c********y
发帖数: 98 | 1 Hi folks, there's a question that has been plaguing me for a while and I
would appreciate your comments and ideas. Any response would be helpful.
An important condition of Barry Weingast's notion of market preserving
federalism is "instituionalzed" allocation of authorities between the national
government and subnational governments. In China, this condition does not
exist (on the contrary, the constitution stipulates a unitary system), so in
his coauthored paper with Yingyi Qian they changed th |
k***g
发帖数: 7244 | 2 呵呵，想起了我原来发过的一个帖子，
http://mitbbs.com/cgi-bin/BBScon?PoliticalScience/M.1083207241.A=239
would
federalism
and
contrary,
with
authorities
how
of
stories about how
I have
appointment
government.
to leave now.
【在 c********y 的大作中提到】
: Hi folks, there's a question that has been plaguing me for a while and I
: would appreciate your comments and ideas. Any response would be helpful.
: An important condition of Barry Weingast's notion of market preserving
: federalism is "instituionalzed" allocation of authorities between the national
: government and subnational governments. In China, this condition does not
: exist (on the contrary, the constitution stipulates a unitary system), so in
: his coauthored paper with Yingyi Qian they changed th
|
m********o
发帖数: 23 | 3 第一个问题，如果回答，总会有点咬文嚼字。:)
首先是，endurable说的是可持续的，对吗？不会是可以忍受的，对吗？
其次，如果狭义理解institutionalized，那么就容易把endurable
和institutionalized对立起来，其实，中国的体制是有表面体制和一些
潜规则的，中央和地方的关系也是如此。固然从宪法上讲中国是中央集权体制，
但是：1、中国法律体制还是要求并允许一定程度的地方自主管理的；
2、中央和地方有利益纠纷的暗流，也有讨价还价的潜规则机制。
而社会的潜规则，总是相对稳定的，它和表面规则相比，是否表面规则
更稳定呢？这是一个相当复杂的问题，并不能简单说，大家都遵守的
不成文规则，一定比成文规则（institution）不稳定，不能持久。
【在 c********y 的大作中提到】
: Hi folks, there's a question that has been plaguing me for a while and I
: would appreciate your comments and ideas. Any response would be helpful.
: An important condition of Barry Weingast's notion of market preserving
: federalism is "instituionalzed" allocation of authorities between the national
: government and subnational governments. In China, this condition does not
: exist (on the contrary, the constitution stipulates a unitary system), so in
: his coauthored paper with Yingyi Qian they changed th
|
m********o
发帖数: 23 | 4 第二个问题，关于地方官员，这个问题有点naive了，:)请原谅我这么说。
地方官员的任命固然经过中央，但不是中央完全的工具。地方官员正好是
一个中央和地方利益的冲突结合点，他的前途要取决于两个矛盾的利益：
其实是中央政策在地方的贯彻，其二是地方政绩（背后是地方个别的利益）。
在矛盾的时候，他不可得兼，只能有所取舍。所以地方官员并不必然永远倒向中央。
其它的原因可能还有很多很多。无论如何，只要地方具体利益和中央所代表的全体利益
有差别，就会有冲突，这个冲突总会体现在当地领导的身上。
【在 c********y 的大作中提到】
: Hi folks, there's a question that has been plaguing me for a while and I
: would appreciate your comments and ideas. Any response would be helpful.
: An important condition of Barry Weingast's notion of market preserving
: federalism is "instituionalzed" allocation of authorities between the national
: government and subnational governments. In China, this condition does not
: exist (on the contrary, the constitution stipulates a unitary system), so in
: his coauthored paper with Yingyi Qian they changed th
|
c********y
发帖数: 98 | 5 thanks very much for your thoughtful reply.
1. Sorry. It's "durable", not "endurable". I was rushing when I posted my
question. but it definitely shows my English insufficiency.
2. Certainly there are some informal rules, but then the question is, what
exactly are these informal rules? Are they alone sufficient to sustain the
central-regional relationship? Weingast and Qian talked about how in Mao's era
Chen Yuan was able to abide the regions by the rule of the center, but Li
Peng's similar effo
【在 m********o 的大作中提到】
: 第一个问题，如果回答，总会有点咬文嚼字。:)
: 首先是，endurable说的是可持续的，对吗？不会是可以忍受的，对吗？
: 其次，如果狭义理解institutionalized，那么就容易把endurable
: 和institutionalized对立起来，其实，中国的体制是有表面体制和一些
: 潜规则的，中央和地方的关系也是如此。固然从宪法上讲中国是中央集权体制，
: 但是：1、中国法律体制还是要求并允许一定程度的地方自主管理的；
: 2、中央和地方有利益纠纷的暗流，也有讨价还价的潜规则机制。
: 而社会的潜规则，总是相对稳定的，它和表面规则相比，是否表面规则
: 更稳定呢？这是一个相当复杂的问题，并不能简单说，大家都遵守的
: 不成文规则，一定比成文规则（institution）不稳定，不能持久。
|
c********y
发帖数: 98 | 6 I think this is an important point, and I've been thinking along the same line
as well. That is, the game is not just between the center and the province,
but the center, the provincical government, and the local government. Or maybe
we can put it as a game between the center, the local government, and the
local populace. So the middle government needs to cater the needs of both the
center and the local.
Again, thanks for your thoughtful comments.
national
in
non-institutionalized
of
appointmen
【在 m********o 的大作中提到】
: 第二个问题，关于地方官员，这个问题有点naive了，:)请原谅我这么说。
: 地方官员的任命固然经过中央，但不是中央完全的工具。地方官员正好是
: 一个中央和地方利益的冲突结合点，他的前途要取决于两个矛盾的利益：
: 其实是中央政策在地方的贯彻，其二是地方政绩（背后是地方个别的利益）。
: 在矛盾的时候，他不可得兼，只能有所取舍。所以地方官员并不必然永远倒向中央。
: 其它的原因可能还有很多很多。无论如何，只要地方具体利益和中央所代表的全体利益
: 有差别，就会有冲突，这个冲突总会体现在当地领导的身上。
|
c********y
发帖数: 98 | 7 wwwww.....right now I'm having some doubts about the validity of the question.
I mean, China's case should really be categorized as decentralization rather
than federalism. Does decentralization require institutionalization? I'm just
too ignorant about the literature or other countries' cases to answer this
question at this moment. Anyone with any illumination?
national
appointment
to
【在 c********y 的大作中提到】
: Hi folks, there's a question that has been plaguing me for a while and I
: would appreciate your comments and ideas. Any response would be helpful.
: An important condition of Barry Weingast's notion of market preserving
: federalism is "instituionalzed" allocation of authorities between the national
: government and subnational governments. In China, this condition does not
: exist (on the contrary, the constitution stipulates a unitary system), so in
: his coauthored paper with Yingyi Qian they changed th
|
m********o
发帖数: 23 | 8 我对政治学和行政管理真的是一窍不通，所谓潜规则也是从法律方面来的，
因为中国传统上的法制，历来不过是政府的价值宣示，法律是政府的
道貌岸然的宣言书，具体的可操作性很大程度被忽视，真正运行起来的时候，
要靠一定的“习俗”。具体中国的中央政府和地方关系，真是了解不多。
除了宪法和几个组织法以外，重要的可能还是党内部的一些惯例，文件和
一些“田野工作”可能是必要的。
对于中国的中央和地方关系，的确思考很少，有一个感觉不知道对不对，
毛时代的社会比较均制，地区差异远远没有改革开放以后大，这一定程度是因为
建国初期中国经济的普遍落后，另外一方面是因为毛时代的建设思路就是
强求各地的一致，地方特殊性仅在最小的程度得到重视。而邓时代的一个思路
是调动积极性，邓的放权和保持中央控制总是有潜在矛盾的，你所说的李鹏
政府的failure可能有这个因素。
【在 c********y 的大作中提到】
: thanks very much for your thoughtful reply.
: 1. Sorry. It's "durable", not "endurable". I was rushing when I posted my
: question. but it definitely shows my English insufficiency.
: 2. Certainly there are some informal rules, but then the question is, what
: exactly are these informal rules? Are they alone sufficient to sustain the
: central-regional relationship? Weingast and Qian talked about how in Mao's era
: Chen Yuan was able to abide the regions by the rule of the center, but Li
: Peng's similar effo
|
m********o
发帖数: 23 | 9 I'm ignorant, too. :)
在美国的语境里，federalism一词的含义是非常简单明确的。而且它是有简单明确的
法律来作为依据的，其含义一是州政府和联邦政府关系，一是指各州之间关系，总体
上说的是美国形式的联邦制度结构。要在中国条件下使用这个词汇，恐怕需要先厘清
它的含义，说明它和美国语境中的含义具有什么区别。中国也存在中央和地方政府分
权的问题。正如你说的，decentralization。这个字更好地表现了一个动态的过程，
而federalism则是一个静态的制度……中国特色的制度恰恰是，在中央和地方分权
问题上，反复出现动态（不仅仅是decentralization，也有centralization，这段
时间温家宝政府的宏观调控就涉及这个问题），而没有一个静态持久的制度。法律、
法规、规章都是表面的，稳定但是实际作用不大，中央和党中央的文件才是一个时期
中央地方关系的最好的反映，其特点就是临时、不长久和不可预测。
所以还是要看你如何界定institution.
【在 c********y 的大作中提到】
: wwwww.....right now I'm having some doubts about the validity of the question.
: I mean, China's case should really be categorized as decentralization rather
: than federalism. Does decentralization require institutionalization? I'm just
: too ignorant about the literature or other countries' cases to answer this
: question at this moment. Anyone with any illumination?
:
: national
: appointment
: to
|
f*****x
发帖数: 545 | 10 I think perhaps this is kind of common agency problem. Have you thought about
the question from that angle?
line
maybe
the
益
not
so
but
regional
have
got
【在 c********y 的大作中提到】
: I think this is an important point, and I've been thinking along the same line
: as well. That is, the game is not just between the center and the province,
: but the center, the provincical government, and the local government. Or maybe
: we can put it as a game between the center, the local government, and the
: local populace. So the middle government needs to cater the needs of both the
: center and the local.
: Again, thanks for your thoughtful comments.
:
: national
: in
|
|
|
c********y
发帖数: 98 | 11 I'm sorry, but what's "common agency" problem? blush. is it like collective
action problem? principal-agent? I'm not familiar with this economics term
although i'm taking some econ courses right now. :(
about
province,
。
利
I
helpful.
【在 f*****x 的大作中提到】
: I think perhaps this is kind of common agency problem. Have you thought about
: the question from that angle?
:
: line
: maybe
: the
: 益
: not
: so
: but
|
m********o
发帖数: 23 | 12 我的理解是，他说的是，代理人和被代理人之间总有一个代理人的self-interest，
按理说，代理人应该仅仅为被代理人的利益服务，但是代理人可能会因为自己的利害关系
背叛这个原则，所以代理关系中又有监督的成本……
他可能是说，地方官员是中央委派，也就应该是中央在地方的代理人，但是地方官员自身
也有各种自我的利益，所以………
【在 c********y 的大作中提到】
: I'm sorry, but what's "common agency" problem? blush. is it like collective
: action problem? principal-agent? I'm not familiar with this economics term
: although i'm taking some econ courses right now. :(
:
: about
: province,
: 。
: 利
: I
: helpful.
|
c********y
发帖数: 98 | 13 that's principal-agent problem.
系
身
collective
【在 m********o 的大作中提到】
: 我的理解是，他说的是，代理人和被代理人之间总有一个代理人的self-interest，
: 按理说，代理人应该仅仅为被代理人的利益服务，但是代理人可能会因为自己的利害关系
: 背叛这个原则，所以代理关系中又有监督的成本……
: 他可能是说，地方官员是中央委派，也就应该是中央在地方的代理人，但是地方官员自身
: 也有各种自我的利益，所以………
|
f*****x
发帖数: 545 | 14 IN the canonical principal-agent framework, there is only one principle one
agent. However there are cases one agent is assoicated with two or more
principles. For example, local government is agent for local residents and
central government. IN this case, there is usually conflict between two
principles. SO how principls should take into account the impact of another
principle?
Whinston (1986): common agency, econometrica is a good reference. Note this is
a complete info framework. If you can w |
f*****x
发帖数: 545 | 15
national
My question is precisely this: how can an non-institutionalized
If it works, then they wont have problem. The problem is what if it fails?
Then it will be changed. This is actually Deng's philosophy: Crossing the
river by touching stones.
My answer to ur question is this may be an accident rather than rule.
This question is not just of theoretical intersts but of
appointment
to
Another possible explanation is using Cheap talk. Central government and local
government have mutual interes
【在 c********y 的大作中提到】
: Hi folks, there's a question that has been plaguing me for a while and I
: would appreciate your comments and ideas. Any response would be helpful.
: An important condition of Barry Weingast's notion of market preserving
: federalism is "instituionalzed" allocation of authorities between the national
: government and subnational governments. In China, this condition does not
: exist (on the contrary, the constitution stipulates a unitary system), so in
: his coauthored paper with Yingyi Qian they changed th
|
f*****x
发帖数: 545 | 16
系
yes
但是地方官员自身
not this, but local officials are also representative of local ppls.
both local ppls and central gov. are principles, the local officials are
agents.
所以………
collective
【在 m********o 的大作中提到】
: 我的理解是，他说的是，代理人和被代理人之间总有一个代理人的self-interest，
: 按理说，代理人应该仅仅为被代理人的利益服务，但是代理人可能会因为自己的利害关系
: 背叛这个原则，所以代理关系中又有监督的成本……
: 他可能是说，地方官员是中央委派，也就应该是中央在地方的代理人，但是地方官员自身
: 也有各种自我的利益，所以………
|
c********y
发帖数: 98 | 17 this is exactly the kind of help I'm looking for. Thanks so much for the
reference, flytoox. I'll read Whinston's paper and then maybe come back to
you. hopefully it's not too mathematically complicated.
I once did a simple incomplete information model of central-local government
relationship. Check your mail for more about that model.
is
that
在
collective
Or
中
【在 f*****x 的大作中提到】
: IN the canonical principal-agent framework, there is only one principle one
: agent. However there are cases one agent is assoicated with two or more
: principles. For example, local government is agent for local residents and
: central government. IN this case, there is usually conflict between two
: principles. SO how principls should take into account the impact of another
: principle?
: Whinston (1986): common agency, econometrica is a good reference. Note this is
: a complete info framework. If you can w
|
c********y
发帖数: 98 | 18 my sense is that the equilibrium we currently have in China is a weak one, and
to strengthen it, we still need formal institutions. the codification of
fiscal sharing among the central and regional governments might be a good
example.
in
local
sometimes
which
2nd
【在 f*****x 的大作中提到】
:
: 系
: yes
: 但是地方官员自身
: not this, but local officials are also representative of local ppls.
: both local ppls and central gov. are principles, the local officials are
: agents.
: 所以………
: collective
|
c********y
发帖数: 98 | 19 I read cheap talk games before, in the context of congressional appropriation
of funds. not sure exactly how it could be used in the central-local
relationship game. would be happy to learn more.
in
local
sometimes
which
2nd
【在 f*****x 的大作中提到】
:
: 系
: yes
: 但是地方官员自身
: not this, but local officials are also representative of local ppls.
: both local ppls and central gov. are principles, the local officials are
: agents.
: 所以………
: collective
|
k***g
发帖数: 7244 | 20 呵呵，应付完了考试，也来灌一把：）
首先，institutionalized allocation of authorities在中国不存在，不是因为中国的
宪法规定了中国是一个unitary system. Unitary
system本身也可以是一种institutionalization，也是一种中央与地方权力的分配方式。
更进一步说，unitary 也不一定必然和federalism 相抵触，类似一个mutil-D的分析，中
国可以并行政治的unitary system和经济的federalism。其它的例子譬如爱尔兰。
中国之所以没有instiutionalzed allocation of authorities是因为中国缺乏一个
framework of constitutional order in which the central government can collect
taxes, allocate transfers, and enforce regulations autonomously.
Weingast把中国的durable allocation等
【在 c********y 的大作中提到】
: Hi folks, there's a question that has been plaguing me for a while and I
: would appreciate your comments and ideas. Any response would be helpful.
: An important condition of Barry Weingast's notion of market preserving
: federalism is "instituionalzed" allocation of authorities between the national
: government and subnational governments. In China, this condition does not
: exist (on the contrary, the constitution stipulates a unitary system), so in
: his coauthored paper with Yingyi Qian they changed th
|
|
|
f*****x
发帖数: 545 | 21
的
。
中
collect
果
itself
equilibrium
我N久以前那片关于厦门远华和江苏钢铁案的例子就是为了说明这个问题。更严密的Game
篇
不
i guess it is economic letters.
We
但
譬
度
，
个
要
是
【在 k***g 的大作中提到】
: 呵呵，应付完了考试，也来灌一把：）
: 首先，institutionalized allocation of authorities在中国不存在，不是因为中国的
: 宪法规定了中国是一个unitary system. Unitary
: system本身也可以是一种institutionalization，也是一种中央与地方权力的分配方式。
: 更进一步说，unitary 也不一定必然和federalism 相抵触，类似一个mutil-D的分析，中
: 国可以并行政治的unitary system和经济的federalism。其它的例子譬如爱尔兰。
: 中国之所以没有instiutionalzed allocation of authorities是因为中国缺乏一个
: framework of constitutional order in which the central government can collect
: taxes, allocate transfers, and enforce regulations autonomously.
: Weingast把中国的durable allocation等
|
f*****x
发帖数: 545 | 22
的
。
中
collect
果
itself
equilibrium
where is this one? i am curious. thx
更严密的Game
篇
不
We
但
譬
度
，
个
要
是
【在 k***g 的大作中提到】
: 呵呵，应付完了考试，也来灌一把：）
: 首先，institutionalized allocation of authorities在中国不存在，不是因为中国的
: 宪法规定了中国是一个unitary system. Unitary
: system本身也可以是一种institutionalization，也是一种中央与地方权力的分配方式。
: 更进一步说，unitary 也不一定必然和federalism 相抵触，类似一个mutil-D的分析，中
: 国可以并行政治的unitary system和经济的federalism。其它的例子譬如爱尔兰。
: 中国之所以没有instiutionalzed allocation of authorities是因为中国缺乏一个
: framework of constitutional order in which the central government can collect
: taxes, allocate transfers, and enforce regulations autonomously.
: Weingast把中国的durable allocation等
|
k***g
发帖数: 7244 | 23 呼~呼~,找到你回帖的句子可真不容易啊：）
可能是我记错了吧，只是依稀记得是Economic Letters,不过有这两个作者的名字，应该
很好查；）
国
式
，
which
如
firms
我N久以前那片关于厦门远华和江苏钢铁案的例子就是为了说明这个问题。更严密的Game
一
记
和
，
（
制
度
举
【在 f*****x 的大作中提到】
:
: 的
: 。
: 中
: collect
: 果
: itself
: equilibrium
: where is this one? i am curious. thx
: 更严密的Game
|
k***g
发帖数: 7244 | 24 半年前写的，原文如下：
发信人: kzeng (读), 信区: PoliticalScience
标 题: 中国的Market-Preserving Federalism和江苏违规钢铁案
发信站: Unknown Space - 未名空间 (Wed Apr 28 22:54:01 2004) WWW-POST
斯坦福的Weingast写了一篇非常有影响力的关于Market-Preserving Federalism文章，并
在另外一篇也很著名的文章中把这个概念用于中国经济的腾飞，他的观点植根于Tiebout
的Financial Federalism，或者形象的说是“用脚投票”，当时在讨论这个东东的时候，
就怀疑它有问题，当时举的是厦门远华案，远华走私使得福建省的FDI从全国的9.3%上升
到13%，刚才看到了江苏钢铁案，其实逻辑也是相同的，即便是犯案人不向地方行贿，地
方官员也乐得行方便，省与省的竞争过于激烈，国家又对省的财政预算实行干预（这是必
要的，防止各省为了吸引投资过分降低地税，或是大举借贷），为了省出只好冒法律的风
险了……
国
式
，
which
如
firms
一
记
【在 f*****x 的大作中提到】
:
: 的
: 。
: 中
: collect
: 果
: itself
: equilibrium
: where is this one? i am curious. thx
: 更严密的Game
|
c********y
发帖数: 98 | 25 thanks. this is helpful too, although your original post about market
preserving federalism really touches on a different topic than my post. Yours
is about the effects of decentralization, while mine is about the
stability/durability of decentralization. I agree with what you said about the
control of the party machinary, but it seems that it is a factor against the
durability of decentralization, since the CCP central committee/polit bureau
controls all.
的
。
中
collect
果
itself
equilibrium
我N久
【在 k***g 的大作中提到】
: 呵呵，应付完了考试，也来灌一把：）
: 首先，institutionalized allocation of authorities在中国不存在，不是因为中国的
: 宪法规定了中国是一个unitary system. Unitary
: system本身也可以是一种institutionalization，也是一种中央与地方权力的分配方式。
: 更进一步说，unitary 也不一定必然和federalism 相抵触，类似一个mutil-D的分析，中
: 国可以并行政治的unitary system和经济的federalism。其它的例子譬如爱尔兰。
: 中国之所以没有instiutionalzed allocation of authorities是因为中国缺乏一个
: framework of constitutional order in which the central government can collect
: taxes, allocate transfers, and enforce regulations autonomously.
: Weingast把中国的durable allocation等
|
c********y
发帖数: 98 | 26 btw, the unitary system thing I mentioned in my first post is just an example
about the lack of institutionalization of decentralization in china. it's not
meant to prove anything. just an example.
的
。
中
collect
果
itself
equilibrium
我N久以前那片关于厦门远华和江苏钢铁案的例子就是为了说明这个问题。更严密的Game
篇
不
We
但
譬
度
，
个
要
是
in
non-institutionalized
of
【在 k***g 的大作中提到】
: 呵呵，应付完了考试，也来灌一把：）
: 首先，institutionalized allocation of authorities在中国不存在，不是因为中国的
: 宪法规定了中国是一个unitary system. Unitary
: system本身也可以是一种institutionalization，也是一种中央与地方权力的分配方式。
: 更进一步说，unitary 也不一定必然和federalism 相抵触，类似一个mutil-D的分析，中
: 国可以并行政治的unitary system和经济的federalism。其它的例子譬如爱尔兰。
: 中国之所以没有instiutionalzed allocation of authorities是因为中国缺乏一个
: framework of constitutional order in which the central government can collect
: taxes, allocate transfers, and enforce regulations autonomously.
: Weingast把中国的durable allocation等
|
k***g
发帖数: 7244 | 27 呵呵，decentralization是一个policy outcome, 只要policy-making system(whi
ch is heavily influenced by party institution)是durable的，这个policy ou
tcome也是durable的。同时，现在decentralized的是经济方面，和CCP的central
comittee没有太大的矛盾啊，呵呵，总不能回到计划经济吧：）
【在 c********y 的大作中提到】
: thanks. this is helpful too, although your original post about market
: preserving federalism really touches on a different topic than my post. Yours
: is about the effects of decentralization, while mine is about the
: stability/durability of decentralization. I agree with what you said about the
: control of the party machinary, but it seems that it is a factor against the
: durability of decentralization, since the CCP central committee/polit bureau
: controls all.
:
: 的
: 。
|
m********o
发帖数: 23 | 28 kzeng兄这里多少有点矛盾吧
前面说中国没有institutionalized allocation of authority，后面又
指出党系统实际上是高度制度化并且发挥社会管理职能的（这无疑是正确的），
这等于是说中国还是有一个制度的。
其次，爱尔兰国土狭小，人口不多，不能和大国比较。
我的想法是，大国家无法实现政治和经济的双重管理模式，单一制度
和联邦制度并存。因为经济管理的决策是无法和政治管理分割的，
尤其在中国，经济运行仍然十分依靠政治权力的时候，更不可能。
而在一个发达的、经济高度社会自治化的社会，政治权力
的影响也是不可忽视的，甚至依然是决定性的。
单一体制的决策过程和联邦体制完全不同，难以实现政治的单一体制
和经济的联邦主义的并存。这一点想请教kzeng兄，能否教导一二。
另外，我感觉现在世界上，联邦制度其实很大程度在退化，当然我并没有
对德国、巴西、澳大利亚、mexico、瑞士等所有联邦国家都了解，
我只是相对了解一点美国的宪法发展过程，感觉从长期而言，联邦制度中，
美国宪法的重大发展取向之一，就是州权的弱化，尤其在经济事务上。
这点和经济高度一体化是分不开的。
最
【在 k***g 的大作中提到】
: 呵呵，应付完了考试，也来灌一把：）
: 首先，institutionalized allocation of authorities在中国不存在，不是因为中国的
: 宪法规定了中国是一个unitary system. Unitary
: system本身也可以是一种institutionalization，也是一种中央与地方权力的分配方式。
: 更进一步说，unitary 也不一定必然和federalism 相抵触，类似一个mutil-D的分析，中
: 国可以并行政治的unitary system和经济的federalism。其它的例子譬如爱尔兰。
: 中国之所以没有instiutionalzed allocation of authorities是因为中国缺乏一个
: framework of constitutional order in which the central government can collect
: taxes, allocate transfers, and enforce regulations autonomously.
: Weingast把中国的durable allocation等
|
k***g
发帖数: 7244 | 29 呵呵，怪我没看仔细：）
【在 c********y 的大作中提到】
: btw, the unitary system thing I mentioned in my first post is just an example
: about the lack of institutionalization of decentralization in china. it's not
: meant to prove anything. just an example.
:
: 的
: 。
: 中
: collect
: 果
: itself
|
c********y
发帖数: 98 | 30 decentralization surely is more than a policy outcome. it's an allocation of
authorities (in a sense, it's an institution itself, but an informal one in
China's case). my question is how this allocation of authority be durable,
without the central government encroaching the territories of sub-national
governments (put it another way, the central government's policies/desires
have often been resisted by sub-national governments). Put it this way, maybe
my original question can be rephrased as fol
【在 k***g 的大作中提到】
: 呵呵，decentralization是一个policy outcome, 只要policy-making system(whi
: ch is heavily influenced by party institution)是durable的，这个policy ou
: tcome也是durable的。同时，现在decentralized的是经济方面，和CCP的central
: comittee没有太大的矛盾啊，呵呵，总不能回到计划经济吧：）
|
|
|
m********o
发帖数: 23 | 31 有意思。:)
哦想这个问题的关键是：为什么institution就是durable 的，formal与否是否是
影响durability的关键要素。
【在 c********y 的大作中提到】
: decentralization surely is more than a policy outcome. it's an allocation of
: authorities (in a sense, it's an institution itself, but an informal one in
: China's case). my question is how this allocation of authority be durable,
: without the central government encroaching the territories of sub-national
: governments (put it another way, the central government's policies/desires
: have often been resisted by sub-national governments). Put it this way, maybe
: my original question can be rephrased as fol
|
c********y
发帖数: 98 | 32 Well, institutions do not have to be durable, but they would contribute to the
durability of those things that they're supposed to support. my question is
how can decentralization be durable when formal institutions are againt it.
there got to be some other balancing forces.
Gosh, I feel I'm such a failure. I thought I had expressed my question clearly
in my first post, but it seems I still haven't got my question across after so
many posts.
of
in
maybe
centralized
我N久以前那片关于厦门远华和江苏钢铁案的例子就是为了说明这
【在 m********o 的大作中提到】
: 有意思。:)
: 哦想这个问题的关键是：为什么institution就是durable 的，formal与否是否是
: 影响durability的关键要素。
|
f*****x
发帖数: 545 | 33 blush, i am away. actually i dont know much about institutional econ, that is
why i didnt reply to u and complexity's posts. i can only follow ur posts:)【
在 kzeng (锴锃) 的大作中提到: 】
该
中
方
析
个
为
我N久以前那片关于厦门远华和江苏钢铁案的例子就是为了说明这个问题。更严密的Game
的
Letters（ |
c********y
发帖数: 98 | 34 Speaking of institutional economics, what do you econ people think of Oliver
Williamson and Doug North? I once had a case study course for MBAs and JDs
that used Williamson's approach, but i didn't get a chance to read Williamson
directly. I did read North's 1990 book and have to say it sucks. i don't know
why he got the nobel. Williamson should be smarter, I guess.
【 在 flytoox (烤红薯) 的大作中提到: 】
is
【
应
我N久以前那片关于厦门远华和江苏钢铁案的例子就是为了说明这个问题。更严密的Game |
k***g
发帖数: 7244 | 35 呵呵，我说的institutionalized allocation of authority指的是由国家的法律所
保障的权力分配，类似于各国写入宪法的中央和地方的关系。这种关系不依赖于某
个政党而存在，政党的更迭与政党的自身的制度对这一关系的影响很小。而中国却
不一样，党的制度不同于国家制度。其实说开去又一个long story，中国的modern
ization很大程度上是exogenous的而不是endogenous，也就是说是由于外因而不是
内因而开始的，举个例子吧，中国的主权国家的形成基本上是被西方的列强给逼的
，中国原先和越南，缅甸等国是没有明确的边界的，因为中国依旧用的是帝国的概
念。但是随着西方的殖民化，中国不得不确立territorial sovergnty的概念，其它
的也是类似，譬如nationalism，和近代nation-state的形成。呵呵，先打住在这里
。
关于大国是否需要政治和经济的双重管理模式，其实这是比较政治上的另一个话题
，简单的可以总结为varieties of capitalism。如果一个国家实行的是free capi
talism(昂格鲁
【在 m********o 的大作中提到】
: kzeng兄这里多少有点矛盾吧
: 前面说中国没有institutionalized allocation of authority，后面又
: 指出党系统实际上是高度制度化并且发挥社会管理职能的（这无疑是正确的），
: 这等于是说中国还是有一个制度的。
: 其次，爱尔兰国土狭小，人口不多，不能和大国比较。
: 我的想法是，大国家无法实现政治和经济的双重管理模式，单一制度
: 和联邦制度并存。因为经济管理的决策是无法和政治管理分割的，
: 尤其在中国，经济运行仍然十分依靠政治权力的时候，更不可能。
: 而在一个发达的、经济高度社会自治化的社会，政治权力
: 的影响也是不可忽视的，甚至依然是决定性的。
|
k***g
发帖数: 7244 | 36 呵呵，没有关系啊，随便聊聊嘛，又不是Seminar：）我的major也不是这个，这个
是Comparative Politics的话题，我是搞International Relations的，所以也是胡
言乱语：）
【在 f*****x 的大作中提到】
: blush, i am away. actually i dont know much about institutional econ, that is
: why i didnt reply to u and complexity's posts. i can only follow ur posts:)【
: 在 kzeng (锴锃) 的大作中提到: 】
: 该
: 中
: 方
: 析
: 个
: 为
: 我N久以前那片关于厦门远华和江苏钢铁案的例子就是为了说明这个问题。更严密的Game
|
k***g
发帖数: 7244 | 37 呵呵，政治学上曾经有一段时间对Williamson的东西很热衷，写了N本书，没记错的
话包括Lake的Entangled Relations，还有Ikenberry的After Victory，在IR这边还
是挺有影响力的，但是现在好像做的人不多了，上个学期有一个哥伦比亚的Assist
ant Professor到我们系Job Talk好像还是在做这个，不过没有拿到offer。
North的书对比较政治里的new institutionalism特别是historical institutiona
lism影响挺大的，个人来说我还是挺喜欢他的东东的，本来这个暑假想参加 Washi
ngton Uni的那个夏令营，因为传言North会去讲课，但是后来又不去了，真是遗憾
。。。
【在 c********y 的大作中提到】
: Speaking of institutional economics, what do you econ people think of Oliver
: Williamson and Doug North? I once had a case study course for MBAs and JDs
: that used Williamson's approach, but i didn't get a chance to read Williamson
: directly. I did read North's 1990 book and have to say it sucks. i don't know
: why he got the nobel. Williamson should be smarter, I guess.
: 【 在 flytoox (烤红薯) 的大作中提到: 】
: is
: 【
: 应
: 我N久以前那片关于厦门远华和江苏钢铁案的例子就是为了说明这个问题。更严密的Game
|
c********y
发帖数: 98 | 38 well, I thought north's new institutional economics approach should be
separated from the historical institutionalism approach. of course, the path
dependency argument overlaps with historical institutionalism. I didn't like
north's book because it jumps between different levels of analysis, and so is
really fuzzy. maybe it's just because I'm stupid.
Oliver
Williamson
know
我N久以前那片关于厦门远华和江苏钢铁案的例子就是为了说明这个问题。更严密的Game
【在 k***g 的大作中提到】
: 呵呵，政治学上曾经有一段时间对Williamson的东西很热衷，写了N本书，没记错的
: 话包括Lake的Entangled Relations，还有Ikenberry的After Victory，在IR这边还
: 是挺有影响力的，但是现在好像做的人不多了，上个学期有一个哥伦比亚的Assist
: ant Professor到我们系Job Talk好像还是在做这个，不过没有拿到offer。
: North的书对比较政治里的new institutionalism特别是historical institutiona
: lism影响挺大的，个人来说我还是挺喜欢他的东东的，本来这个暑假想参加 Washi
: ngton Uni的那个夏令营，因为传言North会去讲课，但是后来又不去了，真是遗憾
: 。。。
|
k***g
发帖数: 7244 | 39 呵呵，可是North本来就是不是做historicla Institutionalism的，只是ＨＩ（hi
storical Institutionalism的简称）借鉴North的东西，两个怎么分开呢?
North已经说了，他仍然用的是agent-based approach，如此说来，对于他是不存在
agent-structure之争的，也就不存在level of analysis的问题了：）
【在 c********y 的大作中提到】
: well, I thought north's new institutional economics approach should be
: separated from the historical institutionalism approach. of course, the path
: dependency argument overlaps with historical institutionalism. I didn't like
: north's book because it jumps between different levels of analysis, and so is
: really fuzzy. maybe it's just because I'm stupid.
:
: Oliver
: Williamson
: know
: 我N久以前那片关于厦门远华和江苏钢铁案的例子就是为了说明这个问题。更严密的Game
|
c********y
发帖数: 98 | 40 well, I didn't mean he's using any structural analysis. of course not. maybe "different level of analysis" is a wrong way to put it. i guess what i mean is that he should really focus on the increasing return matrix thing. that seems to the thrust of
his idea of going down the path of no return. yet his discusson of that is very brief. he spends a lot of pages about relative price change, change of taste, these obvious things. and ideology etc. it's like spending pages after pages explaining
ele
【在 k***g 的大作中提到】
: 呵呵，可是North本来就是不是做historicla Institutionalism的，只是ＨＩ（hi
: storical Institutionalism的简称）借鉴North的东西，两个怎么分开呢?
: North已经说了，他仍然用的是agent-based approach，如此说来，对于他是不存在
: agent-structure之争的，也就不存在level of analysis的问题了：）
|
|
|
k***g
发帖数: 7244 | 41 突然发现你误解我原贴的意思了//blush, 我说“找到你回帖的句子可真不容易啊：）”
是因为你在我的帖子里回了一句话，而我用的是Telnet的方式，一下子看不到你的话，很
难找到那句话，不是说你回帖少的意思，表误会：）
is
【
应
为
配
分
。
一
因
【在 f*****x 的大作中提到】
: blush, i am away. actually i dont know much about institutional econ, that is
: why i didnt reply to u and complexity's posts. i can only follow ur posts:)【
: 在 kzeng (锴锃) 的大作中提到: 】
: 该
: 中
: 方
: 析
: 个
: 为
: 我N久以前那片关于厦门远华和江苏钢铁案的例子就是为了说明这个问题。更严密的Game
|
k***g
发帖数: 7244 | 42 呵呵，还好吧，毕竟没有什么大错。 Harvard的Paul Pearson马上要出一本关于Path
Dependency的书了，我看到了那本书的手稿，第一章便有惊人之语，increasing return
最后可以达到equilibrium（他在APSR上那篇文章上也犯这个错误了）：）不过historica
l institutionalism有与rational choice institutionalism媾和的趋势，两个的东西作
的越来越像了：）
"different level of analysis" is a wrong way to put it. i guess what i mean is
that he should really focus on the increasing return matrix thing. that seems
to the thrust of
very brief. he spends a lot of pages about relative price change, change of
taste, these obvious
【在 c********y 的大作中提到】
: well, I didn't mean he's using any structural analysis. of course not. maybe "different level of analysis" is a wrong way to put it. i guess what i mean is that he should really focus on the increasing return matrix thing. that seems to the thrust of
: his idea of going down the path of no return. yet his discusson of that is very brief. he spends a lot of pages about relative price change, change of taste, these obvious things. and ideology etc. it's like spending pages after pages explaining
: ele
|
f*****x
发帖数: 545 | 43
Williamson
hehee, yes, williamson is much better. Steven cheung claimed North stole his
idea and got the noble prize.
i don't know
posts:)
，
我N久以前那片关于厦门远华和江苏钢铁案的例子就是为了说明这个问题。更严密的Game
【在 c********y 的大作中提到】
: Speaking of institutional economics, what do you econ people think of Oliver
: Williamson and Doug North? I once had a case study course for MBAs and JDs
: that used Williamson's approach, but i didn't get a chance to read Williamson
: directly. I did read North's 1990 book and have to say it sucks. i don't know
: why he got the nobel. Williamson should be smarter, I guess.
: 【 在 flytoox (烤红薯) 的大作中提到: 】
: is
: 【
: 应
: 我N久以前那片关于厦门远华和江苏钢铁案的例子就是为了说明这个问题。更严密的Game
|
