h****8
发帖数: 72 | 1 https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/dalio-next-logical-steps-dangerous-
journey-war-1935-45-analog
主要观点是
1. 局势的发展向战争靠拢，就像上个世纪三十年代
2. 美国很可能挑起更多的战争对抗，处贸易战外， 下面是资本战，技术战，和地缘政
治战。 比照二战前，美国可能对中国挑起石油禁运和没收资产， 这个以前不会想到的
现在大家都在底下开始盘算了，对美国可能并不是好事。
3. 中国按自己的经典战略行事，悄悄地取得战略优势，相比之下，中国的赢面更大，
应为中国改变基本面的速度比美国快。
Regarding that classic dangerous journey, you have heard me describe it many
times but, at the risk of boring you, I will repeat it. I believe that we
are on a classic journey that we haven’t seen in our lifetimes but has
happened many times before, most recently in the late 1930s.
It is being driven by the same big forces that drove the dynamics in the
late 1930s. In particular, now, like in the late 1930s and unlike any period
since, these three big forces are converging.
They are:
The largest wealth and political gaps since the late 1930s exist, which is
leading to the emergence of and conflicts between populists of the left and
populists of the right. If history and logic are to be our guides, it seems
reasonable to worry that the gaps between the rich and the poor and the
populists of the left and the populists of the right will become more war-
like and that the consequences of their fighting could undermine the
efficient operation of the economy as well as the efficient running of
government. History has shown, logic suggests, and what seems to be
happening is that the greater conflict leads to a) the reduced respect for
both law and the art of compromise by our political leaders, and b) the
increased testing of relative powers and the increased use of “emergency
powers” to gain and use more power than these acts were intended for. It is
likely that the upcoming US elections will be the greatest ideological
clash that we have seen in our lifetimes, approaching the extreme fascist-
communist clashes of the 1930s. It is likely that after the election there
will be many more conflicts, tax law changes, and wealth redistributions
that will have big implications for markets and economies.
There is limited ability of the world’s reserve currency central banks to
stimulate the economy in the event of an economic downturn. When I imagine
what the next economic downturn will be like with the social and political
polarity that now exists, I expect it will be socially and politically ugly
and that some form of “Monetary Policy 3” (see this May 2019 article) will
have to happen or the economic depression won’t be rectified. To implement
MP3-type monetary policy will require very large fiscal spending and large
budget deficits that will have to be funded by a) substantially increased
taxes on companies and the rich, and b) the printing of money by central
banks and the buying of the debts that are coming from the deficits.
Typically, this has led to capital flight as investors seek to escape these
things, which has quite often led to capital controls that are intended to
keep capital in the country and the currency so that it can more easily be
taxed and/or devalued. So, naturally, I can’t help but wonder whether this
extraordinary (i.e., nothing like this has happened in my lifetime)
deviation from convention to restrict capital flows to China could be
followed by these other steps when/if the circumstances that I’m describing
unfold.
There is a rising power (China) challenging the existing world power (the US
), which will probably lead to more conflicts between them about many
different issues. History has shown that this situation has led to the
increased risk of wars that typically come in four forms: trade wars,
capital wars, technology wars, and geopolitical wars. As far as the trade
wars go, you can see them for yourself (so I won’t delve into them) and
probably have yourself drawn comparisons with the Smoot-Hawley Tariffs in
1930 and with various tariffs in several countries during the 1930s.
Regarding the capital and currency wars, the ability of the US president to
unilaterally cut off capital flows to China and also freeze payments on the
debts owed to China and also use sanctions to inhibit non-American financial
transactions with China must be considered as possibilities. That’s why
the proposed step of limiting American portfolio investments in China makes
me both think about the implications of this step and wonder if it is an
inching toward bigger moves.
For perspective about what can be done and how it would be done, one can
look at the US freezing of Japanese assets and embargoing of oil to Japan in
the late 1930s to early ‘40s; they show how the use of special emergency
powers gives the president the ability to do these things. Emergency powers
today are most accessible to the president under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA). It empowers the president to
unilaterally impose capital and FX controls, freeze assets and/or payments
on assets (coupons), and force asset divestures to “deal with any unusual
and extraordinary threat” from outside the US to “the national security…
economy of the United States.” Just the realization that these moves can be
used has important implications for capital flows. For example, how would
you feel if you were an adversarial foreign investor holding US bonds given
this situation, given where US bond interest rates are and the impending
deficits and monetizations of them? Of course, China dumping US bonds would
have its own terrible consequences too. In any case, from not having to
worry about such things in the past, now all market participants need to
worry about them.
Regarding the technology war, we have seen the tip of the spear with Huawei,
and we (Bridgewater) have given you an extensive look at the moves we can
imagine could be done by both sides, so I won’t embellish more on them. As
far as the geopolitical war is concerned, it’s a war of influence that is
being fought in the classic Chinese way of quietly gaining strength and
showing that strength to one’s opponent so that they realize that it is
better to retreat than to fight. That is certainly happening in Asia and, to
a lesser extent, in other parts of the world.
Countries are increasingly having to choose whether they are aligned with
the US or China. When presented with this choice, they typically answer it
based on both economic and military calculations. Almost without exception,
they say that the economics favors being aligned with China because China is
more important to them economically (because China is bigger in trade and
bigger in capital inflows) and that the military support favors the US if
the US is willing to use it to support them, which is highly doubtful.
At the same time, China’s own military capabilities (including cyber) are
rising relative to the US’s, especially in Asia. As a result, China is for
the most part quietly winning the geopolitical war, particular in Asia. As
for what is likely to happen next, the big thing is the 2020 elections
because that will determine who the players are; until then, actions and
agreements are more for theater to play to the crowd than the real deal.
After the elections, the real picture will emerge. Longer term, barring any
big shocks, time is on China’s side as it is improving at a faster rate
than the US, and the big question is whether the world will:
a) peacefully evolve toward two different spheres of influence, with China
the dominant force in the East and the US the dominant force in West, or
b) have more painful wars of their various types.
Under each of these three broad categories of influences, I have imagined a
detailed sequence of events for how these dynamics will progress, based on
how sequences of events have classically played out in the past and how it
is logical they will play out nowadays. I do this so I can compare how
events transpire relative to expectations. If they’re largely the same, I
assume the sequence will continue as imagined, and if they’re different, I
abandon my theory and recalibrate.
To me, last week’s developments seemed like the most recent logical steps
in this classic dangerous journey that is analogous with that which occurred
in the 1935-45 period.
Four Appendices
What follows are four appendices.
Appendix 1 provides a more detailed account of what actually happened, what
can happen, and how it can happen pertaining to threats to curtail capital
flows to China.
Appendix 2 recounts the path to war in the late 1930s via excerpts from my
book “Principles for Navigating Big Debt Crises” (available in pdf form
here for free).
Appendix 3 recounts various times monetary policies didn’t work because
there was “pushing on a string” and provides the various Monetary Policy 3
-type fiscal/monetary coordinations that occurred in the past.
Appendix 4 provides the legal basis for capital controls and capturing the
assets of foreign entities.
Appendix 1: A More Precise Account of What Happened, Why, and What Is Likely
to Happen
To be precise, two narrow measures are being examined by the administration.
The first narrow step under consideration by the White House is whether to
support/push for Senator Marco Rubio’s Equitable Act legislation. The
Equitable Act outlines a process for the delisting of a Chinese firm from US
stock exchanges if it doesn’t fully comply with US accounting and
oversight regulations, e.g., audit requirements. Senator Rubio notes that
China’s government has long been reluctant to allow overseas regulators to
inspect local accounting firms—including member firms of the Big Four
international accounting networks—citing national security concerns, and
that a 2013 agreement allowing US regulators to request audit working papers
in China has not been effectively implemented. Resultantly, in December
2018, the SEC and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)
flagged the difficulties US regulators faced in inspecting the audit work
and practices of auditing firms in China that examine US-listed Chinese
companies.
The second narrow measure under discussion is a potential ban (or
restriction) precluding the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board from
including the MSCI All Country World ex-US Index in the ~$50 billion Federal
Employees Retirement Fund (FERF, the government’s main retirement savings
fund) in 2020. Senator Rubio and other members of Congress who support such
a ban argue that retirement assets of federal government employees,
including members of the US Armed Forces, will be exposed to “severe and
undisclosed material risks” associated with many of the Chinese companies
listed on this MSCI index.
Why Are These Things Happening?
The motivations and objectives driving these discussions appear varied: from
wanting to enforce US accounting and oversight regulations in order to
engender reciprocity (Senator Rubio’s Equitable Act bill), to curtailing
access to US capital by certain Chinese firms implicated by national
security concerns (restricting FERF’s planned MSCI offering), and
ultimately to decoupling US and China capital markets so as to undermine
China’s rise. There are officials (Peter Navarro) who seek to limit China’
s access to US capital, as they think such access strengthens the Communist
Party in China—an economic rival and rising geostrategic competitor with
different values antithetical from the US/West. Recently, Steve Bannon
characterized the goal this way: “The Frankenstein monster that we have to
destroy is created by the West. It’s created by our capital.” There are
other officials trying to circumscribe these measures and keep them
separated from trade negotiations so as not to inflame tensions, sink
markets, and weaken the real economy. Some officials, on the other hand,
reportedly see these measures as giving the US increased leverage in the
trade negotiations with China at a critical juncture. All these US officials
appear to share concerns about US capital enabling Chinese firms when the
lines of demarcation between state-owned and private firms are further
eroding. They are concerned with the unusual influence the Chinese
government has over private firms, including placing restrictions on the
release of financial information of Chinese firms. And, importantly, they
want to counter industrial policies such as President Xi’s new “military-
civil fusion” directed at enhancing cooperation between China’s technology
firms and the military and Made in China 2025.
These discussions, in turn, are taking place days before Vice Premier Liu He
’s expected visit to Washington for high stakes talks on October 10-11.
These talks importantly will play out in the shadow of scheduled US tariff
increases, a potential Xi-Trump meeting, and the pending expiration of
Huawei licenses. In particular, i) on October 15 tariffs are scheduled to
increase to 30% from 25% on $200 billion in imports from China; ii) there is
a scheduled meeting on November 16-17 between Xi and Trump at the APEC
Summit; iii) on November 19 Huawei’s general temporary license is due to
expire, and iv) on December 15 tariffs are scheduled to be imposed on $160
billion of the most politically sensitive Chinese imports (consumer products
of high value to US consumers with no readily available substitutes (~87%
sourced from China)).
Appendix 2: The 1930s Path to War (Excerpted from Part 2 of “Principles for
Navigating Big Debt Crises,” Which Was about the 1930 - 1941 Period)
While the purpose of this chapter has been to examine the debt and economic
circumstances in the United States during the 1930s, the linkages between
economic conditions and political conditions, both within the United States
and between the United States and other countries—most importantly Germany
and Japan—cannot be ignored because economics and geopolitics were very
intertwined at the time. Most importantly, Germany and Japan had internal
conflicts between the haves (the Right) and the have-nots (the Left), which
led to more populist, autocratic, nationalistic, and militaristic leaders
who were given special autocratic powers by their democracies to bring order
to their badly managed economies. They also faced external economic and
military conflicts arising as these countries became rival economic and
military powers to existing world powers.
To help to convey the picture in the 1930s, I will quickly run though the
geopolitical highlights of what happened from 1930 until the official start
of the war in Europe in 1939 and the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941. While
1939 and 1941 are known as the official start of the wars in Europe and the
Pacific, the wars really started about 10 years before that, as economic
conflicts that were at first limited progressively grew into World War II.
As Germany and Japan became more expansionist economic and military powers,
they increasingly competed with the UK, US, and France for both resources
and influence over territories. That eventually led to the war, which
culminated in it being clear which country (the United States) had the power
to dictate the new world order. This has led to a period of peace under
that world order and will continue until the same process happens again.
More precisely:
In 1930, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff began a trade war.
In 1931, Japan’s resources were inadequate, and its rural poverty became
severe, so it invaded Manchuria, China to obtain natural resources. The US
wanted to keep China free from Japanese control and was competing for
natural resources—especially oil, rubber, and tin—from Southeast Asia,
while at the same time Japan and the US had significant trade with each
other.
In 1931, the depression in Japan was so severe that it drove Japan off the
gold standard, leading to both the floating of the yen (which depreciated
greatly) and big fiscal and monetary expansions that led to Japan being the
first country to experience a recovery and strong growth (which lasted until
1937).
In 1932, there was a lot of internal conflict in Japan, which led to a
failed coup and a massive upsurge in right-wing nationalism and militarism.
During the period from 1931 to 1937, the military took over control of the
government and increased its top-down command of the economy.
In 1933, Hitler came to power in Germany as a populist promising to exercise
control over the bad economy, to bring order to the political chaos of the
democracy of the time, and to fight the communists. Within just two months
of being named chancellor, he was able to take total authoritarian control;
using the excuse of national security, he got the Reichstag to pass the
Enabling Act, which gave him virtually unlimited powers (in part by locking
up political opponents and also by convincing some moderates that it was
necessary). He promptly refused to make reparations payments, stepped out of
the League of Nations, and took control of the media. To create a strong
economy and attempt to bring prosperity to the people, he created a top-down
command economy. For instance, Hitler was involved with setting up
Volkswagen to build a more affordable car and directed the building of the
national German Autobahn (highway system). He believed that Germany’s
potential was limited by its geographic boundaries, that it didn’t have
adequate raw materials to feed the industrial military complex, and that
German people should be ethnically united.
At the same time, Japan became increasingly strong with its top-down command
economy, building a military-industrial complex, with the military intended
to protect its bases in East Asia and northern China and to expand its
controls over other territories.
Germany also got stronger by building its military-industrial complex and
looking to expand and claim adjacent lands.
In 1934, there was severe famine in parts of Japan, causing even more
political turbulence and reinforcing the right-wing, militaristic, and
nationalistic movement. Because the free market wasn’t working for the
people, that led to the strengthening of the command economy.
In 1936, Germany took back the Rhineland militarily, and in 1938, it annexed
Austria.
In 1936, Japan signed a pact with Germany.
In 1936–37, the Fed tightened, which caused the fragile economy to weaken,
and other major economies weakened with it.
In 1937, Japan’s occupation of China spread, and the second Sino-Japanese
War began. The Japanese took over Shanghai and Nanking, killing an estimated
200,000 Chinese civilians and disarmed combatants in the capture of Nanking
alone. The United States provided China’s Chiang Kai-shek government with
fighter planes and pilots to fight the Japanese, thus putting a toe in the
war.
In 1939, Germany invaded Poland, and World War II in Europe officially began.
In 1940, Germany captured Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium,
Luxembourg, and France.
During this time, most companies in Germany and Japan remained publicly
owned, but their production was controlled by their respective governments
in support of the war.
In 1940, Henry Stimson became the US Secretary of War. He increasingly used
aggressive economic sanctions against Japan, culminating in the Export
Control Act of July 2, 1940. In October, he ramped up the embargo,
restricting “all iron and steel to destinations other than Britain and
nations of the Western Hemisphere.”
Beginning in September 1940, to obtain more resources and take advantage of
the European preoccupation with the war on their continent, Japan invaded
several colonies in Southeast Asia, starting with French Indochina. In 1941,
Japan extended its reach by seizing oil reserves in the Dutch East Indies
to add the “Southern Resource Zone” to its “Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere.” The “Southern Resource Zone” was a collection of
mostly European colonies in Southeast Asia, whose conquest would afford
Japan access to key natural resources (most importantly oil, rubber, and
rice). The latter, the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” was a
bloc of Asian countries controlled by Japan, not (as they previously were)
the Western powers.
Japan then occupied a naval base near the Philippine capital, Manila. This
threatened an attack on the Philippines, which was at the time an American
protectorate.
In 1941, to aid the Allies without fully entering the war, the United States
began its Lend-Lease policy. Under this policy, the United States sent oil,
food, and weaponry to the Allied Nations for free. This aid totaled over $
650 billion in today’s dollars. The Lend-Lease policy, although not an
outright declaration of war, ended the United States’s neutrality.
In the summer of 1941, US President Roosevelt ordered the freezing of all
Japanese assets in the United States and embargoed all oil and gas exports
to Japan. Japan calculated that it would be out of oil in two years.
In December 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and British and Dutch colonies
in Asia. While it didn’t have a plan to win the war, it wanted to destroy
the Pacific Fleet that threatened Japan. Japan supposedly also believed that
the US would be weakened both by fighting a war in two fronts (Europe and
Asia) and by its political system; Japan thought that totalitarianism and
the command military industrial complex approaches of their country and
Germany were superior to the individualistic/capitalist approach of the
United States.
These events led to the “war economy” conditions, explained at the end of
Part 1.
Appendix 3: Past Needs for and Ways of Executing Monetary Policy 3
Monetary Policy 3 puts money more directly into the hands of spenders
instead of investors/savers and incentivizes them to spend it. Because
wealthy people have fewer incentives to spend the incremental money and
credit they get compared to less wealthy people, when the wealth gap is
large and the economy is weak, directing spending opportunities at less
wealthy people is more productive. Logic and history show us that there is a
continuum of actions to stimulate spending that have varying degrees of
control to them. At one end are coordinated fiscal and monetary actions, in
which fiscal policy makers provide stimulus directly through government
spending or indirectly by providing incentives for nongovernment entities to
spend. At the other end, the central bank can provide “helicopter money”
by sending cash directly to citizens without coordination with fiscal policy
makers. Typically, though not always, there is a coordination of monetary
policy and fiscal policy in a way that creates incentives for people to
spend on goods and services. Central banks can also exert influence through
macroprudential policies that help to shape things in ways that are similar
to how fiscal policies might. For simplicity, I have organized that
continuum and provided references to specific prior cases of each below.
Fiscal/Monetary Coordination can take three basic forms:
Increase in debt-financed fiscal spending, paired with QE that buys most of
the new issuance (e.g., Japan in the 1930s, US during WWII, US and UK in the
2000s).
Increase in debt-financed fiscal spending, where the Treasury isn’t on the
hook for the debt, because:
a) The spending is paired with QE where the central bank retires the debt or
commits to rolling the debt forever,
b) The central bank promises to print money to cover debt payments (e.g.,
Germany in the 1930s), or
c) Where the central bank directly lends to entities other than the
government that will use it for stimulus projects (e.g., lending to
development banks in China in 2008).
Directly giving newly printed money to the government to spend, not
bothering to go through issuing debt. Past cases have included printing fiat
currency (e.g., Imperial China, the American Revolution, the US Civil War,
Germany in the 1930s, UK during WWI) or debasing hard currency (Ancient Rome
, Imperial China, 16th-century England).
Printing money and doing direct cash transfers to households (i.e.,
helicopter money). When we refer to “helicopter money,” we mean directing
money into the hands of spenders of money to get them to spend (e.g., the US
veterans’ bonus during the Great Depression, Imperial China).
How that money is directed could take different forms—the basic variants
are a) to either direct the same amounts to everyone, or to aim for some
degree of helping one or more groups over others (e.g., to the poorer more
than to the rich), and b) to provide this money either as one-offs or over
time (perhaps as a universal basic income). These variants could be paired
with an incentive to spend it—like the money disappearing if not spent
within a year.
The money could be directed to specific investment accounts (like retirement
, education, or accounts earmarked for small business investments) to target
it toward socially desirable spending/investment.
One potential way to craft the policy is to distribute returns/holdings from
QE to households instead of to the government.
Big debt write-down accompanied by big money creation (the “year of Jubilee
”). (e.g., Ancient Rome, the Great Depression, Iceland).
While I won’t offer opinions on each of these, I will say that the most
effective approaches involve fiscal/monetary coordination, because that
ensures that both the providing and the spending of money will occur. If
central banks just give people money (helicopter money), that’s typically
less adequate than giving them that money with incentives to spend it.
However, sometimes it is difficult for those who set monetary policy to
coordinate with those who set fiscal policy, in which case other approaches
are used.
Also, keep in mind that sometimes the policies don’t fall exactly into
these categories, as they have elements of more than one of them. For
example, if the government gives a tax break, that’s probably not
helicopter money, but it depends on how it’s financed. The government can
also spend money directly without a loan financed by the central bank—that
is helicopter money through fiscal channels.
While central banks influence the costs and availabilities of credit for the
economy as whole, they also have powers to influence the costs and
availabilities of credit for targeted parts of the financial system through
their regulatory authorities. These policies, which are called
macroprudential policies, are especially important when it’s desirable to
differentiate entities—e.g., when it is desirable to restrict credit to an
overly indebted area while simultaneously stimulating the rest of the
economy, or when it’s desirable to provide credit to some targeted entities
but not provide it broadly. Macroprudential policies take numerous forms
that are valuable in different ways in all seven stages of the big debt
cycle. Because explaining them here would require too much of a digression,
they are explained in some depth in the appendix of my book “Principles for
Navigating Big Debt Crises.” If you want to dig deeper, please review that
appendix.
Appendix 4: The Legal Authorities of the President to Curtail Capital Flows
The president has broad, powerful, and mostly unilateral authority to
regulate commerce (trade and finance) with foreign countries, under the
executive’s emergency powers—codified in statute and reaffirmed by courts
(courts have shown great deference to the president’s judgment in matters
of foreign and national security). Key among them and one that President
Trump has tapped and will likely tap for any meaningful curtailment of
capital flows (e.g., foreign exchange controls) is the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1977. §1701 of IEEPA empowers the
president to declare a national emergency to “deal with any unusual and
extraordinary threat, which has its source…outside the United States, to
the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.”
IEEPA gives the president discretion to “investigate,” “block,” “
regulate,” “compel,” or “prohibit,” the “importation,” “transfer,”
or “acquisition” of “property in which any foreign country or a national
thereof has any interest.” §1702(a)(1)(B) of IEEPA empowers the president
to act with respect to any person “subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.”
In the 42 years since its enactment, presidents have declared 54 national
emergencies under IEEPA, 29 of which are ongoing. Presidents have tapped
IEEPA to restrict a wide range of international transactions while expanding
both the rationale for emergencies and targets of the restrictions, e.g.,
at first, targets were foreign governments, and later IEEPA was used to
target individuals and non-state actors (terror groups). History (judicial
precedent and congressional inaction) suggests that Trump could wield IEEPA
with great force/impact, e.g., delisting Chinese companies on US stock
exchanges, blocking all US-based transactions or freezing the US assets of
any foreign firm or person, imposing currency controls or restricting FX
purchases for certain or all foreign nationals, forcing divestment of US
assets, blocking SWIFT payments system for foreign firms, and prohibiting US
firms from outsourcing to China. President Trump cited IEEPA as the legal
authority enabling his “order” that American companies “immediately start
looking for an alternative to China.” Barring a successful court challenge
, the only check on Trump’s IEEPA authority is Congress, which has yet to
attempt to invalidate a national emergency. The political bar for
congressional action is high—under IEEPA, Congress can invalidate a state
of emergency via a joint resolution. The Supreme Court, however, has held
that a joint resolution will not suffice. Congress must pass legislation to
that effect, e.g., amend IEEPA to circumscribe the president’s emergency
powers. Trump could then veto the legislation. And overriding a veto
requires a two-thirds supermajority in both chambers.
Historical Precedent
There is much precedent for the president’s use of emergency powers before
IEEPA. Before IEEPA’s enactment in 1977, the president’s emergency powers
—enabling broad regulation of commerce (trade and financial)—were anchored
in the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) of 1917. It was enacted after the
US entered World War I. Section 5 of TWEA delegates to the president broad
wartime powers to regulate all forms of international commerce and financial
flows and to freeze or seize any foreign assets during a time of war. While
the 1917 Act required a declaration of war, it was subsequently amended in
1933 to allow the president to declare a national emergency during peacetime
. The declaration empowers the president with broad powers over both
domestic and international transactions (the amendment came about due to the
Great Depression, and President Roosevelt invoked Section 5(b) of the
amended TWEA to declare a national emergency and order a bank holiday).
Specifically, the 1933 amendment gave the president the authority to: “
investigate, regulate, or prohibit...by means of licenses or otherwise any
transactions in foreign exchange, transfers of credit between or payments by
banking institutions...and export, hoarding, melting, or earmarking of gold
or silver coin or bullion or currency by any person within the United
States or any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” For example, with
the objective of denying Germany access to Danish and Norwegian assets in
the US, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8389, based on the
authority vested in him by the TWEA Act as amended in 1933, to freeze all
financial transactions involving (and assets of) Danes and Norwegians. In
June 1941, President Roosevelt extended the freezing of assets to all of
continental Europe under Executive Order 8785, backstopped by the TWEA. | s**********o
发帖数: 14359 | | h****8
发帖数: 72 | 3
你神经病
【在 s**********o 的大作中提到】
: 战争贩子滚开，要死就死你全家
| s**********o
发帖数: 14359 | 4 两个GDP NO1 NO2的核国家搞热战，这是要毁灭地球吗？
谁是神经病，一目了然。
【在 h****8 的大作中提到】
:
: 你神经病
| x******h
发帖数: 13678 | 5
人家就说一种可能，结果有人就喜欢蹦蹦跳跳说别人神经病，真是大字报没写够的主啊
【在 h****8 的大作中提到】
:
: 你神经病
| s**********o
发帖数: 14359 | 6 看似阴茎据点，旁征博引，其实狗屁不通，时代变了，大家都有核武器，
你扔我一个，我扔你一个，地球就毁灭了，两个核国家搞武器战争的可能为零，
贸易战最多就是互不来往，贸易为零，不存在你打我一梭子，我扔你一个手雷
的情况。只有战争贩子鼓吹战争，想看笑话，不死他全家，死谁家？
"主要观点是
1. 局势的发展向战争靠拢，就像上个世纪三十年代
2. 美国很可能挑起更多的战争对抗
" | i********y
发帖数: 6 | 7 “美国之所以主导世界秩序，是因为在二战之后，他没有侵占任何一方的土地，他永远
是在为他倡导的普世价值观而战斗。”
美国别人不打就打法西斯打独裁者，法西斯被打了说美国坏，于是地球上80%的人口都
笑了。
“中共进攻了美国之后，根据《北大西洋公约》《太平洋安全保障条约》《美日安保条
约》《美韩共同防御条约》《美菲联防条约》等协定，相当于同时向美国、阿尔巴尼亚
、比利时、保加利亚、加拿大、克罗地亚、捷克、丹麦、爱沙尼亚、法国、德国、希腊
、匈牙利、冰岛、意大利、拉脱维亚、立陶宛、卢森堡、荷兰、挪威、波兰、葡萄牙、
罗马尼亚、斯洛伐克、斯洛文尼亚、西班牙、土耳其、英国以及日本、韩国、澳大利亚
、菲律宾等国家开战。” |
|
