B*******e
发帖数: 30 | 1 操他妈的
3月15-16的 会议记录 4月6号release 出来
再骗一笔
草泥马 傻逼fed res
3月16号 的 press release 就有了increase in the primary credit rate to 0.5
percent：
In a related action, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
voted
unanimously to approve a 1/4 percentage point increase in the primary credit
rate to 0.5 percent, effective March 17, 2022
MBS 有一点点不同：
3月16号
o Roll over at auction all principal payments from the Federal Reserve's
holdings of Treasury securities and reinvest all principal payments
from the Federal Reserve's holdings of agency debt and agency
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) in agency MBS.
o Allow modest deviations from stated amounts for reinvestments, if
needed for operational reasons.
o Engage in dollar roll and coupon swap transactions as necessary to
facilitate settlement of the Federal Reserve's agency MBS
transactions.”
这就是会议记录所有的屁话：
4月 6 号
In the United States, incoming economic data and Federal Reserve
communications led investors to expect a
more rapid removal of policy accommodation than they
had previously expected. Market participants almost
universally expected a 25 basis point increase in the target range for the
federal funds rate at the current meeting. Moreover, futures prices implied
that the federal
funds rate would increase around 170 basis points
through year-end, about 70 basis points more than had
been priced in at the time of the January meeting. Similarly, the median
projection of the target range for the
federal funds rate in the Open Market Desk’s most recent surveys of primary
dealers and market participants
showed an increase of 150 basis points this year. The
median projected path for the target range beyond 2022
rose another 100 basis points by the first half of 2024 to
a level modestly above the median projected longer-run
level before returning closer to the longer-run level in
2025. Consistent with shifting expectations for the path
of policy, shorter-dated Treasury yields rose notably
over the intermeeting period and the spread between the
10-year Treasury yield and 2-year Treasury yield narrowed.
Market participants expected an earlier and somewhat
faster reduction in System Open Market Account
(SOMA) holdings of securities than they did in January.
In the Desk surveys, almost 90 percent of respondents
projected balance sheet runoff to begin by July. Overall,
survey respondents expected a significant reduction in
the balance sheet over coming years, although there was
a high degree of uncertainty around the magnitude of the
total decline.
The manager turned next to a discussion of money markets and policy
implementation. Market participants expected the interest on reserve
balances rate and overnight reverse repurchase agreement (ON RRP) offering
rate to be increased by 25 basis points at the current
meeting, in line with their expected increase in the target
range, and anticipated that the changes would fully pass
through to market overnight interest rates. There was
uncertainty around how ON RRP usage might evolve in
the near term as money market rates increased. If banks
lifted their deposit rates by less than the increase in returns available on
alternative investments, depositors
could shift funds into these alternatives, leading to
downward pressure on rates and increased ON RRP
take-up. If instead deposit rates moved up in line with
net yields on alternative investments, ON RRP takeup
could remain relatively steady. Over the longer term,
however, ON RRP balances were expected to decline as
the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet runoff proceeded
and gradually lifted money market rates relative to the
ON RRP rate.
Turning to Desk operations, the manager noted that the
Desk would be maintaining the size of the SOMA portfolio through
reinvestments until the Committee directed otherwise. For Treasury
securities, the Desk
would follow the usual practice of rolling over all principal payments at
auctions. In the absence of regular secondary-market purchases of Treasury
securities, the
Desk planned to maintain operational readiness by conducting small-value
purchases and sales of Treasury securities. For agency mortgage-backed
securities (MBS),
the Desk planned to continue to reinvest principal payments on a monthly
basis through secondary-market
purchases. The manager discussed a plan to simplify administrative aspects
of the SOMA holdings of agency
MBS in coming months through a process of CUSIP
(Committee on Uniform Securities Identification Procedures) aggregation. The
Desk undertook similar programs of CUSIP aggregation following the
conclusion of
previous large-scale asset purchase programs; these past
CUSIP aggregation programs were successful at reducing the cost and
complexity of maintaining agency MBS
holdings.
Finally, the manager provided an update on the SRF.
The Desk had onboarded four depository institutions as
counterparties and noted that a number of additional
banks were currently under review. The Desk planned
to adjust the counterparty eligibility requirements in
____________________________________________________________________________
_________________ Minutes of the Meeting of March 15–16, 2022 Page 3
early April to make the SRF accessible to a broader range
of banks, in line with the Committee’s intention to expand eligibility over
time and with efforts to ensure that
Desk counterparty policies promote a fair and competitive marketplace.
By unanimous vote, the Committee ratified the Desk’s
domestic transactions over the intermeeting period. No
intervention operations occurred in foreign currencies
for the System’s account during the intermeeting period.
Plans for Reducing the Size of the Balance Sheet
Participants continued their discussion of topics related
to plans for reducing the size of the Federal Reserve’s
balance sheet in a manner consistent with the approach
described in the Principles for Reducing the Size of the
Federal Reserve’s Balance Sheet that the Committee released following its
January meeting.
The participants’ discussion was preceded by a staff
presentation that reviewed the Committee’s 2017–19 experience with balance
sheet reduction and presented a
range of possible options for reducing the Federal Reserve’s securities
holdings over time in a predictable
manner. All of the options featured a more rapid pace
of balance sheet runoff than in the 2017–19 episode.
The options differed primarily with respect to the size of
the monthly caps for securities redemptions in the
SOMA portfolio. The presentation addressed the potential implications of
each option for the path of the
balance sheet during and after runoff. The staff presentation also featured
alternative approaches the Committee could consider with respect to SOMA
holdings of
Treasury bills as well as alternative ways the Committee
could eventually slow and then stop balance sheet runoff
as the size of the SOMA portfolio approached levels
consistent with the Committee’s ample-reserves framework for policy
implementation.
In their discussion, all participants agreed that elevated
inflation and tight labor market conditions warranted
commencement of balance sheet runoff at a coming
meeting, with a faster pace of decline in securities holdings than over the
2017–19 period. Participants reaffirmed that the Federal Reserve’s
securities holdings
should be reduced over time in a predictable manner primarily by adjusting
the amounts reinvested of principal
payments received from securities held in the SOMA.
Principal payments received from securities held in the
SOMA would be reinvested to the extent they exceeded
monthly caps. Several participants remarked that they
would be comfortable with relatively high monthly caps
or no caps. Some other participants noted that monthly
caps for Treasury securities should take into consideration potential risks
to market functioning. Participants
generally agreed that monthly caps of about $60 billion
for Treasury securities and about $35 billion for agency
MBS would likely be appropriate. Participants also generally agreed that the
caps could be phased in over a period of three months or modestly longer if
market conditions warrant.
Participants discussed the approach toward implementing caps for Treasury
securities and the role that the Federal Reserve’s holdings of Treasury
bills might play in the
Committee’s plan to reduce the size of the balance sheet.
Most participants judged that it would be appropriate to
redeem coupon securities up to the cap amount each
month and to redeem Treasury bills in months when
Treasury coupon principal payments were below the
cap. Under this approach, redemption of Treasury bills
would typically bring the total amount of Treasury redemptions up to the
monthly cap. Several participants
remarked that reducing the Federal Reserve’s Treasury
bill holdings over time would be appropriate because
Treasury bills are highly valued as safe and liquid assets
by the private sector, and the Treasury could increase bill
issuance to the public as SOMA bill holdings decline. In
addition, participants generally noted that maintaining
large holdings of Treasury bills is not necessary under
the Federal Reserve’s ample-reserves operating framework; in the previous
scarce-reserves regime, Treasury
bill holdings were useful as a tool that could be used to
drain reserves from the banking system when necessary
to control short-term interest rates. A couple of participants commented
that holding some Treasury bills
could be appropriate if the Federal Reserve wished to
keep its Treasury portfolio neutral with respect to the
universe of outstanding Treasury securities.
With respect to the Federal Reserve’s agency MBS redemptions, participants
generally noted that MBS principal prepayments would likely run under the
proposed
monthly cap in a range of plausible interest rate scenarios but that the cap
could guard against outsized reductions in the Federal Reserve’s agency
MBS holdings in
scenarios with especially high prepayments. Some participants noted that
under the proposed approach to
running off Treasury and agency securities primarily
through adjustments to reinvestments, agency MBS
holdings would still make up a sizable share of the Federal Reserve’s asset
holdings for many years. Participants generally agreed that after balance
sheet runoff
was well under way, it will be appropriate to consider
sales of agency MBS to enable suitable progress toward
a longer-run SOMA portfolio composed primarily of
____________________________________________________________________________
_________________ Page 4 Federal Open Market Committee
Treasury securities. A Committee decision to implement
a program of agency MBS sales would be announced
well in advance.
Several participants noted the significant uncertainty
around the future level of reserves that would be consistent with the
Committee’s ample-reserves operating
framework. Against this backdrop, participants generally agreed that it
would be appropriate to first slow and
then stop the decline in the size of the balance sheet
when reserve balances were above the level the Committee judged to be
consistent with ample reserves, thereby
allowing reserves to decline more gradually as nonreserve liabilities
increased over time. Participants agreed
that lessons learned from the previous balance sheet reduction episode
should inform the Committee’s current
approach to reaching ample reserve levels and that close
monitoring of money market conditions and indicators
of near-ample reserves should help inform adjustments
to the pace of runoff. A couple of participants noted
that the establishment of the SRF, which did not exist in
the previous runoff episode, could address unexpected
money market pressures that might emerge if the Committee adopted an
approach to balance sheet reduction
in which reserves declined relatively rapidly, but several
others noted that the facility was not intended as a substitute for ample
reserves. Participants generally agreed
that it was important for the Committee to be prepared
to adjust any of the details of its approach to reducing
the size of the balance sheet in light of economic and
financial developments.
No decision regarding the Committee’s plan to reduce
the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet was made at this
meeting, but participants agreed they had made substantial progress on the
plan and that the Committee was
well placed to begin the process of reducing the size of
the balance sheet as early as after the conclusion of its
upcoming meeting in May.
Staff Review of the Economic Situation
The information available at the time of the March 15–
16 meeting suggested that U.S. real gross domestic product (GDP) was
increasing in the first quarter at a pace
that was slower than the rapid gain posted in the fourth
quarter of 2021. Labor market conditions improved further in January and
February, and indicators of labor
compensation continued to show robust increases.
Consumer price inflation through January—as measured
by the 12-month percentage change in the price index
for personal consumption expenditures (PCE)—remained elevated.
Total nonfarm payroll employment grew strongly in January and February. The
unemployment rate edged
down, on net, from 3.9 percent in December to 3.8 percent in February. The
unemployment rate for African
Americans and for Hispanics declined over this period;
however, both rates remained noticeably higher than the
national average. The labor force participation rate increased in February,
as did the employment-to-population ratio. The private-sector job openings
rate in January, as measured by the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey,
was little changed, on net, from its November level and remained well above
its pre-pandemic level;
the quits rate also remained elevated. Average hourly
earnings rose 5.1 percent over the 12 months ending in
February, about the same as its year-earlier pace, with
widespread increases across industries.
Consumer prices continued to rise rapidly. Total PCE
price inflation was 6.1 percent over the 12 months ending in January, and
core PCE price inflation, which excludes changes in consumer energy prices
and many
consumer food prices, was 5.2 percent over the same period. The trimmed mean
measure of 12-month PCE inflation constructed by the Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas was 3.5 percent in January, 1.8 percentage points
higher than its year-earlier rate of increase. In February,
the 12-month change in the consumer price index (CPI)
was 7.9 percent, while core CPI inflation was 6.4 percent
over the same period. The staff’s common inflation expectations index,
which combines information from
many indicators of inflation expectations and inflation
compensation, had largely leveled off over the fall and
was close to its 2014 average.
Real PCE appeared to be rising at a faster pace in the
first quarter of 2022 than in the fourth quarter of 2021
as social distancing unwound further. Housing demand
remained strong, though activity in the residential housing sector continued
to be restrained by shortages of
construction materials, buildable lots, and other inputs.
Available indicators suggested that growth in business
fixed investment was picking up in the first quarter as
growth in nonresidential structures investment turned
positive.
Available data suggested that motor vehicle production
declined sharply in February as ongoing shortages of
semiconductors and other supply chain problems continued to restrain output.
Outside of the motor vehicle
sector, manufacturing production appeared to have
moved up over January and February; however, this increase did not appear to
reflect a substantial reduction in
supply bottlenecks, as many indicators of the state of
____________________________________________________________________________
_________________ Minutes of the Meeting of March 15–16, 2022 Page 5
bottlenecks showed little sign of improvement over this
period. In particular, materials inputs such as electronic
components and aluminum remained in short supply,
while broad measures of industrial input prices remained
elevated. Separately, transportation and distribution activity continued to
be held back by port congestion and
a shortage of truck drivers.
Available indicators suggested that real government purchases were little
changed in the first quarter after declining in the fourth quarter of 2021.
Although real state
and local purchases appeared to be rising, federal defense purchases
appeared to be contracting further in the
first quarter.
The U.S. international trade deficit widened at the end
of last year to a record high and surpassed that high at
the beginning of this year. Imports of goods grew rapidly again in January,
led by increases in consumer goods,
while exports of goods fell back slightly from elevated
fourth-quarter levels. Shipping congestion and other
bottlenecks continued to restrain the level of trade in
goods. Services exports and imports fell back in January
relative to December, reflecting a reduction in travel to
and from the United States. Because international travel
remained depressed, services trade was still very low relative to pre-
pandemic norms.
Incoming data suggested that the rapid spread of the
Omicron variant had tempered the foreign recovery
around the turn of the year. Purchasing managers indexes were consistent
with the Omicron wave having a
notable effect on services activity but a rather muted effect on
manufacturing activity and supplier delivery
times. Moreover, with COVID-19 cases having fallen in
many regions, authorities had already eased restrictions
and social mobility had recovered, except in China,
where lockdowns were recently reimposed. The Russian
invasion of Ukraine, however, constituted another negative shock to the
global economy by pushing up commodity prices further, hurting global risk
sentiment, and
exacerbating supply bottlenecks. Inflation abroad continued to rise, driven
by recovering global demand, rising
retail energy and food prices, and ongoing strains on
global supply chains; the effects of the Russian invasion
contributed to some of these inflationary pressures.
Staff Review of the Financial Situation
Financial markets were highly volatile over the intermeeting period, with
strained liquidity in some markets.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine led to periods of particularly elevated
volatility and deteriorating investor risk
sentiment. Nominal Treasury yields and the expected
path of policy rose during the intermeeting period,
driven by economic data releases and FOMC communications that were viewed as
implying a more rapid removal of monetary policy accommodation than
previously expected. Domestic equity indexes declined modestly, while those
in Europe fell noticeably. Financing
conditions remained accommodative, although borrowing costs increased
further.
Investors interpreted incoming economic data and Federal Reserve
communications as implying a more rapid
removal of monetary policy accommodation than they
had previously expected. On net, the expected path of
the federal funds rate implied by financial market
quotes—unadjusted for term premiums—rose significantly, along with the
yields on nominal Treasury securities, since the previous FOMC meeting. Near
-term inflation compensation implied by Treasury InflationProtected
Securities rose sharply, reflecting the higherthan-anticipated CPI releases
and surging energy prices
following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Spreads of investment- and speculative-grade corporate
bonds widened noticeably since the previous FOMC
meeting and ended the period close to the medians of
their historical distributions. Spreads of municipal
bonds also widened significantly across credit categories.
Broad equity indexes declined modestly, on net, amid
significant fluctuations. Equity prices increased early in
the period because of stronger-than-anticipated corporate earnings and
economic data releases, but they retraced these gains as investor risk
sentiment deteriorated
following the Ukraine invasion. The one-month optionimplied volatility on
the S&P 500—the VIX—surged
briefly immediately following the invasion but ended the
intermeeting period slightly lower on net.
Foreign asset prices were highly volatile over the intermeeting period in
response to geopolitical developments, central bank communications, and
rising inflation concerns. News related to Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine, in particular, contributed to decreases in major
foreign equity indexes, especially in Europe, and a moderate increase in the
broad dollar index. Despite downward pressure from the geopolitical events,
AFE sovereign yields increased notably, on net, on higher-than-expected
inflation readings and central bank communications that were perceived as
less accommodative than
expected. EME sovereign spreads widened, and EMEdedicated funds experienced
moderate portfolio outflows, which increased after the Russian invasion.
Even
so, financial conditions among EMEs—including fund
flows and the relative strength of local currencies outside
of Europe—were resilient compared with past episodes
____________________________________________________________________________
_________________ Page 6 Federal Open Market Committee
of global turbulence, reflecting in part higher commodity
prices and monetary policy tightening by EME central
banks.
Liquidity conditions became strained in some financial
markets during the intermeeting period. Market
depth—a gauge of the ability to transact in large volumes
at quotes posted by market makers—deteriorated in U.S.
Treasury, U.S. equity, and crude oil markets. Trading
volumes generally remained within normal ranges in
most markets and increased above normal levels in
Treasury markets later in the period. Bid–ask spreads
did not increase notably in most markets. However, investors reported that
strained liquidity at times amplified
the volatility of price moves and may have contributed
to the particularly large swings in Treasury yields and equity prices late
in the intermeeting period.
Short-term funding markets were mostly stable over the
intermeeting period, although spreads in some segments
widened. The effective federal funds rate and the Secured Overnight
Financing Rate generally held steady at
8 basis points and 5 basis points, respectively. Overnight
rates on commercial paper (CP) across most sectors also
held steady, although rates and spreads on longer-tenor
CP and negotiable certificates of deposit increased amid
the escalation of the Ukraine invasion. Spreads between
three-month forward rate agreements and overnight index swaps widened as
borrowers increased precautionary issuance of longer-tenor debt while money
market
investors preferred shorter-duration investments.
ON RRP take-up was little changed, averaging about
$1.6 trillion.
In domestic credit markets, credit remained broadly
available for most types of borrowers during the intermeeting period.
Nonfinancial gross corporate bond issuance slowed noticeably in January and
February, reflecting lower demand for credit due to rising borrowing
costs and elevated issuance over the past two years.
However, issuance rebounded to healthy levels in March
for investment-grade firms, with a few high-yield firms
also raising funds. Leveraged loan issuance was strong
in January and February. Small business loan originations in December
roughly matched pre-pandemic levels. The share of small firms that actively
sought financing in the past few months and reported that it was more
difficult to acquire credit compared with three months
earlier remained very low.
For households, both nonmortgage and mortgage credit
remained accommodative. Credit card balances increased significantly in the
fourth quarter, and auto
credit outstanding grew at a moderate pace in December. The number of
mortgage rate locks for home purchases through February was elevated
relative to prepandemic levels. Mortgage credit for households with
low credit scores continued to ease through February
but remained tighter than before the pandemic.
The credit quality of large nonfinancial corporations and
municipalities remained strong over the intermeeting period. The volumes of
credit rating upgrades for corporate and municipal bonds outpaced those of
downgrades
moderately in January and February. Default rates on
corporate bonds, municipal bonds, and leveraged loans
remained very low; most market indicators of future expected default rates
for corporate bonds and leveraged
loans also remained low.
Credit quality in the commercial real estate sector continued to show some
signs of stress. Delinquency rates
for commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) collateralized by hotel and
retail properties continued to decline in January but remained well above
pre-pandemic
levels, while those for CMBS in the office sector increased somewhat in
January but remained fairly low by
historical standards.
For households, credit quality remained fairly healthy.
Delinquency rates for mortgages, which include loans in
forbearance and other loans behind on payments, continued to trend down
through December, while those
for prime auto loan and prime credit card borrowers remained flat in
December. For nonprime borrowers, delinquency rates rose in December,
although they remained subdued by historical standards.
Information on borrowing costs through February and
early March suggested that the events surrounding Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine did not have a significant effect
on financing conditions during the intermeeting period.
Borrowing costs continued to increase in many sectors
but remained low relative to their historical distributions.
Spreads in the corporate bond, municipal bond, and
CMBS markets generally rose to somewhat above their
pre-pandemic levels, reflecting heightened geopolitical
risks, uncertainty about the outlook for monetary policy,
and elevated financial market volatility. Residential
mortgage rates increased, mostly as a result of widening
MBS spreads, which market participants attributed
mainly to the tapering of the Federal Reserve’s agency
MBS purchases and uncertainty surrounding the market
supply of agency MBS that would accompany balance
sheet runoff by the Federal Reserve. Interest rates on
____________________________________________________________________________
_________________ Minutes of the Meeting of March 15–16, 2022 Page 7
new credit cards rose to roughly their pre-pandemic levels, while rates on
auto loans also rose slightly but remained significantly below pre-pandemic
levels.
Staff Economic Outlook
The near-term projection for U.S. economic activity prepared by the staff
for the March FOMC meeting was
weaker than in January, reflecting the anticipated economic effects of the
conflict in Ukraine and financial
conditions that were expected to be less supportive than
previously assumed. For 2022 as a whole, real GDP
growth was projected to step down markedly from its
rapid 2021 pace before picking up slightly in 2023 as the
continued resolution of supply constraints provided a
small boost to growth. Real GDP growth was expected
to slow further in 2024 to a pace that was in line with
potential growth. However, the level of real GDP was
expected to remain well above potential over the projection period, and
labor market conditions were expected
to remain very tight.
The staff’s near-term projection for PCE price inflation
was revised up considerably relative to January. The upward revision
reflected the staff’s reaction to the persistently high and broad-based
levels of domestic inflation,
import price inflation, and wage growth that had been
observed, as well as the staff’s expectation that the upward pressure on
inflation from supply and demand imbalances would last longer than
previously assumed. In
addition, total PCE price inflation was further revised up
to reflect higher expected paths for consumer energy
and food prices. All told, total PCE price inflation was
projected to be 4 percent in 2022. PCE price inflation
was then expected to slow to 2.3 percent in 2023 and to
2.1 percent in 2024 as food, energy, and import price inflation moved lower
and as supply and demand imbalances were resolved.
The staff continued to judge that the risks to the baseline
projection for real activity were skewed to the downside
and that the risks to the inflation projection were skewed
to the upside. The COVID-19 pandemic remained a
source of downside risk to activity, while the possibility
of more severe and more persistent supply issues was
viewed as posing an additional downside risk to activity
and an upside risk to inflation. The Russian invasion of
Ukraine was perceived as adding to the uncertainty
around the outlook for economic activity and inflation,
as the conflict carried the risk of further exacerbating
supply chain disruptions and of putting additional upward pressure on
inflation by boosting the prices for energy, food, and other key commodities
. Finally, the possibility that continued high inflation would cause
longerterm inflation expectations to become unanchored was
seen as another upside risk to the inflation projection.
Participants’ Views on Current Conditions and the
Economic Outlook
In conjunction with this FOMC meeting, participants
submitted their projections of the most likely outcomes
for real GDP growth, the unemployment rate, and inflation for each year from
2022 through 2024 and over the
longer run based on their individual assessments of appropriate monetary
policy, including the path of the federal funds rate. The longer-run
projections represented
each participant’s assessment of the rate to which each
variable would be expected to converge, over time, under appropriate
monetary policy and in the absence of
further shocks to the economy. A Summary of Economic Projections was
released to the public following
the conclusion of the meeting.
In their discussion of current economic conditions, participants noted that
indicators of economic activity and
employment had continued to strengthen. Job gains had
been strong in recent months, and the unemployment
rate had declined substantially. Inflation remained elevated, reflecting
continued supply and demand imbalances, higher energy prices, and broader
price pressures.
With appropriate firming in the stance of monetary policy, participants
expected inflation to return to the Committee’s 2 percent objective over
time and the labor market to remain strong. Participants recognized that the
invasion of Ukraine by Russia was causing tremendous
human and economic hardship for the Ukrainian people.
They judged that the implications of the war for the U.S.
economy were highly uncertain, but in the near term, the
invasion and related events were likely to create significant additional
upward pressure on inflation and could
weigh on economic activity.
With regard to the economic outlook, participants noted
that real GDP growth had slowed from its rapid pace in
the fourth quarter of 2021, largely reflecting weaker inventory investment,
but consumption and business investment continued to rise solidly. The
Omicron variant
left only a mild and brief imprint on economic data, as
households and firms appeared resilient to this wave of
the virus. Relative to their December forecasts, participants had revised
down their projections for real GDP
growth this year, reflecting factors such as a slowdown
in inventory investment from its strong pace late last
year, reduced fiscal and monetary policy accommodation, and the Russian
invasion of Ukraine, which had led
to higher prices of energy and other commodities, increased uncertainty, and
weighed on broader financial
____________________________________________________________________________
_________________ Page 8 Federal Open Market Committee
conditions and consumer sentiment. Even so, participants judged that
economic fundamentals remained
solid and that they expected above-trend growth to continue, sustaining a
strong labor market.
Participants commented that demand for labor continued to substantially
exceed available supply across many
parts of the economy and that their business contacts
continued to report difficulties in hiring and retaining
workers. Participants observed that various indicators
pointed to a very tight labor market. Employment
growth remained strong through the Omicron wave. A
couple of participants highlighted that the annual benchmark revision to the
establishment survey employment
data revealed stronger employment growth in the second
half of 2021 than was initially reported. The unemployment rate had fallen
to a post-pandemic low, and quits
and job openings were at all-time highs. Although payroll employment
remained below its pre-pandemic level,
the shortfall was concentrated in a few sectors and reflected a shortage of
workers rather than insufficient demand for labor. Consistent with a tight
labor market,
nominal wages were rising at the fastest pace in many
years. While wage gains thus far had been the strongest
among the lowest quartile of earners and among production and supervisory
workers, wage pressures had begun
to spread across the income and skill distributions.
Many participants commented that they expected the labor market to remain
strong and wage pressures to remain elevated. A few participants noted that
there were
signs that the pandemic-related factors that had held
back labor supply might be abating and pointed to the
notable increase in the labor force participation rate
among prime-age men in February.
Participants remarked that recent inflation readings continued to
significantly exceed the Committee’s longerrun goal and noted that
developments associated with
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including the related surge
in energy prices, will add to near-term inflation pressures. Some
participants noted that elevated inflation
had continued to broaden from goods into services, especially rents, and
into sectors that had not yet experienced large price increases, such as
education, apparel,
and health care. A few participants also noted that the
number of spending categories experiencing inflation
rates above 4 percent had continued to rise, or that the
trimmed mean inflation measure from the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas had
risen to its highest level since
the early 1980s. Many participants indicated that their
business contacts continued to report substantial increases in wages and
input prices that were being passed
through into higher prices to their customers without
any significant decrease in demand. Participants commented on a few factors
that might lead the high inflation readings to persist, including strong
aggregate demand, significant increases in energy and commodity
prices, and supply chain disruptions that were likely to
require a lengthy period to resolve. In addition, some
participants noted that recent higher inflation could affect future
inflation dynamics. For example, a few participants commented that
persistently high inflation
readings might lead businesses, when setting prices, to
be more attentive to aggregate inflation or more willing
to raise prices. In addition, a couple of other participants
noted that some household survey data suggested that
near-term consumer inflation expectations have become
more sensitive to actual inflation readings since the beginning of the
pandemic. A few participants commented
that both survey- and market-based measures of shortterm inflation
expectations were at historically high levels. Several other participants
noted that longer-term
measures of inflation expectations from households,
professional forecasters, and market participants still appeared to remain
well anchored, which—together with
appropriate monetary policy and an eventual easing of
supply constraints—would support a return of inflation
over time to levels consistent with the Committee’s
longer-run goal.
Participants agreed that developments surrounding the
Russian invasion of Ukraine, including the resulting
sanctions, were adding to inflation pressures and posing
upside risks to the inflation outlook. Participants noted
that Russia and Ukraine were major suppliers of various
commodities used in the production of energy, food,
and some industrial inputs. A continued cutoff of that
supply from the world market would further push up
prices for those commodities and, over time, lead to
price increases in downstream industries. The invasion
had also exacerbated the disruptions of supply chains.
Participants commented that, by leading to higher energy and food prices,
weighing on consumer sentiment,
and contributing to tighter financial conditions, the invasion also
negatively affected the growth outlook. A
few participants highlighted additional downside risks to
growth associated with the war, such as the risk that a
more protracted conflict than the public currently expects could lead to
much tighter global financial conditions or other disruptions. A couple of
participants
commented that the increased uncertainty might lead
businesses and consumers to reduce spending, though
their business contacts currently were not seeing signs of
such shifts or expecting a significant pullback in demand.
____________________________________________________________________________
_________________ Minutes of the Meeting of March 15–16, 2022 Page 9
Several participants judged that the upside risk to inflation associated
with the war appeared more significant
than the downside risk to growth, as inflation was already high, the United
States had a relatively low level of
financial and trade exposure to Russia, and the U.S.
economy was well positioned to absorb additional adverse demand shocks.
In their discussion of risks to the outlook, participants
agreed that uncertainty regarding the path of inflation
was elevated and that risks to inflation were weighted to
the upside. Participants cited several such risks, including ongoing supply
bottlenecks and rising energy and
commodity prices, both of which were exacerbated by
the Russian invasion; recent COVID-related lockdowns
in China that had the potential to further disrupt supply
chains; and the possibility that longer-run inflation expectations might
become unanchored. Uncertainty
about real activity was also seen as elevated. Various
participants noted downside risks to the outlook, including risks associated
with the Russian invasion, a broad
tightening in global financial conditions, and a prolonged rise in energy
prices.
In their consideration of the appropriate stance of monetary policy, all
participants concurred that the U.S.
economy was very strong, with an extremely tight labor
market, and that inflation was high and well above the
Committee’s 2 percent inflation objective. Against this
backdrop, all participants agreed that it was appropriate
to begin a process of removing policy accommodation
by raising the target range for the federal funds rate at
this meeting. They further judged that ongoing increases
in the target range for the federal funds rate would be
warranted to achieve the Committee’s objectives. Participants also agreed
that reducing the size of the Federal
Reserve’s balance sheet would play an important role in
firming the stance of monetary policy and that they expected it would be
appropriate to begin this process at a
coming meeting, possibly as soon as in May. Participants judged that the
firming of monetary policy, alongside an eventual waning of supply–demand
imbalances,
would help to keep longer-term inflation expectations
anchored and bring inflation down over time to levels
consistent with the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run
goal while sustaining a strong labor market.
Many participants noted that—with inflation well above
the Committee’s objective, inflationary risks to the upside, and the
federal funds rate well below participants’
estimates of its longer-run level—they would have preferred a 50 basis
point increase in the target range for the
federal funds rate at this meeting. A number of these
participants indicated, however, that, in light of greater
near-term uncertainty associated with Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine, they judged that a 25 basis point increase
would be appropriate at this meeting. Many participants
noted that one or more 50 basis point increases in the
target range could be appropriate at future meetings,
particularly if inflation pressures remained elevated or
intensified. A number of participants noted that the
Committee’s previous communications had already contributed to a tightening
of financial conditions, as evident in the notable increase in longer-term
interest rates
over recent months.
All participants indicated their strong commitment and
determination to take the measures necessary to restore
price stability. In that context, participants judged that
the Committee’s approach of commencing increases in
the target range for the federal funds rate, and indicating
that ongoing increases were likely, was fully warranted.
Participants judged that it would be appropriate to move
the stance of monetary policy toward a neutral posture
expeditiously. They also noted that, depending on economic and financial
developments, a move to a tighter
policy stance could be warranted. A few participants
judged that, at the current juncture, a significant risk facing the
Committee was that elevated inflation and inflation expectations could
become entrenched if the public
began to question the Committee’s resolve to adjust the
stance of policy as appropriate to achieve the Committee’s 2 percent longer
-run objective for inflation. These
participants suggested that expediting the removal of
policy accommodation would reduce this risk while also
leaving the Committee well positioned to adjust the
stance of policy if geopolitical and other developments
led to a more rapid dissipation of demand pressures than
expected.
Participants agreed that the economic outlook was
highly uncertain and that policy decisions must take account of the state of
financial markets and the economy.
As always, the Committee would need to be prepared to
adjust the stance of monetary policy in response to the
evolving economic outlook and the risks to the outlook.
In this regard, participants noted that developments associated with Russia
’s invasion of Ukraine posed heightened risks for both the United States
and the global
economy. Against this backdrop, all participants judged
that risk management would be important in deciding
upon the appropriate stance of monetary policy, and that
policy also would need to be nimble in responding to
incoming data and the evolving outlook. In particular,
all participants underscored the need to remain attentive
____________________________________________________________________________
_________________ Page 10 Federal Open Market Committee
to the risks of further upward pressure on inflation and
longer-run inflation expectations.
Committee Policy Action
In their discussion of monetary policy for this meeting,
members agreed that indicators of economic activity and
employment had continued to strengthen. Job gains had
been strong in recent months, and the unemployment
rate had declined substantially. Members also agreed
that inflation remained elevated, reflecting continued
supply and demand imbalances, higher energy prices,
and broader price pressures.
Members agreed that geopolitical developments warranted several changes to
the postmeeting statement.
They concurred that the invasion of Ukraine by Russia
was causing tremendous human and economic hardship,
and they agreed to update the statement to recognize this
tragic situation. Members agreed that the implications
of the war for the U.S. economy were highly uncertain,
but they judged that, in the near term, the invasion and
related events were likely to create additional upward
pressure on inflation and weigh on economic activity.
In their assessment of the monetary policy stance necessary for achieving
the Committee’s maximumemployment and price-stability goals, members agreed
that with appropriate firming in the stance of monetary
policy, they expected inflation to return to the Committee’s 2 percent
objective and the labor market to remain
strong. In support of these goals, the Committee decided to raise the target
range for the federal funds rate
to ¼ to ½ percent and anticipated that ongoing increases
in the target range would be appropriate. One member
preferred to raise the target range for the federal funds
rate by 0.5 percentage point to ½ to ¾ percent at this
meeting in light of elevated inflation pressures. With regard to reducing
the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, all members agreed that
they had made substantial progress on arriving at a plan specifying the
steps
the Committee would take. They expected that, depending on economic and
financial conditions, beginning the
process of reducing the size of the balance sheet would
be appropriate at a coming meeting, possibly as early as
at the Committee’s May meeting.
Members agreed that, in assessing the appropriate stance
of monetary policy, they would continue to monitor the
implications of incoming information for the economic
outlook and that they would be prepared to adjust the
stance of monetary policy as appropriate in the event
that risks emerged that could impede the attainment of
the Committee’s goals. They also concurred that, in assessing the
appropriate stance of monetary policy, they
would take into account a wide range of information, including readings on
public health, labor market conditions, inflation pressures and inflation
expectations, and
financial and international developments.
At the conclusion of the discussion, the Committee
voted to authorize and direct the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, until instructed otherwise, to execute
transactions in the SOMA in accordance with the following domestic policy
directive, for release at 2:00 p.m.:
“Effective March 17, 2022, the Federal Open
Market Committee directs the Desk to:
• Undertake open market operations as necessary to maintain the
federal funds rate in
a target range of ¼ to ½ percent.
• Conduct overnight repurchase agreement
operations with a minimum bid rate of
0.5 percent and with an aggregate operation
limit of $500 billion; the aggregate operation limit can be temporarily
increased at
the discretion of the Chair.
• Conduct overnight reverse repurchase
agreement operations at an offering rate of
0.3 percent and with a per-counterparty
limit of $160 billion per day; the percounterparty limit can be temporarily
increased at the discretion of the Chair.
• Roll over at auction all principal payments
from the Federal Reserve’s holdings of
Treasury securities and reinvest all principal
payments from the Federal Reserve’s holdings of agency debt and agency
mortgagebacked securities (MBS) in agency MBS.
• Allow modest deviations from stated
amounts for reinvestments, if needed for
operational reasons.
• Engage in dollar roll and coupon swap
transactions as necessary to facilitate settlement of the Federal Reserve’s
agency MBS
transactions.”
The vote also encompassed approval of the statement
below for release at 2:00 p.m.:
“Indicators of economic activity and employment have continued to
strengthen. Job gains
have been strong in recent months, and the unemployment rate has declined
substantially. Inflation remains elevated, reflecting supply and
____________________________________________________________________________
_________________ Minutes of the Meeting of March 15–16, 2022 Page 11
demand imbalances related to the pandemic,
higher energy prices, and broader price pressures.
The invasion of Ukraine by Russia is causing
tremendous human and economic hardship.
The implications for the U.S. economy are
highly uncertain, but in the near term the invasion and related events are
likely to create additional upward pressure on inflation and weigh
on economic activity.
The Committee seeks to achieve maximum employment and inflation at the rate
of 2 percent
over the longer run. With appropriate firming
in the stance of monetary policy, the Committee
expects inflation to return to its 2 percent objective and the labor market
to remain strong.
In support of these goals, the Committee decided to raise the target range
for the federal
funds rate to ¼ to ½ percent and anticipates
that ongoing increases in the target range will be
appropriate. In addition, the Committee expects to begin reducing its
holdings of Treasury
securities and agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities at a coming
meeting.
In assessing the appropriate stance of monetary
policy, the Committee will continue to monitor
the implications of incoming information for
the economic outlook. The Committee would
be prepared to adjust the stance of monetary
policy as appropriate if risks emerge that could
impede the attainment of the Committee’s
goals. The Committee’s assessments will take
into account a wide range of information, including readings on public
health, labor market
conditions, inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and financial
and international developments.”
Voting for this action: Jerome H. Powell, John C.
Williams, Michelle W. Bowman, Lael Brainard, Esther L.
5 In taking this action, the Board approved requests to establish the rate
submitted by the boards of directors of the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston,
Philadelphia, Cleveland, Richmond, Atlanta, Chicago, St. Louis, Minneapolis
, Kansas City,
and San Francisco. This vote also encompassed approval by
the Board of Governors of the establishment of a 0.50 percent
primary credit rate by the remaining Federal Reserve Banks,
effective on the later of March 17, 2022, and the date such
Reserve Banks inform the Secretary of the Board of such a
George, Patrick Harker, Loretta J. Mester, and
Christopher J. Waller.
Voting against this action: James Bullard.
Patrick Harker voted as an alternate member at this
meeting.
President Bullard preferred at this meeting to raise the
target range for the federal funds rate by 0.5 percentage
point to ½ to ¾ percent in light of elevated inflation
pressures.
To support the Committee’s decision to raise the target
range for the federal funds rate, the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System voted unanimously to
raise the interest rate paid on reserve balances to
0.40 percent, effective March 17, 2022. The Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System voted unanimously to approve a ¼
; percentage point increase in the
primary credit rate to 0.50 percent, effective March 17,
2022.5
It was agreed that the next meeting of the Committee
would be held on Tuesday–Wednesday, May 3–4, 2022.6
The meeting adjourned at 10:30 a.m. on March 16, 2022.
Notation Votes
By notation vote completed on February 15, 2022, the
Committee unanimously approved the minutes of the
Committee meeting held on January 25–26, 2022.
By notation vote completed on February 17, 2022, the
Committee unanimously approved the Investment
Trading Policy for FOMC Officials and related revisions
to the Program for Security of FOMC information. In
conjunction with the notation vote, all non-voting participants also
expressed support for the Policy and related revisions to the Program.
____________________ | B*******e
发帖数: 30 | 2 就0.5的primary credit rate 只涨了0.25 能翻天啊 肏
3 月16号 就知道 涨了0.25 primary credit rate 到 0.5
操他妈大傻逼FED | B*******e
发帖数: 30 | 3 600亿 security 加350亿 MBS 算个屁啊！ 肏
之前放了多少水？这一点点 相对于 6万亿M2 的大水 根本就是一根鸡巴毛
肏 | h**********l
发帖数: 1 | 4 所以今年蹦不了，还是慢牛？
记得以前有人说过，美国股市和中国房市是两大奇葩存在，政府不敢让崩的庞氏骗局 | b**e
发帖数: 3199 | 5 主席同志，您不要太悲愤，从3.16到4.6，才3周MM就爆拉了快20%。
另外问一下，今年gbtc ethe的premium一路走低，是什么原因？币还是抗通胀的神器吗？
【在 B*******e 的大作中提到】
: 就0.5的primary credit rate 只涨了0.25 能翻天啊 肏
: 3 月16号 就知道 涨了0.25 primary credit rate 到 0.5
: 操他妈大傻逼FED
| l********4
发帖数: 33 | 6 发大水的好时光已经过去了，现在是加息周期，加密币不像前两年那么疯狂很正常的。
另外之前grayscale超高的premium是因为加密币不够主流化的问题，投资者的选择不多
，尤其是股市投资者没法买币只能买这个玩意。现在股市有不少投资加密币的etf/etn
了，甚至连Bitcoin IRA都搞出来了，没必要搞grayscale这种四不像了。
吗？
【在 b**e 的大作中提到】
: 主席同志，您不要太悲愤，从3.16到4.6，才3周MM就爆拉了快20%。
: 另外问一下，今年gbtc ethe的premium一路走低，是什么原因？币还是抗通胀的神器吗？
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