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发帖数: 11737 | 1 China needs no foreign help to feed itself
China can meet the demands of its growing population without importing grain
from elsewhere, says Peng Gong.
Peng Gong
China has a long-standing ambition to be self-sufficient in grain — rice,
wheat, maize (corn) and soya beans — yet it imported some 95 million tonnes
last year, about 17% of its domestic production. This raised concerns that
its grain imports would rise, and push up the price of food. These fears
were highlighted by Lester Brown of the Earth Policy Institute in Washington
DC, in an article in The Washington Post in March, titled 'Can the United
States feed China?'
I thank Lester for his warning on food security in China, but I believe it
is not a matter of whether China can feed itself. It is a matter of whether
the Chinese people will choose to do so.
First, some history. China's grain production quadrupled from 1950 to 2010,
and last year saw the largest ever harvest. Much of the grain that China
imported last year was not for consumption, but for storage in case of
crises. In fact, for the past 60 years, China has, with just 7–8% of the
globe's agricultural land, fed about 22% of the world's population.
“It is not a matter of whether China can feed itself. it is a matter of
whether the Chinese people will choose to do so.”
China's population is projected to grow by around 9%, until it peaks at 1.46
billion around 2030. This turns the question of who will feed China into
whether China can maintain self-sufficiency in grain production in the next
20 years.
There are certainly challenges. The growth of large cities should slow the
pace of rural development, but China's registered-permanent-residence policy
allows floating farmer workers, who spend most of their time in cities, to
build houses in their home villages. Village development in the North China
Plain doubled in the past decade, gobbling up 3.1 million hectares of top-
quality agricultural land. And, as older farmers leave the labour force and
young ones go to cities, the decline in agricultural knowledge could reduce
grain yields.
Another issue is water. The north now produces more than 60% of China's
grain thanks to expanded irrigation, yet groundwater supplies there continue
to decrease and severe droughts have hit production. Although many global
climate models predict that north China will become wetter, the region has
become drier, perhaps too dry even to justify planned investment in new
water infrastructure.
I am optimistic that these challenges can be overcome. China has introduced
land-conversion rules that require developers and local governments to
replace lost agricultural land, by draining swampland for example. The
country has also invested heavily in improving cropland through efficient
irrigation and mechanized cultivation and harvesting. And about 10 million
hectares of marsh and flood land in China were converted to agricultural
land between 1978 and 2008, although at a cost to ecosystems.
The government has pledged to invest four trillion renminbi (US$600 billion)
over the next ten years to secure water supplies. Properly used, this
investment could increase irrigated agricultural land by 10–20%,
potentially boosting grain production by 5–10%. Even climate change could
help. Glaciers in western China are likely to melt faster over the next few
decades, and could water new farmland in that region. Then there is indoor,
hydroponic cultivation, which has already entered China on a household scale
for growing vegetables.
If per-capita grain consumption can be held stable, then to feed itself
China would need only to increase grain production by 9%. Yes, the growing
middle class wants to eat more meat, which requires more grain, but older
people tend to eat less meat, so the demand could be balanced as the
population ages. The country does not have to follow the Western model of
development based on overconsumption. Thrift is deeply ingrained in the
philosophy and culture of the people.
Brave policy decisions are needed. Better planning can regulate construction
in rural and urban areas. Reducing the per-family area of land for
residential construction would also help.
Because of the trend towards urbanization, many rural residences will become
vacant in the next 20–30 years. This land must be returned to agricultural
use. With this in mind, building rural structures on stilts would avoid
soil destruction and enable the reclamation of built-up land. China should
abolish the permanent-residence registry system and stop floating farmer
workers constructing rural residences.
Furthermore, as the cold Qinghai–Tibet plateau warms, China should look to
develop cropland reserves there for emergency use. And in the rural south,
the government should provide financial incentives for farmers to sow
farmland currently left idle by a shortage of labour. An effective model
could be worker-owned agricultural cooperatives directly linked to urban
markets through subsidized transport.
Extra investment to train farmers and strengthen the role of agricultural
specialists at the town and village level would protect and raise crop
yields. The current promotion of college students to serve as village
officers, for instance, could be enhanced with training on biodynamic
farming technology and environmental protection.
With these measures, China can maintain the current level of agricultural
land, and make full use of idle land. It could grow grain production, not by
9%, but by 20–30%. Given the country's remarkable achievements in
population control and economic reform over the past 30 years, the world
does not need to worry about having to feed China just yet.
Peng Gong is in the Center for Earth System Science at Tsinghua University,
China, and the Department of Environmental Science, Policy and Management,
University of California, Berkeley, USA. |
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