t******o
发帖数: 61 | 1 2007 ................................................... 11.0 5.5 5.5
2008 ................................................... (9.6) (37.0) 27.4
2009 ................................................... 19.8 26.5 (6.7)
看最近三年的营收，最惨的经济危机一年已经过去了，甚至在过后的一年还有个巨大的
反弹，这种20%左右的收益，刚刚在2017年有过，不知道后面还会不会有。
Charlie and I avoid businesses whose futures we can’t evaluate, no matter
how exciting their
products may be. In the past, it required no brilliance for people to
foresee the fabulous growth
that awaited such industries as autos (in 1910), aircraft (in 1930) and
television sets (in 1950). But
the future then also included competitive dynamics that would decimate
almost all of the
companies entering those industries. Even the survivors tended to come away
bleeding.
查理和我不碰那些无法预计未来的业务，即便产品看起来再nb也不碰。
其实这就让他们远离了IT和互联网，因为这俩都是很难预计未来的，一个互联网公司，
融资三四轮后还无法盈利的比比皆是，即便是Amazon Tesla这种大热门公司，还是很难
知道未来如何，无法像沃尔玛那种未来营收一目了然。
我在想，这种选择企业的方法，让巴菲特投资更加谨慎，没有啥大风险，也不会有暴涨
。到底是好是坏呢？
We will never become dependent on the kindness of strangers. . Instead, we
will always arrange our affairs so that any requirements for cash we may
conceivably have will be dwarfed by our own liquidity.
永远不要指望陌生人的善举，尤其是当你需要现金时，只能靠你自己。陌生人不会雪中
送炭给你cash的。居安思危永远是投资始终保持的。
We tend to let our many subsidiaries operate on their own, without our
supervising and
monitoring them to any degree. T
“我们试图让旗下公司自己运营，避免来自我们的监督”。我就怀疑，真的是这样吗？
恐怕不是主动地，而是不这样根本就管理不过来。
We make no attempt to woo Wall Street. Investors who buy and sell based upon
media or analyst
commentary are not for us.
“我们不在乎华尔街那一套。尤其是靠着媒体或者分析师的评论买股票”。这让我想起
了马斯克回答分析师提问时那种回应，反而暗暗较好。那帮分析师懂个屁，就知道看营
收，没有长远眼光。一帮傻叉大忽悠。
When it’s raining gold, reach for a bucket, not a thimble.
当天上掉金币时，记得用桶，而不会小杯子。
这个是不是在说，看准了好机会，要有足够的现金去买？
We’ve put a lot of money to work during the chaos of the last two years. It
’s been an
ideal period for investors: A climate of fear is their best friend. Those
who invest only when commentators are
upbeat end up paying a heavy price for meaningless reassurance. In the end,
what counts in investing is what you
pay for a business – through the purchase of a small piece of it in the
stock market – and what that business earns
in the succeeding decade or two.
经济危机的那两年，巴菲特投资了很多。当人们在这种危机时代很害怕时，恰恰是你自
己的机会，毕竟那时候很多好企业股价被拉低。当问题是，作为一个人，很难在周围都
悲观时保持乐观，这个恰恰是非常非常反人性的。
Charlie and I believe that a CEO must not
delegate risk control. It’s simply too important. At Berkshire, I both
initiate and monitor every derivatives
contract on our books, with the exception of operations-related contracts at
a few of our subsidiaries, such as
MidAmerican, and the minor runoff contracts at General Re.
作为CEO，不应该让别人去作风控，而是应该亲自抓。巴菲特亲自过目了旗下每一个衍
生品合同。不过好在他们一共也没几个合同，因为都是数额很大的合同。我很好奇，如
果他们量化分析部门结果跟他自己的感觉不一致，怎么办？
In my view a board of directors of a huge financial institution is derelict
if it does not insist that its
CEO bear full responsibility for risk control. If he’s incapable of
handling that job, he should look for other
employment.
一个公司的董事会不该相信一个不亲自抓风控的ceo，那种ceo应该被开了。
这话尤其重要，看看现在大银行，哪一个不是风控部门老大直接汇报给ceo？如果不是
，离这公司远点。
I have been in dozens of board meetings in which acquisitions have been
deliberated, often with the
directors being instructed by high-priced investment bankers (are there any
other kind?). Invariably, the bankers
give the board a detailed assessment of the value of the company being
purchased, with emphasis on why it is
worth far more than its market price. In more than fifty years of board
memberships, however, never have I heard
the investment bankers (or management!) discuss the true value of what is
being given. When a deal involved the
issuance of the acquirer’s stock, they simply used market value to measure
the cost. They did this even though
they would have argued that the acquirer’s stock price was woefully
inadequate – absolutely no indicator of its
real value – had a takeover bid for the acquirer instead been the subject
up for discussion.
“我参加过无数的董事会，当他们决定收购某一家公司时，就被那帮投行牵着鼻子走，
用各种定价细节和模型来给被收购企业估价，估出来的价格远高于实际价格”。
其实投行就是吃这个饭的，作为一个中介机构，永远都是把自己的利益放在最高，即便
声称为客户着想。估价越高，拿的佣金就越高。
When stock is the currency being contemplated in an acquisition and when
directors are hearing from
an advisor, it appears to me that there is only one way to get a rational
and balanced discussion. Directors should
hire a second advisor to make the case against the proposed acquisition,
with its fee contingent on the deal not
going through. Absent this drastic remedy, our recommendation in respect to
the use of advisors remains: “Don’t
ask the barber whether you need a haircut.”
解决方案就是雇用另一个advisor，给董事会提交一份相反的报告，劝告董事会不要收
购那家企业。如果成功劝说不收购，才拿到佣金。这就引入了竞争机制，会避免很多过
高收购价格。问题在于，这是战术问题，战略上呢？为什么没人这么干？是不是到这么
干还是不想这么干？
现代企业，董事会成员并非为自己的持有企业着想。那么多人拥有该企业股份，就相当
于没有人拥有这企业。都是tmd的在其位不谋其政。
I can’t resist telling you a true story from long ago. We owned stock in a
large well-run bank that for
decades had been statutorily prevented from acquisitions. Eventually, the
law was changed and our bank
immediately began looking for possible purchases. Its managers – fine
people and able bankers – not
unexpectedly began to behave like teenage boys who had just discovered girls.
They soon focused on a much smaller bank, also well-run and having similar
financial characteristics
in such areas as return on equity, interest margin, loan quality, etc. Our
bank sold at a modest price (that’s why
we had bought into it), hovering near book value and possessing a very low
price/earnings ratio. Alongside,
though, the small-bank owner was being wooed by other large banks in the
state and was holding out for a price
close to three times book value. Moreover, he wanted stock, not cash.
Naturally, our fellows caved in and agreed to this value-destroying deal. “
We need to show that we are
in the hunt. Besides, it’s only a small deal,” they said, as if only major
harm to shareholders would have been a
legitimate reason for holding back. Charlie’s reaction at the time: “Are
we supposed to applaud because the dog
that fouls our lawn is a Chihuahua rather than a Saint Bernard?”
17
The seller of the smaller bank – no fool – then delivered one final demand
in his negotiations. “After
the merger,” he in effect said, perhaps using words that were phrased more
diplomatically than these, “I’m going
to be a large shareholder of your bank, and it will represent a huge portion
of my net worth. You have to promise
me, therefore, that you’ll never again do a deal this dumb.”
“我不禁想起了一个真实事件。我们持有一家大型银行股份（我猜是wells fargo）。
这银行要收购一家小银行。由于那家小银行被多家同时竞买，身价暴涨。同时，投行还
在不断的忽悠买买买。最终还是以很高的价格收购了，远高于其实际价值。收购完成后
，由于是使用了该大银行的股份收购，因此被收购者的老板成了这家大银行的股东。他
跟董事会说：我已经是这家大银行的董事了，我大部分身家都在这里，我要警告你们，
以后不要再做如此愚蠢的收购！” | c*******v
发帖数: 2599 | 2 不要看老巴说什么。要看他hands on做什么。
这里只有一条：他自己在亲自动手看风控。
所以任何一个声称自己懂价值投资的人，
如果不会自己做风控。那多半就是骗子。
matter
【在 t******o 的大作中提到】
: 2007 ................................................... 11.0 5.5 5.5
: 2008 ................................................... (9.6) (37.0) 27.4
: 2009 ................................................... 19.8 26.5 (6.7)
: 看最近三年的营收，最惨的经济危机一年已经过去了，甚至在过后的一年还有个巨大的
: 反弹，这种20%左右的收益，刚刚在2017年有过，不知道后面还会不会有。
: Charlie and I avoid businesses whose futures we can’t evaluate, no matter
: how exciting their
: products may be. In the past, it required no brilliance for people to
: foresee the fabulous growth
: that awaited such industries as autos (in 1910), aircraft (in 1930) and
| F****s
发帖数: 3761 | 3 十年倒计时还剩九年半。
【在 c*******v 的大作中提到】
: 不要看老巴说什么。要看他hands on做什么。
: 这里只有一条：他自己在亲自动手看风控。
: 所以任何一个声称自己懂价值投资的人，
: 如果不会自己做风控。那多半就是骗子。
:
: matter
|
|
