由买买提看人间百态

boards

本页内容为未名空间相应帖子的节选和存档,一周内的贴子最多显示50字,超过一周显示500字 访问原贴
Stock版 - China Is Running Out Of Money
相关主题
华尔街日报无情嘲弄中国借钱给别人上瘾 (转载)So ECB lends 250 billion to IMF
FED Raise Fed Discount Rate!!靠, 真的玩负利率了
Gold price is beyond imagination这种美元,oil, 黄金,白银同时涨意味着什么?
Fraction ... Er ... Fictional Reserve Banking (zz)这个市场predatory trading肯定是盛行。MM忒损。
通胀是纸币泛滥债务无穷的一个必须?I am afraid that trade war is coming (转载)
ZT 中国要求商业银行收敛放贷有我们党妈在卖国,这轮牛市倒不了
FBC miss了The New iPhone is here
花街又来玩一哭二闹三上吊ZT Bullish or Bearish?
相关话题的讨论汇总
话题: china话题: country话题: currency话题: banks话题: reserves
进入Stock版参与讨论
1 (共1页)
k********8
发帖数: 7948
1
http://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonchang/2012/08/12/china-is-run
China Is Running Out Of Money
Gordon G. Chang Contributor
Image credit: AFP/Getty Images via @daylife
Last week’s release of disappointing economic and trade data for July has,
predictably, renewed calls for additional stimulus. In May, Beijing ramped
up its support for the economy, and observers had expected activity to pick
up by last month.
Why has the economy so far failed to respond? There are various reasons,
but perhaps the most important is that the country is running out of money
for stimulus.
At first glance, that proposition seems preposterous. After all, the People
’s Bank of China, the central bank, held $3.24 trillion of foreign currency
reserves at the end of the first half of this year. Yet foreign currency,
no matter how plentiful, has limited usefulness in a local currency crisis.
In any event, the PBOC’s foreign currency holdings are almost evenly
matched with renminbi-denominated liabilities that were incurred to acquire
all those dollars, pounds, euros, and yen. As a result, the central bank
cannot use the reserves without driving itself deep—actually, deeper—into
insolvency.
The recent slight decline in the value of the renminbi versus the dollar has
decreased the amount of the PBOC’s liabilities in relations to its assets
and has therefore marginally strengthened its balance sheet, but the central
bank still does not have the flexibility to use its reserves as it pleases.
Therefore, a massive foreign currency injection into the economy, even if
it would work, is not in the cards.
Nonetheless, the central bank could, as it did beginning in 2003, inject a
limited amount of reserves into the country’s state banks to permit them to
lend more money. The last stimulus program, announced at the end of 2008,
created growth primarily because the state banks, at Beijing’s direction,
embarked on an extraordinary lending spree. In 2009, for instance, new
local currency lending reached a record 9.59 trillion yuan, just about
double that of 2008. The loan-a-thon continued in 2010 and 2011 as the
economy got hooked on easy credit.
The lending spree has ended, however. The state banks cannot fund all the
hundreds of new projects—500 according to one count—that Beijing and local
governments have announced in recent months. Why? Many of the loans
central technocrats forced bankers to make since 2008 will never be repaid.
The China Banking Regulatory Commission claimed the banks’ nonperforming
loan ratio at the end of the first quarter was 0.9%, but even the regulator
expresses doubts about its own figure. And the rapid buildup of bad loans
since the end of 2008 will have consequences.
Banks, despite what the CBRC says, are burdened by questionable loans and
will have to scrounge for funding before they can make long-term commitments
for stimulus projects. Tsinghua University’s Patrick Chovanec reports
that this year banks have managed to make new loans but most of them have
been short-term. Moreover, he notes these financial institutions will have
problems soon as they will need their remaining liquidity to refinance
wealth management and property trust products coming due. In short, they
will scramble just to find the cash for existing commitments. Funds for new
projects—the ones that represent growth—will be scarce. In July, not
surprisingly, new renminbi lending fell, dropping below all estimates to 540
.1 billion yuan from 919.8 billion in June.
In any event, economists believe infrastructure—stimulus—spending will
only make up for declining demand from private businesses. As the Wall
Street Journal’s Tom Orlik reports, such spending is not expected to
stimulate growth.
Despite everything, some cities are getting funding for new projects, but
that’s only because the CBRC has essentially ordered the banks to shovel
funds to the uncreditworthy local government financing vehicles. Just
months ago, Chovanec notes, these borrowers were on the “do-not-lend list.
” Yet many localities, even after the lending taps were opened, are still
cash-strapped.
So how bad is the situation? Anne Stevenson-Yang of J Capital Research
reports that the tax bureau of one of China’s largest cities “has no money
.” Its officials, incredibly, have been told to collect their own salaries
from taxpayers directly. The breakdown of government in that city is also
evident across the country, where localities are now desperate for revenue.
Taizhou, in prosperous Jiangsu province, has imposed an illegal 5% tax on
rentals and has sent collectors door-to-door to demand the levy. Changning
in Hunan has cancelled vacation and one day each weekend for tax collectors.
Fifteen cities and counties in Hainan, the island province, have collected
only 17% of the budgeted land sale revenue.
Hangzhou’s tax revenues are down 2.7% this year. This figure does not
include revenue from land sales, down more than 50% in the first six months.
Xiangtan in Hunan has missed salary payments to teachers and not made
pension contributions. It is rumored that Wuxi could not pay salaries in
May and that Ordos, the infamous ghost city, had to borrow from a state coal
company to meet operating expenses.
And Shenyang, the capital of Liaoning province, has become predatory,
increasing the collection of non-tax fees by 57% this year. Last week,
thousands of stores and restaurants closed for three days as owners heard
that “rapacious” officials planned to knock on doors to impose “fat fines
” to finance China’s National Games, which will be held in the city next
year. Shenyang officials quickly denied the plan, but owners, not wanting
to take chances, remained shuttered nonetheless.
When shops close to avoid predatory officials, we know China’s coffers are
almost empty. And to make matters worse, the country’s financial problems
will be harder to solve now that the country’s balance of payments has
turned negative. The net outflow in the second quarter of this year was the
first since 1998. The country’s reserves also dropped in Q2. We should
not be surprised: there was perhaps $110 billion of capital flight during
that period, and the gusher outflow looks like it continued in June.
Chinese citizens are losing confidence fast.
No developing country has ever escaped a major financial crisis. The People
’s Republic of China is about to have its first one now. The country, from
the great cities on the coast to tiny hamlets in the mountains, is short of
cash.
Follow me on Twitter @GordonGChang
m********o
发帖数: 2088
2
Gordon G. Chang is a just China basher. No credit.
1 (共1页)
进入Stock版参与讨论
相关主题
ZT Bullish or Bearish?通胀是纸币泛滥债务无穷的一个必须?
China can avoid becoming Japan ZTZT 中国要求商业银行收敛放贷
Holy: look at WSJ Money Flow, data error?FBC miss了
请问大牛们怎么买人民币呀?花街又来玩一哭二闹三上吊
华尔街日报无情嘲弄中国借钱给别人上瘾 (转载)So ECB lends 250 billion to IMF
FED Raise Fed Discount Rate!!靠, 真的玩负利率了
Gold price is beyond imagination这种美元,oil, 黄金,白银同时涨意味着什么?
Fraction ... Er ... Fictional Reserve Banking (zz)这个市场predatory trading肯定是盛行。MM忒损。
相关话题的讨论汇总
话题: china话题: country话题: currency话题: banks话题: reserves