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发帖数: 496 | 1 Euthyphro. Why have you left the Lyceum, Socrates? and what are you doing in
the Porch of the King Archon? Surely you cannot be concerned in a suit
before the King, like myself?
Socrates. Not in a suit, Euthyphro; impeachment is the word which the
Athenians use.
Euth. What! I suppose that some one has been prosecuting you, for I cannot
believe that you are the prosecutor of another.
Soc. Certainly not.
Euth. Then some one else has been prosecuting you?
Soc. Yes.
Euth. And who is he?
Soc. A young man who is little known, Euthyphro; and I hardly know him: his
name is Meletus, and he is of the deme of Pitthis. Perhaps you may remember
his appearance; he has a beak, and long straight hair, and a beard which is
ill grown.
Euth. No, I do not remember him, Socrates. But what is the charge which he
brings against you?
Soc. What is the charge? Well, a very serious charge, which shows a good
deal of character in the young man, and for which he is certainly not to be
despised. He says he knows how the youth are corrupted and who are their
corruptors. I fancy that he must be a wise man, and seeing that I am the
reverse of a wise man, he has found me out, and is going to accuse me of
corrupting his young friends. And of this our mother the state is to be the
judge. Of all our political men he is the only one who seems to me to begin
in the right way, with the cultivation of virtue in youth; like a good
husbandman, he makes the young shoots his first care, and clears away us who
are the destroyers of them. This is only the first step; he will afterwards
attend to the elder branches; and if he goes on as he has begun, he will be
a very great public benefactor.
Euth. I hope that he may; but I rather fear, Socrates, that the opposite
will turn out to be the truth. My opinion is that in attacking you he is
simply aiming a blow at the foundation of the state. But in what way does he
say that you corrupt the young?
Soc. He brings a wonderful accusation against me, which at first hearing
excites surprise: he says that I am a poet or maker of gods, and that I
invent new gods and deny the existence of old ones; this is the ground of
his indictment.
Euth. I understand, Socrates; he means to attack you about the familiar sign
which occasionally, as you say, comes to you. He thinks that you are a
neologian, and he is going to have you up before the court for this. He
knows that such a charge is readily received by the world, as I myself know
too well; for when I speak in the assembly about divine things, and foretell
the future to them, they laugh at me and think me a madman. Yet every word
that I say is true. But they are jealous of us all; and we must be brave and
go at them.
Soc. Their laughter, friend Euthyphro, is not a matter of much consequence.
For a man may be thought wise; but the Athenians, I suspect, do not much
trouble themselves about him until he begins to impart his wisdom to others,
and then for some reason or other, perhaps, as you say, from jealousy, they
are angry.
Euth. I am never likely to try their temper in this way.
Soc. I dare say not, for you are reserved in your behaviour, and seldom
impart your wisdom. But I have a benevolent habit of pouring out myself to
everybody, and would even pay for a listener, and I am afraid that the
Athenians may think me too talkative. Now if, as I was saying, they would
only laugh at me, as you say that they laugh at you, the time might pass
gaily enough in the court; but perhaps they may be in earnest, and then what
the end will be you soothsayers only can predict.
Euth. I dare say that the affair will end in nothing, Socrates, and that you
will win your cause; and I think that I shall win my own.
Soc. And what is your suit, Euthyphro? are you the pursuer or the defendant?
Euth. I am the pursuer.
Soc. Of whom?
Euth. You will think me mad when I tell you.
Soc. Why, has the fugitive wings?
Euth. Nay, he is not very volatile at his time of life.
Soc. Who is he?
Euth. My father.
Soc. Your father! my good man?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. And of what is he accused?
Euth. Of murder, Socrates.
Soc. By the powers, Euthyphro! how little does the common herd know of the
nature of right and truth. A man must be an extraordinary man, and have made
great strides in wisdom, before he could have seen his way to bring such an
action.
Euth. Indeed, Socrates, he must.
Soc. I suppose that the man whom your father murdered was one of your
relatives-clearly he was; for if he had been a stranger you would never have
thought of prosecuting him.
Euth. I am amused, Socrates, at your making a distinction between one who is
a relation and one who is not a relation; for surely the pollution is the
same in either case, if you knowingly associate with the murderer when you
ought to clear yourself and him by proceeding against him. The real question
is whether the murdered man has been justly slain. If justly, then your
duty is to let the matter alone; but if unjustly, then even if the murderer
lives under the same roof with you and eats at the same table, proceed
against him. Now the man who is dead was a poor dependent of mine who worked
for us as a field labourer on our farm in Naxos, and one day in a fit of
drunken passion he got into a quarrel with one of our domestic servants and
slew him. My father bound him hand and foot and threw him into a ditch, and
then sent to Athens to ask of a diviner what he should do with him.
Meanwhile he never attended to him and took no care about him, for he
regarded him as a murderer; and thought that no great harm would be done
even if he did die. Now this was just what happened. For such was the effect
of cold and hunger and chains upon him, that before the messenger returned
from the diviner, he was dead. And my father and family are angry with me
for taking the part of the murderer and prosecuting my father. They say that
he did not kill him, and that if he did, dead man was but a murderer, and I
ought not to take any notice, for that a son is impious who prosecutes a
father. Which shows, Socrates, how little they know what the gods think
about piety and impiety.
Soc. Good heavens, Euthyphro! and is your knowledge of religion and of
things pious and impious so very exact, that, supposing the circumstances to
be as you state them, you are not afraid lest you too may be doing an
impious thing in bringing an action against your father?
Euth. The best of Euthyphro, and that which distinguishes him, Socrates,
from other men, is his exact knowledge of all such matters. What should I be
good for without it?
Soc. Rare friend! I think that I cannot do better than be your disciple.
Then before the trial with Meletus comes on I shall challenge him, and say
that I have always had a great interest in religious questions, and now, as
he charges me with rash imaginations and innovations in religion, I have
become your disciple. You, Meletus, as I shall say to him, acknowledge
Euthyphro to be a great theologian, and sound in his opinions; and if you
approve of him you ought to approve of me, and not have me into court; but
if you disapprove, you should begin by indicting him who is my teacher, and
who will be the ruin, not of the young, but of the old; that is to say, of
myself whom he instructs, and of his old father whom he admonishes and
chastises. And if Meletus refuses to listen to me, but will go on, and will
not shift the indictment from me to you, I cannot do better than repeat this
challenge in the court.
Euth. Yes, indeed, Socrates; and if he attempts to indict me I am mistaken
if I do not find a flaw in him; the court shall have a great deal more to
say to him than to me.
Soc. And I, my dear friend, knowing this, am desirous of becoming your
disciple. For I observe that no one appears to notice you- not even this
Meletus; but his sharp eyes have found me out at once, and he has indicted
me for impiety. And therefore, I adjure you to tell me the nature of piety
and impiety, which you said that you knew so well, and of murder, and of
other offences against the gods. What are they? Is not piety in every action
always the same? and impiety, again- is it not always the opposite of piety
, and also the same with itself, having, as impiety, one notion which
includes whatever is impious?
Euth. To be sure, Socrates.
Soc. And what is piety, and what is impiety?
Euth. Piety is doing as I am doing; that is to say, prosecuting any one who
is guilty of murder, sacrilege, or of any similar crime-whether he be your
father or mother, or whoever he may be-that makes no difference; and not to
prosecute them is impiety. And please to consider, Socrates, what a notable
proof I will give you of the truth of my words, a proof which I have already
given to others:-of the principle, I mean, that the impious, whoever he may
be, ought not to go unpunished. For do not men regard Zeus as the best and
most righteous of the gods?-and yet they admit that he bound his father (
Cronos) because he wickedly devoured his sons, and that he too had punished
his own father (Uranus) for a similar reason, in a nameless manner. And yet
when I proceed against my father, they are angry with me. So inconsistent
are they in their way of talking when the gods are concerned, and when I am
concerned.
Soc. May not this be the reason, Euthyphro, why I am charged with impiety-
that I cannot away with these stories about the gods? and therefore I
suppose that people think me wrong. But, as you who are well informed about
them approve of them, I cannot do better than assent to your superior wisdom
. What else can I say, confessing as I do, that I know nothing about them?
Tell me, for the love of Zeus, whether you really believe that they are true
.
Euth. Yes, Socrates; and things more wonderful still, of which the world is
in ignorance.
Soc. And do you really believe that the gods, fought with one another, and
had dire quarrels, battles, and the like, as the poets say, and as you may
see represented in the works of great artists? The temples are full of them;
and notably the robe of Athene, which is carried up to the Acropolis at the
great Panathenaea, is embroidered with them. Are all these tales of the
gods true, Euthyphro?
Euth. Yes, Socrates; and, as I was saying, I can tell you, if you would like
to hear them, many other things about the gods which would quite amaze you.
Soc. I dare say; and you shall tell me them at some other time when I have
leisure. But just at present I would rather hear from you a more precise
answer, which you have not as yet given, my friend, to the question, What is
"piety"? When asked, you only replied, Doing as you do, charging your
father with murder.
Euth. And what I said was true, Socrates.
Soc. No doubt, Euthyphro; but you would admit that there are many other
pious acts?
Euth. There are.
Soc. Remember that I did not ask you to give me two or three examples of
piety, but to explain the general idea which makes all pious things to be
pious. Do you not recollect that there was one idea which made the impious
impious, and the pious pious?
Euth. I remember.
Soc. Tell me what is the nature of this idea, and then I shall have a
standard to which I may look, and by which I may measure actions, whether
yours or those of any one else, and then I shall be able to say that such
and such an action is pious, such another impious.
Euth. I will tell you, if you like.
Soc. I should very much like.
Euth. Piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is that
which is not dear to them.
Soc. Very good, Euthyphro; you have now given me the sort of answer which I
wanted. But whether what you say is true or not I cannot as yet tell,
although I make no doubt that you will prove the truth of your words.
Euth. Of course.
Soc. Come, then, and let us examine what we are saying. That thing or person
which is dear to the gods is pious, and that thing or person which is
hateful to the gods is impious, these two being the extreme opposites of one
another. Was not that said?
Euth. It was.
Soc. And well said?
Euth. Yes, Socrates, I thought so; it was certainly said.
Soc. And further, Euthyphro, the gods were admitted to have enmities and
hatreds and differences?
Euth. Yes, that was also said.
Soc. And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger? Suppose for
example that you and I, my good friend, differ about a number; do
differences of this sort make us enemies and set us at variance with one
another? Do we not go at once to arithmetic, and put an end to them by a sum
?
Euth. True.
Soc. Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly end the
differences by measuring?
Euth. Very true.
Soc. And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting to a
weighing machine?
Euth. To be sure.
Soc. But what differences are there which cannot be thus decided, and which
therefore make us angry and set us at enmity with one another? I dare say
the answer does not occur to you at the moment, and therefore I will suggest
that these enmities arise when the matters of difference are the just and
unjust, good and evil, honourable and dishonourable. Are not these the
points about which men differ, and about which when we are unable
satisfactorily to decide our differences, you and I and all of us quarrel,
when we do quarrel?
Euth. Yes, Socrates, the nature of the differences about which we quarrel is
such as you describe.
Soc. And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when they occur, are of
a like nature?
Euth. Certainly they are.
Soc. They have differences of opinion, as you say, about good and evil, just
and unjust, honourable and dishonourable: there would have been no quarrels
among them, if there had been no such differences-would there now?
Euth. You are quite right.
Soc. Does not every man love that which he deems noble and just and good,
and hate the opposite of them?
Euth. Very true.
Soc. But, as you say, people regard the same things, some as just and others
as unjust,-about these they dispute; and so there arise wars and fightings
among them.
Euth. Very true.
Soc. Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by the gods, and
are both hateful and dear to them?
Euth. True.
Soc. And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro, will be pious and also
impious?
Euth. So I should suppose.
Soc. Then, my friend, I remark with surprise that you have not answered the
question which I asked. For I certainly did not ask you to tell me what
action is both pious and impious: but now it would seem that what is loved
by the gods is also hated by them. And therefore, Euthyphro, in thus
chastising your father you may very likely be doing what is agreeable to
Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos or Uranus, and what is acceptable to
Hephaestus but unacceptable to Here, and there may be other gods who have
similar differences of opinion.
Euth. But I believe, Socrates, that all the gods would be agreed as to the
propriety of punishing a murderer: there would be no difference of opinion
about that.
Soc. Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did you ever hear any one arguing
that a murderer or any sort of evil-doer ought to be let off?
Euth. I should rather say that these are the questions which they are always
arguing, especially in courts of law: they commit all sorts of crimes, and
there is nothing which they will not do or say in their own defence.
Soc. But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet say that they ought
not to be punished?
Euth. No; they do not.
Soc. Then there are some things which they do not venture to say and do: for
they do not venture to argue that the guilty are to be unpunished, but they
deny their guilt, do they not?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. Then they do not argue that the evil-doer should not be punished, but
they argue about the fact of who the evil-doer is, and what he did and when?
Euth. True.
Soc. And the gods are in the same case, if as you assert they quarrel about
just and unjust, and some of them say while others deny that injustice is
done among them. For surely neither God nor man will ever venture to say
that the doer of injustice is not to be punished?
Euth. That is true, Socrates, in the main.
Soc. But they join issue about the particulars-gods and men alike; and, if
they dispute at all, they dispute about some act which is called in question
, and which by some is affirmed to be just, by others to be unjust. Is not
that true?
Euth. Quite true.
Soc. Well then, my dear friend Euthyphro, do tell me, for my better
instruction and information, what proof have you that in the opinion of all
the gods a servant who is guilty of murder, and is put in chains by the
master of the dead man, and dies because he is put in chains before he who
bound him can learn from the interpreters of the gods what he ought to do
with him, dies unjustly; and that on behalf of such an one a son ought to
proceed against his father and accuse him of murder. How would you show that
all the gods absolutely agree in approving of his act? Prove to me that
they do, and I will applaud your wisdom as long as I live.
Euth. It will be a difficult task; but I could make the matter very dear
indeed to you.
Soc. I understand; you mean to say that I am not so quick of apprehension as
the judges: for to them you will be sure to prove that the act is unjust,
and hateful to the gods.
Euth. Yes indeed, Socrates; at least if they will listen to me.
Soc. But they will be sure to listen if they find that you are a good
speaker. There was a notion that came into my mind while you were speaking;
I said to myself: "Well, and what if Euthyphro does prove to me that all the
gods regarded the death of the serf as unjust, how do I know anything more
of the nature of piety and impiety? for granting that this action may be
hateful to the gods, still piety and impiety are not adequately defined by
these distinctions, for that which is hateful to the gods has been shown to
be also pleasing and dear to them." And therefore, Euthyphro, I do not ask
you to prove this; I will suppose, if you like, that all the gods condemn
and abominate such an action. But I will amend the definition so far as to
say that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they love pious or holy
; and what some of them love and others hate is both or neither. Shall this
be our definition of piety and impiety?
Euth. Why not, Socrates?
Soc. Why not! certainly, as far as I am concerned, Euthyphro, there is no
reason why not. But whether this admission will greatly assist you in the
task of instructing me as you promised, is a matter for you to consider.
Euth. Yes, I should say that what all the gods love is pious and holy, and
the opposite which they all hate, impious.
Soc. Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or simply to
accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of others? What do
you say?
Euth. We should enquire; and I believe that the statement will stand the
test of enquiry.
Soc. We shall know better, my good friend, in a little while. The point
which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is
beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the
gods.
Euth. I do not understand your meaning, Socrates.
Soc. I will endeavour to explain: we, speak of carrying and we speak of
being carried, of leading and being led, seeing and being seen. You know
that in all such cases there is a difference, and you know also in what the
difference lies?
Euth. I think that I understand.
Soc. And is not that which is beloved distinct from that which loves?
Euth. Certainly.
Soc. Well; and now tell me, is that which is carried in this state of
carrying because it is carried, or for some other reason?
Euth. No; that is the reason.
Soc. And the same is true of what is led and of what is seen?
Euth. True.
Soc. And a thing is not seen because it is visible, but conversely, visible
because it is seen; nor is a thing led because it is in the state of being
led, or carried because it is in the state of being carried, but the
converse of this. And now I think, Euthyphro, that my meaning will be
intelligible; and my meaning is, that any state of action or passion implies
previous action or passion. It does not become because it is becoming, but
it is in a state of becoming because it becomes; neither does it suffer
because it is in a state of suffering, but it is in a state of suffering
because it suffers. Do you not agree?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. Is not that which is loved in some state either of becoming or
suffering?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. And the same holds as in the previous instances; the state of being
loved follows the act of being loved, and not the act the state.
Euth. Certainly.
Soc. And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro: is not piety, according to
your definition, loved by all the gods?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason?
Euth. No, that is the reason.
Soc. It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. And that which is dear to the gods is loved by them, and is in a state
to be loved of them because it is loved of them?
Euth. Certainly.
Soc. Then that which is dear to the gods, Euthyphro, is not holy, nor is
that which is holy loved of God, as you affirm; but they are two different
things.
Euth. How do you mean, Socrates?
Soc. I mean to say that the holy has been acknowledge by us to be loved of
God because it is holy, not to be holy because it is loved.
Euth. Yes.
Soc. But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them because it is loved
by them, not loved by them because it is dear to them.
Euth. True.
Soc. But, friend Euthyphro, if that which is holy is the same with that
which is dear to God, and is loved because it is holy, then that which is
dear to God would have been loved as being dear to God; but if that which
dear to God is dear to him because loved by him, then that which is holy
would have been holy because loved by him. But now you see that the reverse
is the case, and that they are quite different from one another. For one (
theophiles) is of a kind to be loved cause it is loved, and the other (osion
) is loved because it is of a kind to be loved. Thus you appear to me,
Euthyphro, when I ask you what is the essence of holiness, to offer an
attribute only, and not the essence-the attribute of being loved by all the
gods. But you still refuse to explain to me the nature of holiness. And
therefore, if you please, I will ask you not to hide your treasure, but to
tell me once more what holiness or piety really is, whether dear to the gods
or not (for that is a matter about which we will not quarrel) and what is
impiety?
Euth. I really do not know, Socrates, how to express what I mean. For
somehow or other our arguments, on whatever ground we rest them, seem to
turn round and walk away from us.
Soc. Your words, Euthyphro, are like the handiwork of my ancestor Daedalus;
and if I were the sayer or propounder of them, you might say that my
arguments walk away and will not remain fixed where they are placed because
I am a descendant of his. But now, since these notions are your own, you
must find some other gibe, for they certainly, as you yourself allow, show
an inclination to be on the move.
Euth. Nay, Socrates, I shall still say that you are the Daedalus who sets
arguments in motion; not I, certainly, but you make them move or go round,
for they would never have stirred, as far as I am concerned.
Soc. Then I must be a greater than Daedalus: for whereas he only made his
own inventions to move, I move those of other people as well. And the beauty
of it is, that I would rather not. For I would give the wisdom of Daedalus,
and the wealth of Tantalus, to be able to detain them and keep them fixed.
But enough of this. As I perceive that you are lazy, I will myself endeavor
to show you how you might instruct me in the nature of piety; and I hope
that you will not grudge your labour. Tell me, then-Is not that which is
pious necessarily just?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. And is, then, all which is just pious? or, is that which is pious all
just, but that which is just, only in part and not all, pious?
Euth. I do not understand you, Socrates.
Soc. And yet I know that you are as much wiser than I am, as you are younger
. But, as I was saying, revered friend, the abundance of your wisdom makes
you lazy. Please to exert yourself, for there is no real difficulty in
understanding me. What I mean I may explain by an illustration of what I do
not mean. The poet (Stasinus) sings-
Of Zeus, the author and creator of all these things,
You will not tell: for where there is fear there is also
reverence. Now I disagree with this poet. Shall I tell you in what respect?
Euth. By all means.
Soc. I should not say that where there is fear there is also reverence; for
I am sure that many persons fear poverty and disease, and the like evils,
but I do not perceive that they reverence the objects of their fear.
Euth. Very true.
Soc. But where reverence is, there is fear; for he who has a feeling of
reverence and shame about the commission of any action, fears and is afraid
of an ill reputation.
Euth. No doubt.
Soc. Then we are wrong in saying that where there is fear there is also
reverence; and we should say, where there is reverence there is also fear.
But there is not always reverence where there is fear; for fear is a more
extended notion, and reverence is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part
of number, and number is a more extended notion than the odd. I suppose that
you follow me now?
Euth. Quite well.
Soc. That was the sort of question which I meant to raise when I asked
whether the just is always the pious, or the pious always the just; and
whether there may not be justice where there is not piety; for justice is
the more extended notion of which piety is only a part. Do you dissent?
Euth. No, I think that you are quite right.
Soc. Then, if piety is a part of justice, I suppose that we should enquire
what part? If you had pursued the enquiry in the previous cases; for
instance, if you had asked me what is an even number, and what part of
number the even is, I should have had no difficulty in replying, a number
which represents a figure having two equal sides. Do you not agree?
Euth. Yes, I quite agree.
Soc. In like manner, I want you to tell me what part of justice is piety or
holiness, that I may be able to tell Meletus not to do me injustice, or
indict me for impiety, as I am now adequately instructed by you in the
nature of piety or holiness, and their opposites.
Euth. Piety or holiness, Socrates, appears to me to be that part of justice
which attends to the gods, as there is the other part of justice which
attends to men.
Soc. That is good, Euthyphro; yet still there is a little point about which
I should like to have further information, What is the meaning of "attention
"? For attention can hardly be used in the same sense when applied to the
gods as when applied to other things. For instance, horses are said to
require attention, and not every person is able to attend to them, but only
a person skilled in horsemanship. Is it not so?
Euth. Certainly.
Soc. I should suppose that the art of horsemanship is the art of attending
to horses?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. Nor is every one qualified to attend to dogs, but only the huntsman?
Euth. True.
Soc. And I should also conceive that the art of the huntsman is the art of
attending to dogs?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. As the art of the ox herd is the art of attending to oxen?
Euth. Very true.
Soc. In like manner holiness or piety is the art of attending to the gods?-
that would be your meaning, Euthyphro?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. And is not attention always designed for the good or benefit of that to
which the attention is given? As in the case of horses, you may observe
that when attended to by the horseman's art they are benefited and improved,
are they not?
Euth. True.
Soc. As the dogs are benefited by the huntsman's art, and the oxen by the
art of the ox herd, and all other things are tended or attended for their
good and not for their hurt?
Euth. Certainly, not for their hurt.
Soc. But for their good?
Euth. Of course.
Soc. And does piety or holiness, which has been defined to be the art of
attending to the gods, benefit or improve them? Would you say that when you
do a holy act you make any of the gods better?
Euth. No, no; that was certainly not what I meant.
Soc. And I, Euthyphro, never supposed that you did. I asked you the question
about the nature of the attention, because I thought that you did not.
Euth. You do me justice, Socrates; that is not the sort of attention which I
mean.
Soc. Good: but I must still ask what is this attention to the gods which is
called piety?
Euth. It is such, Socrates, as servants show to their masters.
Soc. I understand-a sort of ministration to the gods.
Euth. Exactly.
Soc. Medicine is also a sort of ministration or service, having in view the
attainment of some object-would you not say of health?
Euth. I should.
Soc. Again, there is an art which ministers to the ship-builder with a view
to the attainment of some result?
Euth. Yes, Socrates, with a view to the building of a ship.
Soc. As there is an art which ministers to the housebuilder with a view to
the building of a house?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. And now tell me, my good friend, about the art which ministers to the
gods: what work does that help to accomplish? For you must surely know if,
as you say, you are of all men living the one who is best instructed in
religion.
Euth. And I speak the truth, Socrates.
Soc. Tell me then, oh tell me-what is that fair work which the gods do by
the help of our ministrations?
Euth. Many and fair, Socrates, are the works which they do. Soc. Why, my
friend, and so are those of a general. But the chief of them is easily told.
Would you not say that victory in war is the chief of them?
Euth. Certainly.
Soc. Many and fair, too, are the works of the husbandman, if I am not
mistaken; but his chief work is the production of food from the earth?
Euth. Exactly.
Soc. And of the many and fair things done by the gods, which is the chief or
principal one?
Euth. I have told you already, Socrates, that to learn all these things
accurately will be very tiresome. Let me simply say that piety or holiness
is learning, how to please the gods in word and deed, by prayers and
sacrifices. Such piety, is the salvation of families and states, just as the
impious, which is unpleasing to the gods, is their ruin and destruction.
Soc. I think that you could have answered in much fewer words the chief
question which I asked, Euthyphro, if you had chosen. But I see plainly that
you are not disposed to instruct me-dearly not: else why, when we reached
the point, did you turn, aside? Had you only answered me I should have truly
learned of you by this time the-nature of piety. Now, as the asker of a
question is necessarily dependent on the answerer, whither he leads-I must
follow; and can only ask again, what is the pious, and what is piety? Do you
mean that they are a, sort of science of praying and sacrificing?
Euth. Yes, I do.
Soc. And sacrificing is giving to the gods, and prayer is asking of the gods
?
Euth. Yes, Socrates.
Soc. Upon this view, then piety is a science of asking and giving?
Euth. You understand me capitally, Socrates.
Soc. Yes, my friend; the. reason is that I am a votary of your science, and
give my mind to it, and therefore nothing which you say will be thrown away
upon me. Please then to tell me, what is the nature of this service to the
gods? Do you mean that we prefer requests and give gifts to them?
Euth. Yes, I do.
Soc. Is not the right way of asking to ask of them what we want?
Euth. Certainly.
Soc. And the right way of giving is to give to them in return what they want
of us. There would be no, in an art which gives to any one that which he
does not want.
Euth. Very true, Socrates.
Soc. Then piety, Euthyphro, is an art which gods and men have of doing
business with one another?
Euth. That is an expression which you may use, if you like.
Soc. But I have no particular liking for anything but the truth. I wish,
however, that you would tell me what benefit accrues to the gods from our
gifts. There is no doubt about what they give to us; for there is no good
thing which they do not give; but how we can give any good thing to them in
return is far from being equally clear. If they give everything and we give
nothing, that must be an affair of business in which we have very greatly
the advantage of them.
Euth. And do you imagine, Socrates, that any benefit accrues to the gods
from our gifts?
Soc. But if not, Euthyphro, what is the meaning of gifts which are conferred
by us upon the gods?
Euth. What else, but tributes of honour; and, as I was just now saying, what
pleases them?
Soc. Piety, then, is pleasing to the gods, but not beneficial or dear to
them?
Euth. I should say that nothing could be dearer.
Soc. Then once more the assertion is repeated that piety is dear to the gods
?
Euth. Certainly.
Soc. And when you say this, can you wonder at your words not standing firm,
but walking away? Will you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them
walk away, not perceiving that there is another and far greater artist than
Daedalus who makes them go round in a circle, and he is yourself; for the
argument, as you will perceive, comes round to the same point. Were we not
saying that the holy or pious was not the same with that which is loved of
the gods? Have you forgotten?
Euth. I quite remember.
Soc. And are you not saying that what is loved of the gods is holy; and is
not this the same as what is dear to them-do you see?
Euth. True.
Soc. Then either we were wrong in former assertion; or, if we were right
then, we are wrong now.
Euth. One of the two must be true.
Soc. Then we must begin again and ask, What is piety? That is an enquiry
which I shall never be weary of pursuing as far as in me lies; and I entreat
you not to scorn me, but to apply your mind to the utmost, and tell me the
truth. For, if any man knows, you are he; and therefore I must detain you,
like Proteus, until you tell. If you had not certainly known the nature of
piety and impiety, I am confident that you would never, on behalf of a serf,
have charged your aged father with murder. You would not have run such a
risk of doing wrong in the sight of the gods, and you would have had too
much respect for the opinions of men. I am sure, therefore, that you know
the nature of piety and impiety. Speak out then, my dear Euthyphro, and do
not hide your knowledge.
Euth. Another time, Socrates; for I am in a hurry, and must go now.
Soc. Alas! my companion, and will you leave me in despair? I was hoping that
you would instruct me in the nature of piety and impiety; and then I might
have cleared myself of Meletus and his indictment. I would have told him
that I had been enlightened by Euthyphro, and had given up rash innovations
and speculations, in which I indulged only through ignorance, and that now I
am about to lead a better life. | J*****3
发帖数: 4298 | 2 这么长，还是英文的，只要信了教，通常就不会轻易改变观念，特别是辩论，基认为这
样的文章都是撒旦让人写的 HOHO | b********n
发帖数: 38600 | 3 But Satan began his existence as one of the most glorious of God's angels.
His name was Lucifer meaning "Light-bearer". Angels were created before the
earth. They were eternal spirits destined to live happily in heaven forever
praising and serving their Creator. They were given free will so that they
might freely choose to return God's love.
【在 J*****3 的大作中提到】
: 这么长，还是英文的，只要信了教，通常就不会轻易改变观念，特别是辩论，基认为这
: 样的文章都是撒旦让人写的 HOHO
| J*****3
发帖数: 4298 | 4 我知道，撒旦不错，尽管野合花写了本书诋毁他，人家很大度，啥也不说，还给了人智慧
the
forever
【在 b********n 的大作中提到】
: But Satan began his existence as one of the most glorious of God's angels.
: His name was Lucifer meaning "Light-bearer". Angels were created before the
: earth. They were eternal spirits destined to live happily in heaven forever
: praising and serving their Creator. They were given free will so that they
: might freely choose to return God's love.
| b********n
发帖数: 38600 | 5 LOL
智慧
【在 J*****3 的大作中提到】
: 我知道，撒旦不错，尽管野合花写了本书诋毁他，人家很大度，啥也不说，还给了人智慧
:
: the
: forever
| c**********h
发帖数: 496 | 6 我不知道撒旦写了什么文章。我只知道，这篇对话，是Plato写的，记录的是他的老师
Socrates和古希腊神学家Euthyphro的对话。这篇文章，是我在MIT大学的官方教学网站
上找到的。就算没听说过MIT大学，那Socrates和Plato不会也没听说过吧？
【在 J*****3 的大作中提到】
: 这么长，还是英文的，只要信了教，通常就不会轻易改变观念，特别是辩论，基认为这
: 样的文章都是撒旦让人写的 HOHO
| a***g
发帖数: 2402 | 7 我想没听说过Socrates和Plato的可能更多一些
【在 c**********h 的大作中提到】
: 我不知道撒旦写了什么文章。我只知道，这篇对话，是Plato写的，记录的是他的老师
: Socrates和古希腊神学家Euthyphro的对话。这篇文章，是我在MIT大学的官方教学网站
: 上找到的。就算没听说过MIT大学，那Socrates和Plato不会也没听说过吧？
| S*******e
发帖数: 1093 | 8 看了半天，看上你的签名档了：）
in
【在 c**********h 的大作中提到】
: Euthyphro. Why have you left the Lyceum, Socrates? and what are you doing in
: the Porch of the King Archon? Surely you cannot be concerned in a suit
: before the King, like myself?
: Socrates. Not in a suit, Euthyphro; impeachment is the word which the
: Athenians use.
: Euth. What! I suppose that some one has been prosecuting you, for I cannot
: believe that you are the prosecutor of another.
: Soc. Certainly not.
: Euth. Then some one else has been prosecuting you?
: Soc. Yes.
| w*********r
发帖数: 3382 | 9 呵呵，和你看圣经一样，关键的，有问题的都被忽略了
【在 S*******e 的大作中提到】
: 看了半天，看上你的签名档了：）
:
: in
| y**l
发帖数: 714 | 10 我读了你这篇文章。也看了你另外发的问题贴。首先，我想指出基督教的神和
Euthyphro的神有两点本质的区别。所以苏格拉底的某些推理并不适用于基督教。
一、古希腊的神（应该就是Euthyphro的神吧）是多位神，而且古希腊相信所有这些神
都是跟人一样，有着或多或少人类的某些优点和缺点。而基督教只有一个神，这位神没
有人类的缺点。
二、文中谈到对神献祭和受神恩赐，是像做生意一样，giving and taking。在这一点
上，基督教完全不同。请看：
Thou ... receivest again what Thou findest, yet didst never lose;
never in need, yet rejoicing in gains;
never covetous, yet exacting usury.
...
Thou payest debts, owing nothing;
remittest debts, losing nothing.
(St. Augustine, Confession)
关于你提的问题，我再想想，回头发到那个帖子里去。
in
【在 c**********h 的大作中提到】
: Euthyphro. Why have you left the Lyceum, Socrates? and what are you doing in
: the Porch of the King Archon? Surely you cannot be concerned in a suit
: before the King, like myself?
: Socrates. Not in a suit, Euthyphro; impeachment is the word which the
: Athenians use.
: Euth. What! I suppose that some one has been prosecuting you, for I cannot
: believe that you are the prosecutor of another.
: Soc. Certainly not.
: Euth. Then some one else has been prosecuting you?
: Soc. Yes.
| | | m*****8
发帖数: 654 | 11 看过哲学史就知道,希腊,印度等走的是多神体系,和基督,犹太,穆斯林走的单一神体系
是不同源的,没有什么可比性.而且多神教比单一神交的渗透能力差很多,所以希腊都闪
族化了. | c**********h
发帖数: 496 | 12 这个我是知道的，可是单神体系和多神体系有什么本质上的不同呢？古希腊的神或多或
少有人类的优点和缺点，而耶稣基督没有缺点？这又怎么证明呢？正如同基督徒一样，
古希腊的人也不会说他们的神优缺点吧？是我们读了有关文章，我们评价他们的神是有
缺点的。
耶稣基督不想让人类拥有智慧，这算不算自私？自私算不算缺点？他说别人打了你的左
脸，你就应该让别人打你的右脸，这是宽容。那么人类吃了智慧果，他为什么不再奖赏
给人类永生果和超越上帝果吃呢？说要宽容，又言行不一致，严以律人，宽以待己，这
算不算缺点？
其实呢，缺点和有点没有明确界限的，角度不同看法不同而已。我们谁也不知道上帝有
没有缺点，或者说，上帝存不存在。
【在 y**l 的大作中提到】
: 我读了你这篇文章。也看了你另外发的问题贴。首先，我想指出基督教的神和
: Euthyphro的神有两点本质的区别。所以苏格拉底的某些推理并不适用于基督教。
: 一、古希腊的神（应该就是Euthyphro的神吧）是多位神，而且古希腊相信所有这些神
: 都是跟人一样，有着或多或少人类的某些优点和缺点。而基督教只有一个神，这位神没
: 有人类的缺点。
: 二、文中谈到对神献祭和受神恩赐，是像做生意一样，giving and taking。在这一点
: 上，基督教完全不同。请看：
: Thou ... receivest again what Thou findest, yet didst never lose;
: never in need, yet rejoicing in gains;
: never covetous, yet exacting usury.
| E******u
发帖数: 3920 | 13 化简版：
尤西弗罗困境（Euthyphro Dilemma）源自柏拉图的《对话：尤西弗罗》。中苏格拉底
与尤西弗罗的对话，可简述如下：
好的事物之所以好是由于上帝指定它们为好；
上帝规定某些事物为好的是由于那些事物本身就是好的。
上述两个说法只能取其一。
如果取1，那么好的行为也可以是坏的，只要上帝如此指定即可。但这就出现矛盾了。
如果取2，那么上帝并未创造好。因而，上帝的存在没有意义。
in
【在 c**********h 的大作中提到】
: Euthyphro. Why have you left the Lyceum, Socrates? and what are you doing in
: the Porch of the King Archon? Surely you cannot be concerned in a suit
: before the King, like myself?
: Socrates. Not in a suit, Euthyphro; impeachment is the word which the
: Athenians use.
: Euth. What! I suppose that some one has been prosecuting you, for I cannot
: believe that you are the prosecutor of another.
: Soc. Certainly not.
: Euth. Then some one else has been prosecuting you?
: Soc. Yes.
| E*****m
发帖数: 25615 | 14 基督教道德的失敗 (三）神與善哪個先？
談到神與道德的問題，一定不能不談尤西弗羅困境 （Euthyphro Dilemma) （註一），
這是個很早就由柏拉圖提出的問題，遠在基督教之前，不過這困境對任何號稱是主管善
惡的神都有效，所以還是可以說是基督教的問題。
產生這困境的問題是『善』的事物為什麼是善，這不外兩種說法：
善的事物之所以善是由於上帝指定它們為善；
上帝规定某些事物為善的是由於那些事物本身就是善的。
粗看之下，好像不痛不癢的只是些細微差別，認真想想的話你應該可以發現這裡面對任
何神都是個難題。 我來解說一下。
這兩個說法顯然是互相衝突的，所以只能有一個是對的，那我們就分別看看。
如果 1 是對的， 那麼除了『上帝指定』以外，沒有任何理由可以說什麼是善，上帝就
是善與不善標準的制定者。 信徒一定不覺得這有什麼問題，本來就認為神就是善，但
是仔細想想，對上帝來說，既然沒有更高的善惡標準，善惡對他來說是可以隨意制定的
，那麼如果上帝說強姦殺人是善的，那麼強姦殺人就是善的（註二），你一個信徒會同
意嗎？ 寫到這裡，我知道信徒一定會說上帝不可能把強姦殺人當作的是善的，但是這
就違反了前提，神為什麼不可能把強姦殺人當作的是善的？ 難道在神之外還有其他的
原因約束著神不可以這樣判斷？ 神沒有更高的神管著，也不必在乎信徒的想法，所以
你只應該問神是怎樣主張的，而不是懷疑神這樣主張對不對。 除非你不相信這第一種
說法。
如果 2 是對的， 那麼善惡標準不是神制定，要不然善惡是一個比神更高智慧的存有制
定的，要不然善惡是人類自己產生的，上帝對善惡判斷就沒有意義了，上帝是多餘而無
用的。
所以你可以看出，這是個兩難困境，兩千多年來的神學家包括阿奎那等都試圖補上這個
有神論的漏洞，可惜沒看到任何有效的論述，我們可以相當有信心的說存在一個制定善
惡的神是說不通的。
註一： http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euthyphro_dilemma
註二：舊約裡事實上有耶和華命令猶太人去殺人強姦的章節 | s*y
发帖数: 933 | 15 这个你确定？自私，不为他人着想，嫉妒，这些人类常有的缺点神也有。不是么？ | y**l
发帖数: 714 | 16 《希腊神话》有讲各个神的个性和优缺点的，比如善妒的赫拉。而基督教的神，至少根
据《圣经》，在理论上是完美的，实际上基督徒也都认为神是完美的，但是非基督徒由
于种种原因，也许从他们的观点来看神并不是完美的。
谁说耶稣基督不想让人拥有智慧？那教会办学校干什么？教会的学校，教学质量有很多
可是很高的，不仅包括神学，也包括大量的自然和人文科学。上次版上谁来着，说天主
教会还资助自然科学研究呢。智慧果本身并不是什么邪恶的东西，问题在于人类对上帝
美意的违背、对自己欲望的放纵。所谓的“永生果”，上帝已经通过耶稣基督的殉难和
复活给了我们了，不存在神“严以律人，宽以待己”的问题。
【在 c**********h 的大作中提到】
: 这个我是知道的，可是单神体系和多神体系有什么本质上的不同呢？古希腊的神或多或
: 少有人类的优点和缺点，而耶稣基督没有缺点？这又怎么证明呢？正如同基督徒一样，
: 古希腊的人也不会说他们的神优缺点吧？是我们读了有关文章，我们评价他们的神是有
: 缺点的。
: 耶稣基督不想让人类拥有智慧，这算不算自私？自私算不算缺点？他说别人打了你的左
: 脸，你就应该让别人打你的右脸，这是宽容。那么人类吃了智慧果，他为什么不再奖赏
: 给人类永生果和超越上帝果吃呢？说要宽容，又言行不一致，严以律人，宽以待己，这
: 算不算缺点？
: 其实呢，缺点和有点没有明确界限的，角度不同看法不同而已。我们谁也不知道上帝有
: 没有缺点，或者说，上帝存不存在。
| l*****a
发帖数: 38403 | 17 妒忌，残暴，经常性的暴怒，杀人如麻，这样的神在你眼里照旧是完美的，
耶稣让人拥有智慧所以教会办了学校，那异端审判是耶稣想要表达的啥意思？
你这所谓的永生果显然不是伊甸园那个，因为你们都难逃一死，不是肉体飞升哈
【在 y**l 的大作中提到】
: 《希腊神话》有讲各个神的个性和优缺点的，比如善妒的赫拉。而基督教的神，至少根
: 据《圣经》，在理论上是完美的，实际上基督徒也都认为神是完美的，但是非基督徒由
: 于种种原因，也许从他们的观点来看神并不是完美的。
: 谁说耶稣基督不想让人拥有智慧？那教会办学校干什么？教会的学校，教学质量有很多
: 可是很高的，不仅包括神学，也包括大量的自然和人文科学。上次版上谁来着，说天主
: 教会还资助自然科学研究呢。智慧果本身并不是什么邪恶的东西，问题在于人类对上帝
: 美意的违背、对自己欲望的放纵。所谓的“永生果”，上帝已经通过耶稣基督的殉难和
: 复活给了我们了，不存在神“严以律人，宽以待己”的问题。
| l*****a
发帖数: 38403 | 18 说真格的，这个版面的基督徒要是有时间和兴趣看柏拉图苏格拉底的话，我很怀疑他们
还会成为基督徒
in
【在 c**********h 的大作中提到】
: Euthyphro. Why have you left the Lyceum, Socrates? and what are you doing in
: the Porch of the King Archon? Surely you cannot be concerned in a suit
: before the King, like myself?
: Socrates. Not in a suit, Euthyphro; impeachment is the word which the
: Athenians use.
: Euth. What! I suppose that some one has been prosecuting you, for I cannot
: believe that you are the prosecutor of another.
: Soc. Certainly not.
: Euth. Then some one else has been prosecuting you?
: Soc. Yes.
| c**********h
发帖数: 496 | 19 你的意思是说，神还是想要人类拥有智慧的？那为什么他反对人类吃智慧果？神可以不
想跟人类分享智慧果，却提倡人类却应该跟他人分享，这是不是自私以及严以律人，宽
以待己？我只是在提问，并不是很肯定的在指责上帝就是严以律人，宽以待己。
至于教会置办学校，我是承认的，因为我去教会看过。不过，你怎么知道教会的学校是
耶稣基督为了给人智慧而创建的？学校的各项费用，包括水电纸张房屋设施，都是靠教
徒捐款而来，并不是哪天夜里从天上掉下来的。学校的老师，都是自愿去教书的，而不
是奉耶稣基督的命令。我也曾想过去教会去教中文或者国际象棋，但是我并不信教，而
教会也并不是非得基督徒才可以去做老师的。我是为了让更多的人能领悟到国际象棋的
精妙之处，才会想去，跟教会其实没有任何关系，更上帝就更没关系了。
我想，不能因为学校是教会办的，或者教会办了学校，就总结出是耶稣基督为了赐予人
类智慧而办的学校吧？有可能学校不是耶稣基督这个神办的，而是教会这个组织机构（
正如同社会上任何一个组织机构一样）办的。再就是耶稣基督的意图，你确定耶稣基督
是想给人类智慧吗？基督徒不是认为上帝是至高无上的，是没有缺点的吗？你知道上帝
是想造学校来给人类智慧的，那意思就是说上帝的意思是你能揣测的？
【在 y**l 的大作中提到】
: 《希腊神话》有讲各个神的个性和优缺点的，比如善妒的赫拉。而基督教的神，至少根
: 据《圣经》，在理论上是完美的，实际上基督徒也都认为神是完美的，但是非基督徒由
: 于种种原因，也许从他们的观点来看神并不是完美的。
: 谁说耶稣基督不想让人拥有智慧？那教会办学校干什么？教会的学校，教学质量有很多
: 可是很高的，不仅包括神学，也包括大量的自然和人文科学。上次版上谁来着，说天主
: 教会还资助自然科学研究呢。智慧果本身并不是什么邪恶的东西，问题在于人类对上帝
: 美意的违背、对自己欲望的放纵。所谓的“永生果”，上帝已经通过耶稣基督的殉难和
: 复活给了我们了，不存在神“严以律人，宽以待己”的问题。
| y**l
发帖数: 714 | 20 人和神的地位本来就不是平等的，不可能说神有的，人也都有。但基督教里，人和人的
地位是平等的。所以人与人之间讲分享，神与人之间讲恩赐。
教会办学校，至少说明根据我们在世信徒的理解，传授知识是好的，所以我们要办学。
至于经费，学校也好，教会也好，都是教徒捐的，没有天上掉下来的。教徒为什么捐？
还不是为上帝在地球上的事业捐的？现在早就没有赎罪券一说了。学校当然不是耶稣像
变魔术一样赐给我们的，而是基督徒根据圣经、根据对上帝的理解，认为是好的，所以
我们出钱出力去办学。你是自愿去教书的；学校的领导者却是以教会的名义办学的，认
为办学是与神的意愿向协调的。如果有不信教的却资质很好的老师愿意加入学校，我们
当然不会排斥——非敌即我么。
至于fruit of knowledge，此处knowledge具体指哪一类知识虽然有争议，但很多基督
徒是有这样一点共识的：知识本身，或者说fruit of knowledge本身并不是邪恶的；问
题在于人对上帝的违抗、以自己为中心判断善与恶。
【在 c**********h 的大作中提到】
: 你的意思是说，神还是想要人类拥有智慧的？那为什么他反对人类吃智慧果？神可以不
: 想跟人类分享智慧果，却提倡人类却应该跟他人分享，这是不是自私以及严以律人，宽
: 以待己？我只是在提问，并不是很肯定的在指责上帝就是严以律人，宽以待己。
: 至于教会置办学校，我是承认的，因为我去教会看过。不过，你怎么知道教会的学校是
: 耶稣基督为了给人智慧而创建的？学校的各项费用，包括水电纸张房屋设施，都是靠教
: 徒捐款而来，并不是哪天夜里从天上掉下来的。学校的老师，都是自愿去教书的，而不
: 是奉耶稣基督的命令。我也曾想过去教会去教中文或者国际象棋，但是我并不信教，而
: 教会也并不是非得基督徒才可以去做老师的。我是为了让更多的人能领悟到国际象棋的
: 精妙之处，才会想去，跟教会其实没有任何关系，更上帝就更没关系了。
: 我想，不能因为学校是教会办的，或者教会办了学校，就总结出是耶稣基督为了赐予人
| | | c**********h
发帖数: 496 | 21 1 “人和神的地位本来就不是平等的，不可能说神有的，人也都有。”这个从何考证？
来源是圣经吗？那也许可以说服基督徒，但是说服不了非基督徒吧？而且，先不说平等
不平等，首先神的存在都还有待考证吧？再说，什么叫平等？这也是个抽象的词，是相
对的，而不是绝对的。
2 教徒们为什么捐款？这个问题问得好。为了上帝在地球上的事业，这是唯一有可能的
原因吗？不能这样说吧？你理性的想一想，如果一个爱面子的人看见旁边的人都捐款，
他有没有可能跟着主流捐个5块钱，免得显得自己吝啬？你再理性的想一想，如果一个
富人要交很多税，捐了钱他就可以免税，那他会不会为了免1000美元的税，而捐出800
美元？假如我不是去教课，而是去捐钱，我一定不是为了上帝在地球上的事业，而是为
了把我的兴趣爱好传播给大家，换句话说，就是为了我个人的喜好。这个无可置疑，因
为我个人的意愿，我个人是最清楚的，对吗？因此，可能的原因有很多，不能确定教徒
捐钱就只有为了上帝在地球上的事业这么一个唯一的原因。
【在 y**l 的大作中提到】
: 人和神的地位本来就不是平等的，不可能说神有的，人也都有。但基督教里，人和人的
: 地位是平等的。所以人与人之间讲分享，神与人之间讲恩赐。
: 教会办学校，至少说明根据我们在世信徒的理解，传授知识是好的，所以我们要办学。
: 至于经费，学校也好，教会也好，都是教徒捐的，没有天上掉下来的。教徒为什么捐？
: 还不是为上帝在地球上的事业捐的？现在早就没有赎罪券一说了。学校当然不是耶稣像
: 变魔术一样赐给我们的，而是基督徒根据圣经、根据对上帝的理解，认为是好的，所以
: 我们出钱出力去办学。你是自愿去教书的；学校的领导者却是以教会的名义办学的，认
: 为办学是与神的意愿向协调的。如果有不信教的却资质很好的老师愿意加入学校，我们
: 当然不会排斥——非敌即我么。
: 至于fruit of knowledge，此处knowledge具体指哪一类知识虽然有争议，但很多基督
| y**l
发帖数: 714 | 22 1. 我解释的就是基督教里神和人的关系，你不赞同也没问题。我的目的就是说，为什
么基督徒并不认为神是宽以待己，严于律人的。当然讨论的前提就是有神，有基督教的
神，否则这个问题就没有讨论的意义了。至于能不能证明有神，我之前已经明确说了，
我证明不了，也没人向我证明或证非过。
2. 在教会还真不太存在因为爱面子捐钱的事。捐钱很多是匿名捐，谁也不知道你捐了
多少。再有，有人喜欢每次崇拜/弥撒的时候捐，有人喜欢每月给教会直接寄支票，有
人喜欢按专项活动捐，有人喜欢每年捐一次。这个大家都知道，谁也不会因为你星期天
没往捐赠篮里放钱而说什么或者有什么想法。至于避税，首先呢，免税又不是只能通过
给教会捐钱才能免税，完全可以捐给符合条件的、千千万万其他非营利组织啊。再说，
大多数人那点收入、捐的那点钱，根本就到不了捐了以后反而税后结余更高的那个档次
，自己的腰包还是要损失的。为个人爱好捐款的话，何必捐给教会呢，可捐的地方多了
。当然不排除出于其他原因给教会捐献，但据我所知，多数人还是为了支持教会在世上
完成上帝的事业。不信你可以问问本版的基督徒。
800
【在 c**********h 的大作中提到】
: 1 “人和神的地位本来就不是平等的，不可能说神有的，人也都有。”这个从何考证？
: 来源是圣经吗？那也许可以说服基督徒，但是说服不了非基督徒吧？而且，先不说平等
: 不平等，首先神的存在都还有待考证吧？再说，什么叫平等？这也是个抽象的词，是相
: 对的，而不是绝对的。
: 2 教徒们为什么捐款？这个问题问得好。为了上帝在地球上的事业，这是唯一有可能的
: 原因吗？不能这样说吧？你理性的想一想，如果一个爱面子的人看见旁边的人都捐款，
: 他有没有可能跟着主流捐个5块钱，免得显得自己吝啬？你再理性的想一想，如果一个
: 富人要交很多税，捐了钱他就可以免税，那他会不会为了免1000美元的税，而捐出800
: 美元？假如我不是去教课，而是去捐钱，我一定不是为了上帝在地球上的事业，而是为
: 了把我的兴趣爱好传播给大家，换句话说，就是为了我个人的喜好。这个无可置疑，因
| c****n
发帖数: 21367 | 23 “多数人为了支持教会在世上完成上帝的事业”，这个目的啊。。。
要是没有上帝，这笔钱就成了“支持教会在世上完成教会的事业”了。。。
证？
平等
是相
能的
款，
一个
是为
，因
【在 y**l 的大作中提到】
: 1. 我解释的就是基督教里神和人的关系，你不赞同也没问题。我的目的就是说，为什
: 么基督徒并不认为神是宽以待己，严于律人的。当然讨论的前提就是有神，有基督教的
: 神，否则这个问题就没有讨论的意义了。至于能不能证明有神，我之前已经明确说了，
: 我证明不了，也没人向我证明或证非过。
: 2. 在教会还真不太存在因为爱面子捐钱的事。捐钱很多是匿名捐，谁也不知道你捐了
: 多少。再有，有人喜欢每次崇拜/弥撒的时候捐，有人喜欢每月给教会直接寄支票，有
: 人喜欢按专项活动捐，有人喜欢每年捐一次。这个大家都知道，谁也不会因为你星期天
: 没往捐赠篮里放钱而说什么或者有什么想法。至于避税，首先呢，免税又不是只能通过
: 给教会捐钱才能免税，完全可以捐给符合条件的、千千万万其他非营利组织啊。再说，
: 大多数人那点收入、捐的那点钱，根本就到不了捐了以后反而税后结余更高的那个档次
| c**********h
发帖数: 496 | 24 1 所以说，人跟人之间是平等的，人跟上帝之间是不平等的，这只是信徒一厢情愿的认
知或者信仰，并不能作为确切的真理，还是有争论的空间的。我并没有赞成，也没有不
赞成，只是陈述一个事实，确实是还未完整的鉴定过，待考证。我们第一个讨论的问题
就是神是否存在，而后有人就说只是把未知创造物暂且命名为“神”，只是一个对于未
知的命名而已。假设它是存在的，那么在神存在的情况下，他到底有没有自私，是不是
宽以待己，严于律人，这些也都是可以质疑的一些问题。其实我是未知论者，对这些问
题，也不想自吹自擂的给出我自己认为正确的答案。我想做的是，提出这些问题，供大
家（包括信徒与非信徒）去理性思考，而不是盲目相信自己的宗教或者是任何人提出的
理论。
2 “在教会还真不太存在因为爱面子捐钱的事”，请说明，到底是“不太存在”还是“
不存在”？我去的教会就有别人能看见你捐钱没捐钱的场合，大概看不清你捐了多少，
但是你有没有去捐，是看得见的。当然，我去的教会只是世界上所有教会之一，而你去
的教会应该也是所有教会的一部分吧？我想当然一下，你不会世界上所有的教会，每个
教会，都去到了吧？所以呢，我只看到了一小部分现实，你也只看到了一小部分现实。
我说的为了面子的可能性，也不能完全排除，对吗？我并不是说这个可能性就100%就是
每个地域的现实，只是说，可能性是有的。你也说了，真要避税，方法有很多，可以通
过千千万万个非营利组织。这我也知道，而且赞同，但是教会就是千千万万非营利组织
之一，而且是个相对普及，比较容易找到的。富人不一定一个个全部要通过教会避税，
但是通过教会来避税是比较容易不麻烦的方法之一。这样，不仅不能排除有富人会这么
做的可能性，而且这种可能性还比较大。有了这两种可能性，甚至我没有想到的更多种
可能性，就不能说肯定的说捐款的人不可能有其他原因，全部都是为了上帝在地球上的
事业吧？
【在 y**l 的大作中提到】
: 1. 我解释的就是基督教里神和人的关系，你不赞同也没问题。我的目的就是说，为什
: 么基督徒并不认为神是宽以待己，严于律人的。当然讨论的前提就是有神，有基督教的
: 神，否则这个问题就没有讨论的意义了。至于能不能证明有神，我之前已经明确说了，
: 我证明不了，也没人向我证明或证非过。
: 2. 在教会还真不太存在因为爱面子捐钱的事。捐钱很多是匿名捐，谁也不知道你捐了
: 多少。再有，有人喜欢每次崇拜/弥撒的时候捐，有人喜欢每月给教会直接寄支票，有
: 人喜欢按专项活动捐，有人喜欢每年捐一次。这个大家都知道，谁也不会因为你星期天
: 没往捐赠篮里放钱而说什么或者有什么想法。至于避税，首先呢，免税又不是只能通过
: 给教会捐钱才能免税，完全可以捐给符合条件的、千千万万其他非营利组织啊。再说，
: 大多数人那点收入、捐的那点钱，根本就到不了捐了以后反而税后结余更高的那个档次
| c**********h
发帖数: 496 | 25 “这个大家都知道，谁也不会因为你星期天没往捐赠篮里放钱而说什么或者有什么想法
。”
别人说话，我们可以听见。至于别人有没有什么想法，这个，我觉得不是你能够得知或
者评论的吧？ | y**l
发帖数: 714 | 26 谁说其他可能性都完全排除了呢？我说的就是“不太存在”，意思就是不是百分之百。
我是说据我了解的大部分人哦。不要把人想得都太精明了哦。
【在 c**********h 的大作中提到】
: 1 所以说，人跟人之间是平等的，人跟上帝之间是不平等的，这只是信徒一厢情愿的认
: 知或者信仰，并不能作为确切的真理，还是有争论的空间的。我并没有赞成，也没有不
: 赞成，只是陈述一个事实，确实是还未完整的鉴定过，待考证。我们第一个讨论的问题
: 就是神是否存在，而后有人就说只是把未知创造物暂且命名为“神”，只是一个对于未
: 知的命名而已。假设它是存在的，那么在神存在的情况下，他到底有没有自私，是不是
: 宽以待己，严于律人，这些也都是可以质疑的一些问题。其实我是未知论者，对这些问
: 题，也不想自吹自擂的给出我自己认为正确的答案。我想做的是，提出这些问题，供大
: 家（包括信徒与非信徒）去理性思考，而不是盲目相信自己的宗教或者是任何人提出的
: 理论。
: 2 “在教会还真不太存在因为爱面子捐钱的事”，请说明，到底是“不太存在”还是“
| c**********h
发帖数: 496 | 27 嗯，对，这样就清楚了。那么你提出的“捐款的人全部都是为了上帝在地球上的事业”
这个理论就被推翻了，对吗？因为，不能确定是不是“全部”100%捐款的人都是为了上
帝在地球上的事业。
【在 y**l 的大作中提到】
: 谁说其他可能性都完全排除了呢？我说的就是“不太存在”，意思就是不是百分之百。
: 我是说据我了解的大部分人哦。不要把人想得都太精明了哦。
|
|
