INC Research, generally considered a mid-sized CRO, said it agreed
to be acquired by a couple of private-equity investors, and last year
PharmaNet was taken private by JLL Partners Inc.
While the methods mid-sized CROs will use to compete are still being
determined, market observers broadly agreed that the status quo isn't viable
.
"Those who don't evolve will be vulnerable," Bain's Murphy said.
-By Jennifer Cummings, Dow Jones Newswires; 212-416-2474; jennifer.cummings
@dowjones.com
【在 c*******g 的大作中提到】![](/moin_static193/solenoid/img/up.png) : I think this is not true...... : 以下文字转载自 Statistics 讨论区 】 : 发信人: jhsph07 (银杏 - 愚公), 信区: Statistics : 标 题: 大药厂今后不会发展R&D了吧 : 发信站: BBS 未名空间站 (Wed Oct 13 12:14:44 2010, 美东) : 都在谈论vitual pharm呢, 公司就留下CxO (CEO, CFO, ...), 销售部门, 几打MD, 和 : 一些监控CRO的同志. 剩下的全外包. 看看LILY, Sanofi, 都朝这方向去了. : Biostat都在被狂裁. : 以后的方向在CRO和中小型biotech了.
| w********g 发帖数: 447 | 8 Outsourcing M&A Year In Review
By Michael A. Martorelli
Several large outsourcing firms made important tuck-in acquisitions, many
mid-sized firms expanded their platforms with strategic acquisitions, and
one outsourcing firm successfully tapped the equity market for an Initial
Public offering (IPO). But the big stories in the pharmaceutical outsourcing
industry in 2009 involved seven “going private” transactions and fifteen
separate divestitures. During the past few years, both in these annual
review articles for Contract Pharma and our own Outsourcing Industry
Monitors, we have supported both types of corporate restructurings for
publicly owned firms that have struggled to achieve their corporate
financial objectives and to satisfy the requirements of their investors.
Going-private transactions, divestitures, and selected fund-raisings are all
worth further attention in this year’s review of consolidation in
outsourcing.
Overall Activity Ebbed and Flowed
Last year at this time, we suggested that the rough economy and the poor
health of the markets for debt and equity capital would have a dampening
effect on the extent of consolidation in outsourcing, at least through the
first half of 2009. We did not anticipate a drastic decline in such activity
, however, given the continued presence of large numbers of willing buyers
and sellers. Transaction volume declined modestly, from about 120 completed
deals in both 2007 and 2008 to about 108 in 2009. We witnessed a slow start
to 2009, a very quiet middle of the year, and a strong pace at the finish.
Tracing only the flow of completed deals during the past 12 months does not
allow one to appreciate the extent and intensity of conversations about
various acquisitions and divestitures that were not completed for one reason
or another.From our vantage point as one of the investment banking firms
most actively involved in the outsourcing industry, we sense there were as
many conversations among interested buyers and sellers as ever. However, for
the second year in a row, it seems that many companies had trouble meeting
their forecasted results; doing so prevented several acquisitions from being
completed.
Despite the constraints on raising capital, private equity investors were
again very active in making new investments in outsourcing; they were
involved in about 22% of all reported transactions. Financial buyers do not
always offer the highest price or the most liquid payment structure to
entrepreneurs wanting to sell their businesses. In the outsourcing arena
however, they can present an interesting alternative to strategic buyers
seeking to bolster existing businesses or expand into new service areas.
Going Private Became a More Viable Option
Let’s back up a bit; at the end of 2006, depending on one’s definition,
there were as many as six-dozen publicly held outsourcing providers. They
represented several service sectors from preclinical research to post-
approval marketing, and included a variety of equipment, consumables, and
laboratory companies as well. Not all of those public firms were achieving
the financial targets set by their managements and expected by their
investors. The smallest among them were finding it increasingly difficult to
compete against the largest industry participants. For those with erratic
financial performance, a small number of floating shares, limited
institutional ownership, minimal trading volume, and no analyst coverage,
the supposed advantages of being a publicly owned company no longer seemed
relevant.
In February 2007, Vector Capital purchased the unprofitable Tripos Inc. and
announced its intention to focus on only one of its core products. The
following month, Genstar Capital approached the management of PRA
International about purchasing the 87% of the company it did not own; in
December 2007, it completed that transaction. And in the same month, Lyceum
Capital used cash to acquire Synexus Clinical Research.
As the year 2008 dawned, other firms’ boards of directors demonstrated a
new receptivity to the idea of taking their companies private. Not
surprisingly, the two that followed that path during the next few quarters
were facing difficult competitive issues and were not able to provide the
type of financial returns that their shareholders had come to expect. In
June, ECI and the senior management of Premier Research took that solidly
based but temporarily challenged company private. That CRO had been working
diligently to achieve the benefits of a few recent acquisitions. In
September, the aforementioned Vector Capital acquired Pharsight Corp., a
leading provider of simulation and modeling software that appeared to have
some marketing synergies with Tripos.
The going-private trend really blossomed in 2009, as seven more outsourcing
firms chose to abandon their public stock listings. Five hitched their
wagons to private equity firms willing to invest in their future success,
while two simply abandoned their publicly held status without raising new
capital.
In March, JLL Partners completed the acquisition of PharmaNet Development
Group. That firm had been plagued by delays and cancellations in its Early
Stage Development and Late Stage Development segments. The $250 million
purchase price included $100 million for the firm’s equity and a commitment
to supply an additional $144 million to retire an issue of 2.25%
convertible notes expiring in August 2009. PharmaNet reported revenue of $
358 million for 2008. The company went public in late 2004, when it merged
into SFBC International; that company adopted the PharmaNet corporate name
in August 2006.
In June, the shareholders of Entelos, Inc. approved the cancellation of the
company’s common stock listing on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM)
of the London Stock Exchange. Delisting the shares effectively made this
provider of biosimulation models a private company. Management had been
seeking new equity financing and trying to restructure the company’s debt.
Certain third parties had indicated an interest in making an investment, but
only if the company would become private. Entelos raised $17 million when
it first listed its shares on the AIM in April 2006. In 2008, the company
recorded a net loss of $13.5 million on revenue of $18.1 million.
In August, the shareholders of ReSearch Pharmaceutical Services approved
management’s plan to delist the common stock and warrants from London’s
AIM, too. The company cancelled its listing in early September. In taking
this action, management expressed its disappointment over the limited volume
of trading in the company’s shares and the potential limitations on future
strategic options that might have been associated with the AIM listing. RPS
became publicly held via a reverse merger into the AIM-listed Cross Shore
Acquisition Corp. in April 2006.
In September, Averion International was effectively taken private by ComVest
Investment Partners, the group that controlled slightly more than 50% of
the company’s shares. This process involved a reverse split of 20,500
shares into 1 share and an immediate forward split back into 20,500 shares
– effectively forcing anyone with fewer than 20,500 shares to accept 1
penny per share. The splits had the effect of reducing the number of
shareholders to fewer than 125, allowing Averion to terminate the
registration of its common stock and revert to the status of a private
company. Averion had achieved publicly held status in July 2006 when the
Nasdaq OTC Bulletin Board-listed IT&E International purchased Millennix Inc.
and Boston Biostatistics, then adopted Averion as its new corporate name.
Also in September, the shareholders of Celsis International plc agreed to a
takeover offer by Nastor Investments, a unit of NAV Funds that owned 20% of
Celsis’ shares. Management had recently expressed caution about the outlook
for the current fiscal year, and the likelihood of continued weakness in
its customers’ demands for contract laboratory services. The board
concluded that a listed company with limited research coverage, minimal
stock trading activity, and a small market capitalization would continue to
have trouble attaining its full potential value. Celsis had been public
since 1993.
In November, the shareholders of Life Sciences Research approved the buyout
offer made in July by Lion Holdings Inc., a private entity controlled by
chairman and chief executive officer Andrew Baker, owner of 18% of the
company’s shares. That offer valued LSR at $118 million; its market
capitalization at the time was closer to $95 million. As far back as August
2008, the company’s board had begun considering strategic alternatives,
since they believed it would become increasingly difficult to compete
against the largest participants in the preclinical toxicology business.
Several parties indicated an interest in acquiring the company, but backed
away from that idea due to concerns about the difficulties of financing such
a transaction and/or concerns about the disruptive tactics of animal rights
activists. LSR reported a revenue decline of 25% (to $142 million) for the
first nine months of 2009. The company had been public since 1988.
Finally, it’s not a done deal yet, but it’s still worth noting that the
board of IMS Health Inc. has agreed to an offer to take the company private.
Sometime in the first quarter of 2010, shareholders are expected to approve
the bid made by TPG Capital and the CPP Investment Board. IMS has not been
posting particularly good results as it has tried to adjust to the
consolidation in the pharmaceutical industry and the new realities of its
customers’ information needs.
Divestitures Again Made Headlines
In each of our annual review articles, we’ve noted that the boards of many
outsourcing companies have discovered the problems associated with managing
troubled operating units: they require disproportionate amounts of
management time, capital, and other scarce resources. There are similar
challenges involved in managing a profitable business, but one that is not
totally compatible with other operations and/or considered critical to a
company’s future. Thus, we are rarely surprised by the divestiture
activities taken by the outsourcing firms we monitor. The past year was the
third in a row in which divestitures made headlines; many should change the
scope and direction of the buyer and/or seller in a very meaningful way.
Two Strategic Restructurings Captured Much Attention
No company in our universe has undergone as much change as MDS Inc.:
In July, it sold the Phase II-IV clinical research business of MDS Pharma
Services to INC Research.
In September, it agreed to sell its Analytical Technologies unit, which
includes a 50% interest in AB Sciex, to Danaher Corporation.
That same month, it announced its intention to sell the Early Stage segment
of MDS Pharma Services.
In November, it completed the sale of its Central Labs operation to the
private equity firm Czura Thornton, which also owns the CRO Chiltern
International.
Assuming all these transactions are consummated, MDS will have gone from a
company with more than $1.2 billion in revenue from three major operating
segments in the fiscal year ended October 31, 2008 to one with only the
Nordion medical isotopes business and a revenue base of about $200 million
in fiscal 2010. MDS might become the classic business school case against
having diverse manufacturing and service operations in one organization.
PPD Inc. is another company that has been active in the acquisition and
divestiture arenas during the past 12 months:
In January, it acquired Merck’s 130,000-sq.-ft. vaccine testing laboratory
in Wayne, PA.
In April, it announced three transactions:
the acquisition of Magen Biosciences, a biotechnology company focused on
dermatologic therapies
the acquisition of AbCRO, a CRO operating in Central and Eastern Europe
the sale of Piedmont Research Center, a provider of preclinical research
services, to Charles River Laboratories
In October, it announced three significant developments:
the acquisition of the Chinese CRO Excel PharmaStudies Inc.
the investment of $100 million in Celtic Therapeutics, an investment
partnership organized to invest in a diversified portfolio of mid-stage drug
development candidates
the planned spin-off to shareholders of a company holding its compound
partnering business.
Finally, in November, it acquired Bio Duro, a drug discovery outsourcing
company that operates a 110,000-sq.-ft. laboratory in Beijing, China.
Collectively, these transactions suggest that PPD’s management is willing
to make meaningful investments in the drug development business while
enhancing its contract service business in selected areas and geographic
territories.
Other Divestitures Should Also Have an Impact
Life Technologies agreed to sell its 50% interest in AB Sciex to Danaher
Corp. The company acquired its interest in Sciex when it purchased Applied
Biosystems in November 2008. However, with 80% of its revenue coming from
consumables and services, management believes the sale of this interest will
not harm the company’s prospects. Meanwhile, adding the combined $650
million in Sciex’s mass spectrometry revenue will enable Danaher to become
the leader in that industry.
eResearch Technology sold its electronic data capture (EDC) business to
OmniComm Systems, Inc., another provider of EDC services. Those operations
had contributed only about 5% of eResearch’s revenue in the recent past.
OmniComm boosted its revenue base again later in the year, when it purchased
the assets of Logos Technologies.
Covance Inc. sold its interactive voice and web response (IVRS/IWRS)
business to Phase Forward. That firm also bought Waban Software, as it
continued to broaden its capabilities in the “e” research arena.
Encorium Group sold its U.S. business (2008 revenue of about $8 million) to
Pierrel Research USA, a unit of the Italian firm Pierrel SpA. At the same
time, it terminated previously announced negotiations to sell its European
operations (2008 revenue of about $22 million) to an unnamed U.S.-based
buyer.
In addition to selling its vaccine lab to PPD Inc., Merck sold its Rosetta
Biosoftware business to Microsoft, and its gene expression lab in Seattle,
WA to Covance.
The Australian company Alesco Corporation Ltd. sold its Biolab unit to
Thermo Fisher Scientific, enhancing Thermo’s presence in the Australia/New
Zealand/South Pacific regions.
Clinical Data sold its Cogenics division to Beckman Coulter. Divesting this
genomics services business will enable Clinical Data to focus on its two
late stage therapeutic programs.
Many Firms Made Strategic Acquisitions
As was the case in 2008, many contract manufacturers and providers of
instruments and/or consumables were quite active. In addition to the
transactions already noted, two others gained considerable attention:
Agilent Technologies acquired Varian Inc. in a cash transaction valued at $1
.5 billion.
Thermo Fisher Scientific paid $470 million for Brahms AG.
There were several acquisitions for which financial terms were not disclosed:
Asterand acquired BioSeek.
Life Technologies acquired BioTrove.
Lonza Group acquired Algonomics NV.
The Danish drug company Lundbeck acquired the French contract manufacturing
firm Eliapharm.
Millipore acquired BioAnaLab Limited.
The clinical research firms were reasonably active buyers in 2009. In
addition to the transactions already noted, other companies made
acquisitions that enhanced an important part of their business:
Chiltern International added to its presence in Latin America with the
purchase of Vigiun, a full-service CRO based in Sao Paulo, Brazil.
ICON plc expanded its bioanalytical capabilities by acquiring Utica, NY-
based Prevalere Life Sciences, and added to its Phase I business with the
acquisition of Qualia Clinical Services in Omaha, NE.
In its first transaction since going private in 2008, UK-based Premier
Research Group acquired Pivotal Research Centers, thus adding Phase I units
in three U.S. states.
ReSearch Pharmaceutical Services used cash and stock to acquire CROs in
China (Paramax International), France (Therapharm Recherches), Germany (
IMEREM Institute for Medical Research Management and Biometrics), and Spain
(Infociencia, S.L.)
Manchester, UK-based Synexus used acquisitions to expand the number of
dedicated research centers from 13 to 26.
United BioSource continued to enhance its capabilities in the broad arena of
evidence-based medicine by acquiring Cognitive Testing Company and Gigamoto
Technology.
Clinipace acquired Worldwide Clinical Research, doubling its employee base
and adding operations in South America.
Other companies completed transactions that resulted in a change in
ownership:
The owners of Lexington KY-based REGISTRAT, Inc. announced sale of a
controlling interest in the company to Lyon, France-based MAPI Group.
The shareholders of eTrials Worldwide accepted an acquisition offer made by
Merge Healthcare Inc. In offering a little more than $18 million for the
company, Merge topped the $15 million offer made by BioClinica.
BioClinca continued to expand its range of offerings by acquiring CardioNow
and Tourtellote Solutions.
The German drug distribution and pharmacy firm Celesio bought Alchemy
Healthcare, an Irish CSO.
Investors Voted with Their Wallets
In prior review articles, we have not taken notice of some large investments
made by private equity firms and public shareholders. Given the difficult
state of the capital markets however, we think successful fund-raising
efforts should be noted and applauded.
Back in April 2007, JLL Partners acquired a 27% interest in Patheon Inc. via
an investment of $150 million in the company’s convertible preferred
shares. In late 2008, it offered to purchase the remainder of the shares and
take the company private. Management opposed a total takeover, but
consented to allowing JLL to increase its interest to the present level of
57%. Throughout the summer, Patheon had been considering a potential
business combination with Lonza Group; in October, the companies ended those
discussions.
In June, Medidata Solutions completed its IPO, raising more than $76 million
by selling 6.3 million new shares and 945,000 existing shares to investors.
In December, underwriters sold another 5.5 million shares on behalf of
existing venture capital shareholders, primarily Insight Venture Partners.
In July, Water Street Partners acquired AAIPharma Services, the
pharmaceutical development division of AAIPharma. The buyer announced its
intention to provide as much as $75 million in financing to expand AAIPharma
Services’ capabilities (a figure that included the price of the initial
acquisition). After that transaction closed, the remaining part of AAIPharma
was renamed ZeeCRO; it provides late stage development services.
In September, two members of the Laukien family raised $115 million by
selling 13.0 million shares of Bruker Corporation, thus reducing its
combined ownership in that company from more than 19% to just over 11%.
That same month, Qiagen NV raised approximately $640 million from the sale
of 31.6 million new common shares.
In October, Berkshire Partners invested $125 million in United BioSource.
Management intends to use that capital to pursue further acquisitions,
including the two noted earlier.
We close this section by noting one more SEC filing; in December, Quintiles
Transnational Holdings Inc. filed a registration statement covering the sale
of $400 million in senior notes due in 2014. In the filing, the company
announced its plans to spin off its PharmaBio subsidiary to shareholders.
That unit holds the historical assets used in the NovaQuest business, itself
a provider of non-traditional strategic resourcing arrangements. Before
that spin-off, Quintiles will transfer the Duloxetine Royalty Sub from
PharmaBio to its holding company; following the receipt of certain necessary
consents, it plans to spin off
【在 c*******g 的大作中提到】![](/moin_static193/solenoid/img/up.png) : I think this is not true...... : 以下文字转载自 Statistics 讨论区 】 : 发信人: jhsph07 (银杏 - 愚公), 信区: Statistics : 标 题: 大药厂今后不会发展R&D了吧 : 发信站: BBS 未名空间站 (Wed Oct 13 12:14:44 2010, 美东) : 都在谈论vitual pharm呢, 公司就留下CxO (CEO, CFO, ...), 销售部门, 几打MD, 和 : 一些监控CRO的同志. 剩下的全外包. 看看LILY, Sanofi, 都朝这方向去了. : Biostat都在被狂裁. : 以后的方向在CRO和中小型biotech了.
| T********l 发帖数: 1670 | 9 感觉并不是像你所说的那样:因为每一种的药都有一些特殊性,一般的CRO很难处理这
些特殊性的问题。我们公司最近有一个在这一类新药是第一个三期的药,因为
outsouring 到美国本土的很有信誉的CRO,结果在scale up 时没成功,预期要推迟一
年NDA,你说这个损失有多大,远远要比outsouring 生下来的钱来得大。特别是后期的
formulation 与 API 这一块,很难outsouring。 | L******r 发帖数: 522 | 10 趋势是趋势,个例是个例,个例的成败,不能说趋势就不是那么回事。举个个例,
Novartis的Aliskiren,在1995年化合物就搞出来了,但是Novartis做scale up和
process做不好,觉得不可能把那么一个复杂的化合物做到成本足够低到能与别的高血
压药竞争,就放弃了。他们的一个R&D的VP,Alice Huxley,跑出去自己搞了个startup
,Speedel,纠集了一帮人,找了个CMO,设计了新的路线,就能把成本降下去,最后这
个药批下来了,连化合物名字都是Alice用自己的名字去取的。后来Novartis花了将近
一个billion,又把speedel买了下来。这个个例能说明小startup和CMO就比Novartis做
得好吗?
小分子API的development,无论是chemistry,还是process,formulation, 以及后期的
regulatory,难度都那么回事,稍微有经验点的CRO, CMO,都能搞定。这也是为什么现
在各个大公司把做小分子的人一通乱砍得一个原因。举个例子,UCB自己的Keppra,专利
快到期的时候,搞了个Keppra XR,那个formulation不是UCB自己做的,是个阿三公司
Alembic做的,license给了UCB。这种做formulation development的公司现在很多很多。
biological,在可预见的将来,估计还是大药厂自己做,Genzyme自己做Myozyme的
scale-up,FDA都不批,所以不能说CRO做失败了,就一定是CRO的问题。biological的
难度确实大很多,大部分CRO,CMO目前还不是那么有经验,个人觉得这部分暂时还不会
大规模去outsource。但是技术的扩散和发展是很快的,今天那些CRO不行,不意味着将
来也不行。
个人觉得将来的趋势是小部分药,尤其是biological药,大药厂还会保留开发和生产能
力。小分子的,从头到尾,outsource的可能性都很高。更多的是从中小biotech去买。
象King,Forest Lab就几乎没有自己的研发,就靠到处买中小公司的,这么些年,一样
活得很滋润。大家都是有样学样而已。
【在 T********l 的大作中提到】![](/moin_static193/solenoid/img/up.png) : 感觉并不是像你所说的那样:因为每一种的药都有一些特殊性,一般的CRO很难处理这 : 些特殊性的问题。我们公司最近有一个在这一类新药是第一个三期的药,因为 : outsouring 到美国本土的很有信誉的CRO,结果在scale up 时没成功,预期要推迟一 : 年NDA,你说这个损失有多大,远远要比outsouring 生下来的钱来得大。特别是后期的 : formulation 与 API 这一块,很难outsouring。
| | | j******w 发帖数: 97 | 11 总体上来说。Outsourcing 还是很厉害。看看被layoff 的 chemists 有多少。看看国
内的多如牛毛的大大小小的 contract lab 就知道了。美国一个 Ph.D. chemist 年薪
9-10w. 加上 benefits, 磨洋工,配套设施,可以养很多人了。美国 80% 的 API 来自
中国和印度。
【在 T********l 的大作中提到】![](/moin_static193/solenoid/img/up.png) : 感觉并不是像你所说的那样:因为每一种的药都有一些特殊性,一般的CRO很难处理这 : 些特殊性的问题。我们公司最近有一个在这一类新药是第一个三期的药,因为 : outsouring 到美国本土的很有信誉的CRO,结果在scale up 时没成功,预期要推迟一 : 年NDA,你说这个损失有多大,远远要比outsouring 生下来的钱来得大。特别是后期的 : formulation 与 API 这一块,很难outsouring。
| j******w 发帖数: 97 | 12 上次去开一个会。95% 的vendor 都是 clinical research organization. 大概 300
家。不知道以后会不会 contract R&D organization, 大公司的 R&D 全像 clinical
trail 一样一个一个包出去。或者 S&D, Search and development.
【在 L******r 的大作中提到】![](/moin_static193/solenoid/img/up.png) : 完全vitual可能性个人觉得不是那么高,但是R&D规模大幅度减小,从目前看,确实是 : 趋势,也符合经济学原理: : 1。大药厂规模大了以后,感觉就象国营企业,每个人都只是个巨大机器上可有可无的 : 螺丝钉,这本身就极大地抑制了人的责任感和创造性。人的本性决定了真正smart的人 : ,在现在VC很成熟的情况下,如果真的有好的idea,会自己出来搞startup,搞对了, : 几年就可以退休,为啥要在大公司慢慢混? : 2。传统的blockbuster领域,现在越来越饱和,FDA要求越来越高,development, : clinical成本越来越高,现在新药的开发都在向难度更高,风险更高,patient pool越 : 来越小的领域发展,传统的大药厂铺开一大摊,收获几个blockbuster就能吃饱的模式 : ,前期成本投入已经超过收获的预期。继续搞下去,只会越来越糟糕,市场也不认同。
| s*******c 发帖数: 179 | 13 Well, what I said is early discovery, you refer to the late stage discovery
where the candidates are ready to move into animal/tox studies. In very
early stage discovery, there are two models for big pharm, either buy the
compound or develop it in house. I know several CRO are setting up discovery research unit. But I don't see the great benefit to outsource a
concept and ask a CRO to discovery a molecule for you.
Actually I would argue the strict regulation in your so-called development
makes it much easier to outsource because everything falls into a SOP/GLP/
GMP guideline. You don't need creative mind or genius. You just want a pair
of hand and mind that can follow the procedures which is what CRO are good
at. At current stage, the majority of these work are still outsourced to the
companies in US. In this respect, CRO will also evovle. Big pharm and
biotech will favor to tie the node with a few preferred CRO vendors that can
provide one-stop shop, look at Lilly, Merck and Sanofi examples. The
smaller CRO can have the advantage on flexibility and cost that appeals to
smaller biotech and startups. The midsized CRO will have a tough time to
fiddle its way through the competition.
So
the
【在 s*****l 的大作中提到】![](/moin_static193/solenoid/img/up.png) : Are you kidding me? Discovery research is already outsourced, and is the : easiest part to outsource. Small molecules systhesis and bioactivity test, : early phase animal study, raw material systhesis, etc. are good examples. So : far most of the big pharma's sites in China are doing at least some : research. : Development part is more difficult to outsource because regulation is much : more strict. Development part is to make DS, DP for clinical trials, and the : quality of the product is much more critical than early phase discovery. : Most development part needs cGMP. In addition, China is not so good at : formulation, scale up process etc. in general, therefore, development part
| s*******c 发帖数: 179 | 14 这个是个例。你比较一下在CRO的人一年做多少个项目,在pharm公司的一年做几个项目
。你所谓的特殊性,对于CRO的人讲,以前见到类似情况的可能性大多了,而且现在很
多下岗的pharm公司的人最后都去了CRO。而且这里有信息的不对称性,自己开发的东西
,毕竟比较熟悉,项目交给CRO的时候,不一定全盘托出,这也有可能造成问题和低效。
【在 T********l 的大作中提到】![](/moin_static193/solenoid/img/up.png) : 感觉并不是像你所说的那样:因为每一种的药都有一些特殊性,一般的CRO很难处理这 : 些特殊性的问题。我们公司最近有一个在这一类新药是第一个三期的药,因为 : outsouring 到美国本土的很有信誉的CRO,结果在scale up 时没成功,预期要推迟一 : 年NDA,你说这个损失有多大,远远要比outsouring 生下来的钱来得大。特别是后期的 : formulation 与 API 这一块,很难outsouring。
| B****n 发帖数: 1876 | 15 哎,本人一直想从普通的化工厂跳到大药厂去,现在被你们说的心都凉了。
你们是不是太危言耸听了?
我知道很多在大药厂工作的人都安安稳稳的,
也打听过裁员的事情,
都说是雷声大雨点小,
尤其是以技术为本的中国人,
受到的影响根本就很小。
也有很多大药厂的人一看形势不好,
趁机跳到待遇更好的地方去了。 | L******r 发帖数: 522 | 16 我认识一堆被裁掉的老中和老外.....不过后来也都找到去处。如前所述,其实现在这
种情况对个人影响没想象那么大,只不过以前是替big pharma干,现在替biotech和CRO
干的区别。
这个看你对未来的追求,有点危机感不是坏事情。感觉今天的汽车业,就是将来的制药
业,有本事的,永远饿不死,但是如果一开始就抱着进大公司然后抱着铁饭碗混饭吃的
,估计前景不会太乐观,40-50岁时再被LAY OFF,会是很被动而艰难的事情。事业这种
东西是不进则退,趁还能折腾,赶快折腾,折腾不动的时候再去找个地方混日子养老吧。
【在 B****n 的大作中提到】![](/moin_static193/solenoid/img/up.png) : 哎,本人一直想从普通的化工厂跳到大药厂去,现在被你们说的心都凉了。 : 你们是不是太危言耸听了? : 我知道很多在大药厂工作的人都安安稳稳的, : 也打听过裁员的事情, : 都说是雷声大雨点小, : 尤其是以技术为本的中国人, : 受到的影响根本就很小。 : 也有很多大药厂的人一看形势不好, : 趁机跳到待遇更好的地方去了。
| T********l 发帖数: 1670 | 17 这是因为这个VP知道化合物的历史,知道他们以前做了那一些尝试,如果没有他以前的
失败的经历,他很难有所作为的。
startup
【在 L******r 的大作中提到】![](/moin_static193/solenoid/img/up.png) : 趋势是趋势,个例是个例,个例的成败,不能说趋势就不是那么回事。举个个例, : Novartis的Aliskiren,在1995年化合物就搞出来了,但是Novartis做scale up和 : process做不好,觉得不可能把那么一个复杂的化合物做到成本足够低到能与别的高血 : 压药竞争,就放弃了。他们的一个R&D的VP,Alice Huxley,跑出去自己搞了个startup : ,Speedel,纠集了一帮人,找了个CMO,设计了新的路线,就能把成本降下去,最后这 : 个药批下来了,连化合物名字都是Alice用自己的名字去取的。后来Novartis花了将近 : 一个billion,又把speedel买了下来。这个个例能说明小startup和CMO就比Novartis做 : 得好吗? : 小分子API的development,无论是chemistry,还是process,formulation, 以及后期的 : regulatory,难度都那么回事,稍微有经验点的CRO, CMO,都能搞定。这也是为什么现
| t**n 发帖数: 4365 | 18 信息不对称也是问题所在啊。对于CRO不能100%的信任。
效。
【在 s*******c 的大作中提到】![](/moin_static193/solenoid/img/up.png) : 这个是个例。你比较一下在CRO的人一年做多少个项目,在pharm公司的一年做几个项目 : 。你所谓的特殊性,对于CRO的人讲,以前见到类似情况的可能性大多了,而且现在很 : 多下岗的pharm公司的人最后都去了CRO。而且这里有信息的不对称性,自己开发的东西 : ,毕竟比较熟悉,项目交给CRO的时候,不一定全盘托出,这也有可能造成问题和低效。
| k******n 发帖数: 133 | 19 I would argue against your concept on the outsourcing of Development, from
the prospective of biologics.
1. The development of biologics is complicated, often time case specific and
required in depth knowledge/expertise on that molecule. Thus, each molecule
would have their unique process. This requires a large number of talent
pools to be dedicated to one particular project, which is contrary to the
idea in CROs, which specialized in streamlining the process to cut the cost
2. CROs are currently function as only as a service provider, not as a risk-
sharing partner. They get paid for offering the service that has been
requested, under the SOP/cGMP guidlines. Thus, there are no incentive for
them to identify potential issues/problems. We had several projects
transferred from CROs to us for late stage development and a lot of issues
that need to be addressed.
3. It appears the big pharms are now all attempting to establish a strong
capacity for the development and production of both brand and generic
biologics in the near future, in anticipating of the expected surge in
revenue from biologics. Many mid or small size biotechs have now partnered
with big pharms to take advantage of their expertise in drug development,
manufacture and experience in dealing with regulatory agencies. To me, big
pharms are now functioning as a manufacturing site for many small biotechs.
I don't see any hope for CROs to compete against big pharm in this regard.
discovery
discovery research unit. But I don't see the great benefit to outsource a
pair
good
the
【在 s*******c 的大作中提到】![](/moin_static193/solenoid/img/up.png) : Well, what I said is early discovery, you refer to the late stage discovery : where the candidates are ready to move into animal/tox studies. In very : early stage discovery, there are two models for big pharm, either buy the : compound or develop it in house. I know several CRO are setting up discovery research unit. But I don't see the great benefit to outsource a : concept and ask a CRO to discovery a molecule for you. : Actually I would argue the strict regulation in your so-called development : makes it much easier to outsource because everything falls into a SOP/GLP/ : GMP guideline. You don't need creative mind or genius. You just want a pair : of hand and mind that can follow the procedures which is what CRO are good : at. At current stage, the majority of these work are still outsourced to the
| l*u 发帖数: 2090 | 20 莫说 R D
看看Up In TheAir
连人事部都被外包了
【在 c*******g 的大作中提到】![](/moin_static193/solenoid/img/up.png) : I think this is not true...... : 以下文字转载自 Statistics 讨论区 】 : 发信人: jhsph07 (银杏 - 愚公), 信区: Statistics : 标 题: 大药厂今后不会发展R&D了吧 : 发信站: BBS 未名空间站 (Wed Oct 13 12:14:44 2010, 美东) : 都在谈论vitual pharm呢, 公司就留下CxO (CEO, CFO, ...), 销售部门, 几打MD, 和 : 一些监控CRO的同志. 剩下的全外包. 看看LILY, Sanofi, 都朝这方向去了. : Biostat都在被狂裁. : 以后的方向在CRO和中小型biotech了.
| | | t*e 发帖数: 47 | 21 nice points, kevin
steve just gave us a presentation about biosimilar and biosuperior at our de
pt off-site meeting this week. finally i got the idea why the company wants
to do the biosuperior :)
and
molecule
cost
risk-
【在 k******n 的大作中提到】![](/moin_static193/solenoid/img/up.png) : I would argue against your concept on the outsourcing of Development, from : the prospective of biologics. : 1. The development of biologics is complicated, often time case specific and : required in depth knowledge/expertise on that molecule. Thus, each molecule : would have their unique process. This requires a large number of talent : pools to be dedicated to one particular project, which is contrary to the : idea in CROs, which specialized in streamlining the process to cut the cost : 2. CROs are currently function as only as a service provider, not as a risk- : sharing partner. They get paid for offering the service that has been : requested, under the SOP/cGMP guidlines. Thus, there are no incentive for
| w****l 发帖数: 535 | 22 非常同意,LIFisher你是做market research的么?
【在 L******r 的大作中提到】![](/moin_static193/solenoid/img/up.png) : 完全vitual可能性个人觉得不是那么高,但是R&D规模大幅度减小,从目前看,确实是 : 趋势,也符合经济学原理: : 1。大药厂规模大了以后,感觉就象国营企业,每个人都只是个巨大机器上可有可无的 : 螺丝钉,这本身就极大地抑制了人的责任感和创造性。人的本性决定了真正smart的人 : ,在现在VC很成熟的情况下,如果真的有好的idea,会自己出来搞startup,搞对了, : 几年就可以退休,为啥要在大公司慢慢混? : 2。传统的blockbuster领域,现在越来越饱和,FDA要求越来越高,development, : clinical成本越来越高,现在新药的开发都在向难度更高,风险更高,patient pool越 : 来越小的领域发展,传统的大药厂铺开一大摊,收获几个blockbuster就能吃饱的模式 : ,前期成本投入已经超过收获的预期。继续搞下去,只会越来越糟糕,市场也不认同。
| h*****t 发帖数: 1226 | 23 which company are you guys from?
Biosuperior (bio better) will cost a lot, since they are actually
"innovation" drugs. You must from a compny with lots of money :)
de
wants
【在 t*e 的大作中提到】![](/moin_static193/solenoid/img/up.png) : nice points, kevin : steve just gave us a presentation about biosimilar and biosuperior at our de : pt off-site meeting this week. finally i got the idea why the company wants : to do the biosuperior :) : : and : molecule : cost : risk-
| f******s 发帖数: 288 | 24 呵呵,我也想知道那个公司?
其实很多公司一直都在做”biobetter“ ,尤其是做自己产品的新一代替代品,其实想
想制药产业和计算机产业/时尚业没太大区别的,只是最大的不同是,制药业的
regulation 太多,所以在development 阶段也许还可以依靠 建立在已有生产知识基础
上的platform technology缩短时间,降低成本,但是到了MAA或更早的时候,还是要有
一套完整的数据,从质量到临床和一个新药基本没有区别。
所谓biosimilar 的基础是,你不可以比reference product 差,而且,也不可以比它
更好。质量上的“相似”,是减少临床数据的绝对基础,否则就必须当作新药处理。至
于如何证明“相似”,这就要求更多的quality来证明,所以biosimilar 在quality 上
的data 要求和新药一样多,在此基础上还要证明相似性,所以总的生产质量上的数据
要求其实比一般的新药多很多。省下的钱/时间基本都在临床试验上,但是实际操作起
来,很多biosimilar的临床package 其实也很大,很多就是省掉phase ii 而已,但是
现在很多新药也未必有phase ii。
所以,这个要时间,等技术发展,等各国药品机构对这类产品建立起信心。
【在 h*****t 的大作中提到】![](/moin_static193/solenoid/img/up.png) : which company are you guys from? : Biosuperior (bio better) will cost a lot, since they are actually : "innovation" drugs. You must from a compny with lots of money :) : : de : wants
| a***a 发帖数: 524 | | v**a 发帖数: 2062 | 26 我有一阵做过給outsource擦屁股的活,问题太多,給CRO擦屁股怎么擦都擦不干净. | H********f 发帖数: 289 | | c*******u 发帖数: 88 | 28 i used to believe in that outsourcing is the way out, but after dealing with
a couple of CROs i would totally change my mind. The fact is, often the
CROs are cheaper but also lack of the in-depth knowledge to get things done
right. The personnel changes are so massive in the CRO industry, that you
will often find out that the so-called experts who are dealing with your
projects are most likely some young guys fresh out of school who keep coming
back to you with all kinds of questions. Last but not least, they expect to
get paid when they have finished their part, no matter that results are of
high quality or not. | E****e 发帖数: 315 | 29 CRO也会不断整合,以后几个大的CRO会占据更大的市场份额,小的烂的会逐渐被淘汰 | b******e 发帖数: 3348 | 30 美国现在唯一确保不会outsourcing的就是军工企业。 | | | S****e 发帖数: 568 | |
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