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发帖数: 3205 | 1 Taiwan is Moving Closer to China, So Why Isn't the U.S. Freaking Out?
The Obama administrationós promises to deepen economic and military ties
with allies in the Asia-Pacific region have fallen flat in light of
budgetary
realities. Defense cuts totaling nearly $1 trillion over the next decade,
and the necessity of focusing diplomatic and military attention on the
Middle
East, most notably Syria, exposed the gap between the White Houseós
unrealistic
expectations and the reality of limited resources. The U.S. Pacific Command
and U.S. Air Force are decreasing troop numbers and cutting exchanges with
key allies in the region, revealing to our allies that the U.S. is losing
the ability to project power in multiple spheres.
Perhaps no other ally is left more vulnerable from the U.S. withdrawal than
Taiwan. In the last five years, Beijing has used its influence to dissuade
other countries from signing trade agreements with Taiwan. As the number
of trade alliances in Asia exploded, Taiwan was not included in any of the
40 regional trade agreements. An export-driven economy, Taiwan canót afford
to be marginalized. Coupled with the U.S. inability to fully rebalance to
Asia, Taiwanese President Ma was left no option but to sign a trade
agreement
with Beijing, a government that for decades has encouraged the island to
assimilate.
In 2010, the Peopleós Republic of China and the government of Taiwan signed
the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). The ECFA will benefit
Taiwan by opening up the mainland service sector to Taiwanese investment;
lowering tariffs on 539 items, which account for 16% of total imports from
Taiwan; and by making the island more attractive to foreign investors
looking
to use it as an access point into mainland China. By 2020 the ECFA could
increase Taiwanós GDP by 4.5% and employment by around 2.5%. At first
glance,
these gains are momentous but, in reality, Taiwan will experience economic
benefits simultaneously with loss of political self-determination. Over
time, the ECFA will put a straitjacket on Taiwan vis-□vis China.
Taiwanós investment in the mainland during 2010 accounted for 80% of its
total foreign direct investment. In the same year, China was Taiwanós
largest
export destination (28%) and second largest import source (14.2%), yet
Taiwan
is Chinaós fifth largest import source (8.3%) and exports to Taiwan only
accounted for 1.7% of Chinaós total exports. This highlights Taiwanós weak
position at the bargaining table, one that will only continue to weaken
now that Taiwan signed a trade agreement and fully inserted itself into
the ǒChina-centeredō regional order.
While reducing barriers to trade serves an economic goal for Taipei, it
serves a political one for Beijing. Chinese leaders have openly stated that
deepening economic relations with Taiwan is part of an ǒembedded
reunificationō
strategy. It does not help that 86% of goods Taiwan produces are industrial
and therefore fungible. If conflict arises, Beijing can easily change to
Japanese or South Korean producers. This would destroy the Taiwanese economy,
which would be left flailing to find another market for semi-industrial
goods.
Today, the American punditocracy believes that Taiwanós reunification with
China through intensifying economic reliance is inevitable. If Taiwan
integrates
with China, however, U.S. strategic interests in Asia will be greatly
diminished,
both for the U.S. and for our regional allies. As policy commentator John
Tkacik advises, we need to form a military strategy that envisions an Asia
in which Taiwan and Beijing work in unison. Although the Bush and Obama
administrations unconsciously allowed Taiwanós military to deteriorate as
time and resources were pulled toward the Middle East, sophisticated weapons
systems and basing structure remained. Should China reclaim Taiwan there
are a number of deeply unnerving strategic advantages it would inherit:
1. Radar sites on Taiwanós mountaintops scan the mainland for ballistic
missiles, but China could use them to search for U.S. Navy ships in the
Pacific.
2. Deep-water naval bases at Su Ao and Hualien would provide a safe haven
for Chinese submarines in the deepest maritime trench in the Pacific.
3. Pratas Reef would provide the Chinese navy with a base equidistant from
Hong Kong and Taiwan, and would extend Chinaós jurisdiction anther 200
miles
towards the Philippines and contested waters in the South China Sea.
4. Control of Itu Aba, the largest islet in the South China Sea's Spratly
Islands, would bolster Chinaós claims in the islands. The islet also has
a functioning airstrip, providing another military base in contested waters.
5. Most significantly, the Taiwan Strait would become an inland waterway.
Complete control of the strait would allow China to block Japan and South
Koreaós access to vital Middle Eastern ports. It would also allow China
to halt the average of 675 commercial ships that transit the strait each
day.
Admittedly, Taiwan is not likely to pass a referendum in the near future,
but since Taiwanós increasing economic integration is strikingly clear,
our next president needs to do everything in his power to ensure that
political
integration remains a far-off prospect. In past years, the White House
reduced
help offered to Taiwan through the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. The Bush
administration agreed to help Taiwan upgrade its F-16s, but this was a
limited
measure designed to avoid increasing tensions in the Washington-Beijing
relationship. President Bush judged Chinaós military too weak to build up
Taiwanós military capabilities and President Obama has been unwilling to
sell arms to Taiwan in hopes that China will become a responsible
stakeholder
in the international system. The U.S. government lost an opportunity to
provide Taiwan with sufficient capabilities to maintain a military balance
vis-□vis China.
It is also interesting that after signing the ECFA, Taiwan was allowed to
sign free trade agreements with other countries. In 2013, Taiwan concluded
a free trade agreement with New Zealand. It is also currently in the midst
of a productive trade negotiation with Singapore. While signing the ECFA
might seem to have opened new trade possibilities for Taiwan, it is
important
to note that in these new free trade agreements, Taiwan is not acknowledged
as a sovereign nation. Indeed, in the FTA with New Zealand, Taiwan is called
the Chinese Taipei.
While these issues may seem secondary after 12 years of war in the Middle
East, their importance remains undiminished, and even in the face of
tremendous
budget cuts, it is time to reevaluate our policy towards mainland China
and Taiwan. Subsequent U.S. administrations should help Taiwan become a
member of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) to decrease its economic
reliance
on China, as well as increase joint military training exercises. The bottom
line is that Taiwan canót fall off the strategy-making table. Tactics that
encourage Taiwan to remain politically less ǒChineseō are necessary for
U.S. security in Asia. |
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