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发帖数: 27852 | 8 Moscow or Kiev-- How Germany could have won WW2
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Pt. #1
The Russian Front was the decisive theatre of WW2. If Germany won everywhere
else, but lost on the Russian Front, then they lost the war. But 80% of the
Wehrmacht was employed fighting the Soviets, so if they lost everywhere
else, but they won on the Russian Front, then depending on when these events
took place the Wehrmacht should have been able to shift forces to redeem
their failures elsewhere, & win the war. Even after the US came in, if
Germany had won on the Russian Front within 6 to 8 months afterward (roughly
the time between the Jap attack on Pearl Harbor & the Torch invasion), then
Germany should have been able to make Europe (& possibly N Africa)
impregnable to invasion.
So how could this have come about? I propose that with just 1 change in
strategy, Germany's victory on the Russian Front was virtually assured--
probably in '42.
On 18 Aug '41 the Army High Command (OKH) presented Hitler with its plan for
the autumn campaign, which designated Moscow as the key objective. On 22
Aug, however, Hitler rejected the OKH plan & decided instead to strip Army
Gp Center (AGC) of both of its 2 panzer armies, sending one to support AGN
vs Leningrad & the other to support AGS vs Kiev. These new dispositions were
in effect by 25 Aug. AGN arguably made no better progress with 2 panzer
armies than it could have with only 1, but AGS won one of the largest
encirclement battles of the war, took the city of Kiev, captured over 450,
000 Soviet troops, & positioned itself for a thrust all the way to the Don
River & the southern city of Rostov, which it captured before the end of the
year (& then had to abandon during the winter).
Taking Gen. Guderian's 2d Panzer Army (2PzA) as an example, between 25 Aug &
the beginning of Oct the 2PzA drove 300 miles to Kiev, 250 miles back to a
position S of Orel & Bryansk, & spent perhaps another 250 miles in tactical
manuvering-- 36 days of exhausting combat for the men, & at least 800 miles
of wear & tear on the vehicles, not counting losses, injuries, & battle
damage. The experience of Gen. Hoth's 3PzA with AGN was similar. These 2
Panzer Armies, worn down as they were, then spearheaded the attack on Moscow
(assisted by Gen. Hoeppner's 4PzA from AGN).
On 25 Aug Moscow was located 200 miles ENE of the German salient at Smolensk
. On 2 Oct Moscow was located 200 miles NNE of Orel & Bryansk, & the
Wehrmacht was in position to begin Operation Typhoon, the campaign against
Moscow. Within days the Wehrmacht captured the 3d, 13th, 19th, 20th, 24th, &
32d Soviet Armies, capturing over 670,000 prisoners & leaving only 90,000
men & 150 tanks available for the defense of Moscow. On 13 Oct, 12 days into
the campaign, 3PzA penetrated within 90 miles of Moscow, having traversed
110 miles from its start-point. The doom of the Soviet Union appeared to
have been sealed.
But on 18 Oct rain began turning the roads into a thick gumbo of mud in
which trucks couldn't move unless they were towed by tanks. Aircraft couldn'
t take off except from paved runways-- but there were almost no paved
runways. A plane could land in the mud only on its belly, or its landing
gear would snag & cause it to crash. On 30 Oct, when the mud grew so thick
even the tanks could hardly move, the offensive was halted on orders from
Hitler. This respite in front of Moscow enabled Stalin to build
fortifications & reinforce the units defending his capital with his Siberian
reserves.
On 15 Nov the ground froze sufficiently to allow the Wehrmacht to resume its
offensive. Three days later Stalin began his first tentative probing
attacks, for the first time using his new T-34 tanks in large formations, &
by the end of the month it was becoming obvious that Russia was in the
beginnings of one of its worst winters on record. Despite all these
disadvantages Wehrmacht troops still fought their way to within artillery
range of the Kremlin by 2 Dec. In blizzard conditions the Battle of Moscow
raged for 3 days before the incredibly severe weather & the withering away
of his troops & equipment caused Hitler to order disengagement.
On 6 Dec Stalin launched his first winter offensive. The Wehrmacht hadn't
prepared any fortifications for the winter, so the Germans suffered heavy
losses while being driven halfway back to their starting positions. Raging
with fury, Hitler purged his army that winter of over 100 senior generals.
Pt #2
During Operation Typhoon the German Wehrmacht enjoyed 16 days of good
weather (2-18 Oct), 12 days of worsening weather (18-30 Oct), followed by 15
more days of impossible weather (31 Oct-14 Nov). This was followed by about
12-14 days of marginal weather (14 thru 26 or 28 Nov, when the ground froze
), followed by 7 to 9 days of worsening weather which by 5 Dec became
impossible. Thus the campaign included a total of 16 days of good weather,
33 days of marginal weather, & 15 days of impossible weather, during which
the Wehrmacht, with exhausted panzer crews fresh from the Kiev & Leningrad
campaigns, fought its way to within artillery range of the Kremlin.
What would have been the situation had Hitler not interfered, & allowed the
OKH plan for the autumn campaign to stand?
Between 25 Aug & 17 Oct there were 53 days of good weather. This favored the
Germans, who needed good weather to make full use of their aircraft,
panzers, & artillery. This is greater than the 49 total days of combined
good & marginal weather encountered in the actual campaign, which argues
strongly, absent other factors, that under the OKH plan the Wehrmacht would
have reached Moscow as early as 16 September-- a mere 24 days into the
campaign.
For the first 12 days progress might have been similar in both scenarios,
since good weather was enjoyed in both. For the next 12 days, however,
Operation Typhoon encountered 4 days of good weather & 8 days of worsening
weather, while in our hypothetical scenario the weather would remain good.
Let us assume that in our hypothetical scenario the pace during this period
would be similar to that achieved in the first 12 days. Since 3PzA
penetrated within 90 miles of Moscow in the first 12 days, having covered
over half the distance from its start-point, it's reasonable to assume,
absent other factors, that the Wehrmacht could have reached Moscow within 24
days. This would leave 29 days of good weather to consolidate these gains &
continue the offensive.
However, these assumptions are "absent other factors." There are 2 other
factors that shorten the time-frame even further.
First is the effect of the Leningrad & Kiev campaigns on the panzers & their
crews. Fresher panzer formations, absent the losses in the Leningrad & Kiev
campaigns, might have arguably made faster progress.
And second, on 14 Sep 1941 Stalin's agent in Japan, Richard Sorge, reported
that the Japanese intended to attack the United States instead of Siberia.
Acting on this information Stalin brought 34 elité divisions of the
Siberian Army, over 1000 tanks, & over 1000 aircraft to defend Moscow. These
forces were in place by mid-November, & represented the main defense that
slowed & ultimately defeated the historical offensive. Had the attack been
launched on 25 Aug instead of 2 Oct, then the Germans would have entered
Moscow on or before 16 Sep-- only 2 days after Sorge's report & long before
the transfer of any Siberian divisions could take place.
There is also 1 other factor that would have increased the impact of the
capture of Moscow. During Operation Typhoon Stalin remained in Moscow
himself, he issued orders that no one was to evacuate, & he threatened to
shoot anyone who tried to leave. Had these orders been in effect during our
hypothetical scenario then the Germans might have captured not only many
senior Soviet government officials & their staffs & files, but also STAVKA,
the Soviet High Command, & its files, & even Stalin himself.
Even absent this particular consideration, the consequences of a German
conquest of Moscow would have been enormous. Moscow was much more than just
the administrative nerve-center of a totalitarian state. It was also the
road & rail hub of European Russia, & one of its largest commercial &
manufacturing complexes. Moscow had long been the seat of Great Russian
chauvinism. If Soviet resistance had continued at all past the fall of
Moscow, then it would have been a resistance infected with gnawing self-
doubts. The Wehrmacht might have been able to continue their campaign--
successfully-- while greatly reducing their forces.
During the autumn campaign AGN should have been stripped of its 4PzA,
because the focus of the campaign was Leningrad, which had been besieged.
AGN was therefore fighting an infantry campaign. 4PzA, as in the historical
Operation Typhoon, should have participated in the advance on Moscow. AGS
should have retained its 1PzA in order to maintain pressure on Soviet forces
defending Kiev.
After the fall of Moscow the Wehrmacht should have dug in to defend the
place, with 4PzA operating N of the city with an infantry Army, 3PzA
operating to the S with an infantry Army, & the city itself heavily defended
by infantry & artillery in fortifications. 2PzA should have been shifted S
of 3PzA to take up positions in preparation for a spring offensive vs Kiev.
The spring '42 campaign should have used 3 PzAs to encircle & reduce Kiev,
driving to the Don & Rostov. By autumn '42 the Wehrmacht should have held
everything from the Volga to the Don. |
