m****a
发帖数: 2593 | 1 https://seekingalpha.com/article/4264912-tesla-pivots-oblivion
客观详尽
Summary
The stock is a trade vehicle.
Financial metrics remain perilous.
Operating efficiencies lag necessities.
The company pivots toward Lyft and Uber.
Introduction
When the numbers speak, do not interrupt.
1. Stock
2. Finance
3. Market
4. Sales
5. Pivots | a****o
发帖数: 6612 | 2 Model 3卖得不够好。没有补贴的话，电池车的电费也不便宜。
自动驾驶出租就是个笑话。先不说level 5自动驾驶不知道什么时候才会商业化，就算
商业化了，自动驾驶出租服务也未必能赢利。 | o****p
发帖数: 9785 | 3 买了电车没有免费充电的话家里就必须装太阳能板，不然就是傻逼了。
【在 a****o 的大作中提到】
: Model 3卖得不够好。没有补贴的话，电池车的电费也不便宜。
: 自动驾驶出租就是个笑话。先不说level 5自动驾驶不知道什么时候才会商业化，就算
: 商业化了，自动驾驶出租服务也未必能赢利。
| m****a
发帖数: 2593 | 4 tesla筹钱的真相
==============================
I (Glenn) love going to the movies. And even though I know it’s not good
for me, nothing is better than getting a big bucket of popcorn and a medium
Diet Coke. But the prices never seem to stop going up – it’s now $14!
Yesterday, while waiting in line for the Avengers movie, I saw that the
theater was offering a combo pack – a large bucket of popcorn (worth $8)
and a large soda (worth $8) for just $12. But then I had an idea: What if I
sold half of my Diet Coke to the next person in line? The medium soda, half
the size of the large, cost $6. So to make it worth his while, I could sell
it to him for $3.
This would be a good deal for both of us. I would be left with my bucket of
popcorn (worth $8) and a medium soda (worth $6) and would pay just $9 for it
after my side transaction. And the guy behind me would get a medium soda
for half the price. Only the theater would lose outâ#166; It should
have received $14 from me and $6 from my new friend but would ultimately get
just $12.
Why am I telling you this story?
Because a similar set of transactions played out with Tesla last week when
the company sold $1.6 billion of convertible bonds and $750 million in stock.
A convertible bond pays an interest rate (in this case, 2%) and can be
exchanged for a fixed number of shares if the stock rises (in this case, if
the stock rises to $309.83 from the issuance price of $243). Convertible
bond buyers appear to get a good deal – in the downside scenario, they’re
senior to shareholders and receive interest and principal upon maturity (
albeit at a lower interest rate than traditional debt). And if the stock
soars, they can convert their bonds to shares and benefit from the gains
above the conversion price.
But as with seemingly everything associated with Tesla, things are not what
they seem. While bulls cheered what seemed to be a successful offering, I
actually think this financing revealed what a desperate situation Tesla is
in. Let me explain.
Using the analogy above, Tesla is the movie theater. It sold the combo pack
(convertible bonds and stock) to underwriters (me), who sold all of the
popcorn (the convertible bonds) and some of the soda (stock) to the guy
behind me in line (investors).
But here’s the kicker: The underwriters sold half of the soda (stock) back
to Tesla for more than Tesla originally sold it. The convertible bond buyers
did well. The stock buyers did, too. Only the movie theater (Tesla) lost
out on the deal.
In reality, it’s more complicated than that, and the math is tricky. But
the bottom line is simple: The underwriters and investors made money at
Tesla’s expense.
So why did Tesla do it? Because it desperately needed the cash and had no
other way to raise it – other than issuing super-expensive capital.
Let’s take a closer look at the transaction using the numbers from the
prospectus. The company issued $750 million in stock (approximately 3
million shares at a price per share of $243). It also issued $1.6 billion of
convertible notes with a 2% interest rate. The note holders can convert the
notes into stock at a share price of $309.83, ultimately representing 5.2
million shares.
But here’s the key: Along with the offering, Tesla paid $413.8 million to
purchase a call option. The stated purpose was to offset the dilution the
company would incur if the convertible notes convert into stock.
Think of a convertible note as debt with an option to buy the stock. We can
segregate these components of value in the convertible bond. In this case,
if the value of the option is the $413.8 million, then the bond is worth
about $1.2 billion ($1.6 billion less the $413.8 million). With these
numbers, Tesla’s effective interest rate on the bond component is 8.5%. In
other words, Tesla in effect just issued an 8.5% bond.
Why would Tesla go through so much trouble (and pay the banks such high fees
) instead of just issuing an 8.5% bond? Simple: Few investors want to buy
huge amounts of debt in a risky, money-losing company like Tesla.
The convertible bondholders have no such risk because they have (or will
soon have) shorted the stock against their convertible bond. If the company
sinks, they’ll make money on the short position. And if it succeeds, they’
ll make money on their convertible bond. It’s a risk-free 8.5% return for
them.
But Tesla bought the $413.8 million hedge from the underwriters – the
people who repackaged the stock that was purchased in the offering. Yes, the
same stock that Tesla sold in its equity deal was repackaged as a call
option that Tesla bought, in effect, a round trip for that stock.
For dealers to create the hedge for Tesla to buy, they need approximately
one-third of the shares (1.73 million) underlying the convertible bond. Let
that sink in – 1.73 million shares out of the 3 million issued – more than
half of the entire stock offering – were required to repackage a security
to sell back to Tesla! This underscores what a difficult time Tesla had
finding investors.
The rest of the transaction falls into place from there. There wasn’t much
stock left to sell, so the underwriters went to existing shareholders and
convinced them that this transaction would give the company some breathing
room. That’s good for the stock, and existing shareholders are already
believers.
As for the convertible, that’s easy to place as long as it’s possible to
short the underlying stock. And of course, the underwriters are happy, they
make $30 million in underwriting fees and only they know how much Tesla
overpaid for the hedging transactions. While I don’t know the exact amount
the company overpaid, keep in mind the negotiations were between a first-
deal, novice 34-year-old CFO and veteran dealmakers at Goldman Sachs (GS).
In addition to the structure of the deal, one important element of this
issuance really troubles me: In the prospectus, the company calls itself a
manufacturer of cars and solar-energy systems.
However, if you listened to the single sales call for the deal, which was
only open to large, well-connected funds, Musk stated that the manufacturing
of cars and solar-energy systems is simply a “backstop to value” and that
Tesla’s path to a $500 billion market cap is via autonomous driving and
robotaxis. This concept is nowhere to be found in Tesla’s publicly filed
selling document. This is a blatant violation of U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) rules to selectively share highly material
information.
In light of this, why isn’t the SEC blocking the sale of these securities?
Because Tesla did a transaction that the SEC doesn’t review!
In my many decades on Wall Street, I have never once seen a company present
one business plan in their regulatory filings while privately pitching an
entirely different one to select investors. This behavior is outrageous, and
we’ll see if Tesla’s acquisition of Maxwell Technologies gets new
scrutiny in light of this brazen sidestepping of regulations.
Once you understand the details of this financing, it becomes clear that
Tesla was truly desperate. While the structure was clever and allowed the
company to raise much-needed cash, it paid a very high price.
The cash gives the company a few more quarters to try to turn things around,
but given the abysmal first quarter and downward trends, I wouldn’t want
to own this stock. Despite the ever-changing narratives, Tesla has never had
a profitable year. I’m willing to bet they never will.
Thanks for your contribution, Glenn!
Best regards,
Whitney | m****a
发帖数: 2593 | 5 Pat Henschel
Comments399 | + Follow
dolson - I think it is likely EV's will replace ICE's in the distant future.
Currently, however, excellent electric motors are plagued by Li-Ion
batteries that have very low energy density (2.1 MJ/L compared to gas, 36 MJ
/L). That is why it takes 3,000 lbs. of batteries to equal 70 lbs of gas.
Moreover, batteries operate within a narrow range of conditions. That is why
Tesla's cannot charge below 32F and must use a climate control system to
keep the battery within accepted parameters. On cold winter mornings, an
unplugged, cold soaked Tesla must use whatever energy it has remaining to
heat its own battery. Until that happens, regen and charging do not work.
Nor can the car operate normally with full power.
All of this means that Tesla's are less convenient than ICE's. If one cannot
plug it in and shelter it from the cold there will be problems. In the city
, Tesla's are fine ... as all purpose, mainstream, affordable cars, they
fall short.
Most average Americans require all purpose affordable cars to help them live
their lives. Winter or summer, commuting or long distance. No BEV can
currently match the overall capability of an ICE. If one lives in Great
Falls Montana or one of 1,000's of cities like it, a BEV is out of the
question unless one is rich and buys it as a novelty.
Until EV's can match the overall capability of ICE's, a meaningful
transition cannot occur. Thus far, they do not. Sadly, someone in a beat up
old Toyota Tercel could challenge the owner of a new P100 to a race from
Denver to North Platte Nebraska (Sante Fe rail hub). The Tesla will require
far more time or perhaps a day to make this trip. The Toyota owner will turn
the key and drive straightaway making North Platte in six hours. This is an
unfortunate fail for a $110K luxury car. Those who stay in the city will
appreciate their BEV. Those who enjoy frequent and carefree long distance
driving are far better off buying an ICE.
Until all of this turns around, BEV's will remain niche cars for those with
specific circumstances.
【在 a****o 的大作中提到】
: Model 3卖得不够好。没有补贴的话，电池车的电费也不便宜。
: 自动驾驶出租就是个笑话。先不说level 5自动驾驶不知道什么时候才会商业化，就算
: 商业化了，自动驾驶出租服务也未必能赢利。
| m****a
发帖数: 2593 | 6 作者：leelight
链接：https://www.zhihu.com/question/276208762/answer/531006991
来源：知乎
著作权归作者所有。商业转载请联系作者获得授权，非商业转载请注明出处。
某OEM测试：我们公司产品发布前，一定会通过2xxx标准非常严格的一系列测试。请问T
有什么流程确保行车的安全性？
T笑问：2xxx标准是什么？
某OEM测试：瞬间石化
某Supplier电池研发：德国这边任何一个汽车部件在发布或升级前，必须通过某种标准
的严格测试，所有测试经手人必须签名留文档。我们部门是六个人，如果真出了大问题
，这六人都可能都会牵涉法律控诉。有次产品release后第二天早上，一下收到几百份
警告邮件，还直接上司被喊去参加紧急会议质问原因。因为一辆Audi出了事故，初步调
查原因是因为这个新的release。我当时就蒙了，不会真去坐牢吧。还好是虚惊一场，
后来查清是其它原因。
T：德国这么严格啊？！我们这里软件研发没有任何文档，什么记录都没有，无据可查
。所有工程师都在全力工作，我们根本没有时间去写文档。有时拿回来的某些标准文档
，几十页看下来都不知道到底讲什么，我就去找头抱怨，明明几行就能说清的问题。
我：这里软件开发必须文档化，任何步骤都需要有记录。
T：我们不允许留下任何今后可能会被控诉的文字文档。有一次我在中国试驾我们的车
，发现了不少问题，我就给管理层发了个email，抱怨了一句：It's dangerous. 结果
我飞回去一到公司就被管理层拉去开会，所有人被告知，这种话决不允许出现在email
或其它有据可查的文档里！
某Supplier电池研发：我做一点补充。Tesla每一个车型，我们都会拿来拆了研究，同
事拆完做测试后都会骂，这些部件根本不达标啊，怎么能上路的！后来我想通了，
Tesla对车的定义不一样。我们做研发，往往95%的目标很容易达到，但如果我们想精进
一点，达到98%，99%，那将要投入巨大精力和金钱，还有非常多的时间。Tesla怎么做
的？他的目标就是达到95%!!! 比如我们做一个歀电池，标准就是任何一个电池单元绝
对不能起火。但是Tesla在十年前申请了一个专利，当电池有一个单元起火时，这个专
利可以延迟它关联电池单元的起火时间，这将为司机空出40秒的时间逃到车外。Tesla
定的标准就是司机有40秒逃生时间，德国企业是不可能做出这样的标准的！ | Y****r
发帖数: 3473 | 7 bond holder 的conversion price 是 309， 他们不会 200 多 去short Tesla的
那个 413 million 的hedge 更是 ridiculous 如果是真的 只能说 tesla 对自己的
future 太有信心了 | a****o
发帖数: 6612 | 8 413 million hedge 是公开可查的。tesla 的convertible 一直这么做的。
: bond holder 的conversion price 是 309， 他们不会 200 多 去short Tesla的
: 那个 413 million 的hedge 更是 ridiculous 如果是真的 只能说 tesla 对自
己的
: future 太有信心了
【在 Y****r 的大作中提到】
: bond holder 的conversion price 是 309， 他们不会 200 多 去short Tesla的
: 那个 413 million 的hedge 更是 ridiculous 如果是真的 只能说 tesla 对自己的
: future 太有信心了
|
|
|
