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发帖数: 10575 | 1 Sect. X. — I COULD wish, indeed, that we were furnished with some better
term for this discussion, than this commonly used term, necessity, which
cannot rightly be used, either with reference to the human will, or the
divine. It is of a signification too harsh and ill-suited for this subject,
forcing upon the mind an idea of compulsion, and that which is altogether
contrary to will; whereas, the subject which we are discussing, does not
require such an idea: for Will, whether divine or human, does what it does,
be it good or evil, not by any compulsion but by mere willingness or desire,
as it were, totally free. The will of God, nevertheless, which rules over
our mutable will, is immutable and infallible; as Boëtius sings, “
Immovable Thyself, Thou movement giv’st to all.” And our own will,
especially our corrupt will, cannot of itself do good; therefore, where the
term fails to express the idea required, the understanding of the reader
must make up the deficiency, knowing what is wished to be expressed — the
immutable will of God, and the impotency of our depraved will; or, as some
have expressed it, the necessity of immutability, though neither is that
sufficiently grammatical, or sufficiently theological.
Upon this point, the Sophists have now laboured hard for many years, and
being at last conquered, have been compelled to retreat. All things take
place from the necessity of the consequence, (say they) but not from the
necessity of the thing consequent. What nothingness this amounts to, I will
not take the trouble to show. By the necessity of the consequence, (to give
a general idea of it) they mean this — If God wills any thing, that same
thing must, of necessity be done; but it is not necessary that the thing
done should be necessary: for God alone is necessary; all other things
cannot be so, if it is God that wills. Therefore, (say they) the action of
God is necessary, where He wills, but the act itself is not necessary; that
is, (they mean) it has not essential necessity. But what do they effect by
this playing upon words? Only this, that the act itself is not necessary,
that is, it has not essential necessity. This is no more than saying, the
act is not God Himself. This, nevertheless, remains certain, that if the
action of God is necessary, or if there is a necessity of the consequence,
every thing takes place of necessity, how much soever the act be not
necessary; that is, be not God Himself, or have not essential necessity. For
, if I be not made of necessity, it is of little moment with me, whether my
existence and being be mutable or not, if, nevertheless, I, that contingent
and mutable being, who am not the necessary God, am made.
Wherefore, their ridiculous play upon words, that all things take place from
the necessity of the consequence, but not from the necessity of the thing
consequent, amounts to nothing more than this — all things take place of
necessity, but all the things that do take place are not God Himself. But
what need was there to tell us this? As though there were any fear of our
asserting, that the things done were God Himself, or possessed divine or
necessary nature. This asserted truth, therefore, stands and remains
invincible — that all things take place according to the immutable will of
God! which they call the necessity of the consequence. Nor is there here any
obscurity or ambiguity. In Isaiah he saith, “My counsel shall stand, and
My will shall be done.” (Isa. xlvi. 10.) And what schoolboy does not
understand the meaning of these expressions, “Counsel,” “will,” “shall
be done,” “shall stand?” |
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