C*********X
发帖数: 10518 | 1 1644年3月，李自成将明帝国的首都北京团团围住，在紫禁城中的崇祯皇帝已经退无可
退。在失去了所有希望的情况下，他砍死了自己的女儿，并将自己的儿子交给亲信太监
分散逃亡以后，他自己本人选择了在煤山自尽。死之前留下来遗诏“朕非王国之君，臣
乃亡国之臣”，看见崇祯皇帝十分的不甘心，那么现在我们假设一下如果在李自成围城
之前，崇祯皇帝选择了迁都南京，明朝的结局又会如何呢？
一、即便崇祯迁往南京，李自成也做不了北京城
1643年，明帝国陕西方面的主力军全军覆没，统帅孙传庭阵亡。此时的明朝北方除了山
海关外还有吴三桂率领的3万多关宁铁骑以外，再也没有任何有生力量可以去抵抗李自
成的农民军。“传庭死，明朝亡”，孙传庭的阵亡使崇祯身边再也无将可用。1644年春
节刚过，李自成就率领着20万以上的部队开始向北京进军。此时，崇祯最明智的选择就
是趁李自成尚未到来，自己火速南迁，北方让给李自成，而自己先巩固南方在图发展。
当时的北方在兵灾、水灾、旱灾的反复蹂躏之下，农业生产已经支离破碎。河南由于人
为的黄河决口成了一片泽国；山东在兵灾和旱灾的作用下也是哀嚎遍地；河北和山西的
情况也不比鲁豫两省好多少。李自成没有任何的政治经验，完全是四处流窜，其占领了
晋豫两地的许多州县以后，没有选择设立官员管理地方，使当地成为自己的辖区。而是
毁其城墙之后选择撤离，至于为什么要拆毁城墙，答案很简单——为了下次再来抢时方
便。从这一点看李自成根本没有帝王那种一步步发展的雄心，也没有把攻陷州县的百姓
当做自己的子民，只把他们当成了随到随取的“取款机”。
李自成在进入北京以后，同样也会选择大肆劫掠一番，犹如一个没有见过世面的暴发户
。至于他提出的那句“均田免粮”的口号，完全是一句废话。鉴于土地的情况，根本不
可能实现平均；至于免粮就更加子虚乌有，没有了军粮他的部队用什么。从各方面来分
析，李自成进入北京以后，将没有能力管理这一大片的区域，最后的结果只能是民心丧
失殆尽，华北地区陷入持续的混乱。
二、该来的清军还回来，管你是不是李自成
李自成进入北京给华北人民带来的绝不是幸福，而是灾难。东北方一直雄心勃勃想入主
中原的满清绝不会放过这个机会。也许有人会问吴三桂，吴三桂最大的可能就是跟随崇
祯皇帝南撤，李自成的部队接手山海关。清廷的摄政王多尔衮的目光显然要比李自成高
远得多，李自成进入北京，他肯定会率领八旗主力南下，与李自成争夺华北地区的控制
区。即便李自成的部队守住了山海关，清军也会绕道从其他方向南下。
在明朝抗击清军的过程中，清军多次选用绕过明军主力，直插纵深的战术，这套方法对
待李自成同样好用。从当时李自成部队的作战能力来看，绝不是以骑兵为主的清军的对
手。即便不在山海关、也会在北京城下，这场大决战在所难免。而交战的结果会与现实
的历史基本相同，李自成同样会败退出北京，然后向他的老巢陕西撤退。清军进入北京
这个很难阻挡。
三、明朝不会这么垮掉，最少也是又一次南北朝
崇祯皇帝的南迁至少可以保证南方不会垮掉。崇祯的南迁使自己这位大明帝国的皇帝仍
然毋庸置疑，绝对不会出现原来时空那种南方诸王争位的乱象。也正应为他是这个帝国
的最高统治者，他在调配全国资源中处于无可抗拒的优势。他完全可以命令部队扼守黄
河天险阻止李自成军或者清军的进攻。至于将领和军队不是问题，通过现实中南明的表
现不难看出当时明朝的威望在南方犹在（现实的情况是南明在南京建立以后，闽浙、两
湖、西南、两广之人纷纷入南京，希望能够重建大明）。
至于清军的入关将在所难免，不过清军绝对不可能统一全国，想通过黄淮地区都将十分
的困难。虽然清军也可以组织起一批伪军，但是由于南方的正牌朝廷还在，这帮人有多
要作用要打一个大大的问号。最主要的是根据全国的情况来看，明朝在对抗中会具有优
势。
之前的南北朝和南宋都是在双方均等的情况下产生的，而明清的对抗将会有所不同。由
于北方战乱已久，经济崩溃，民生凋敝；即便清廷占领了华北也很难立刻南下。而南方
由于战乱波及较少，经济的底子还在，而且具体来讲民心还在。崇祯皇帝在南京站稳脚
跟以后，至少可以保住半壁江山。最理想的可能是与清廷以黄河为界，明军守住黄河天
险；最差的可能也能守住淮河一线，使东南地区绝对的安全。在这场新的南北对抗中，
将会是明强清弱的态势出现。至于四川的张献忠，从他的种种行为来看，他很难长久在
四川待下去。至于具体四川一带地区的归属问题，就要看明清两方的高层谁能把握住最
好时机，收取四川技高一筹了。 | d******a
发帖数: 32122 | 2 崇祯殉国，比逃跑健将咸丰蒋介石毛泽东强一万倍
---明粉
【在 C*********X 的大作中提到】
: 1644年3月，李自成将明帝国的首都北京团团围住，在紫禁城中的崇祯皇帝已经退无可
: 退。在失去了所有希望的情况下，他砍死了自己的女儿，并将自己的儿子交给亲信太监
: 分散逃亡以后，他自己本人选择了在煤山自尽。死之前留下来遗诏“朕非王国之君，臣
: 乃亡国之臣”，看见崇祯皇帝十分的不甘心，那么现在我们假设一下如果在李自成围城
: 之前，崇祯皇帝选择了迁都南京，明朝的结局又会如何呢？
: 一、即便崇祯迁往南京，李自成也做不了北京城
: 1643年，明帝国陕西方面的主力军全军覆没，统帅孙传庭阵亡。此时的明朝北方除了山
: 海关外还有吴三桂率领的3万多关宁铁骑以外，再也没有任何有生力量可以去抵抗李自
: 成的农民军。“传庭死，明朝亡”，孙传庭的阵亡使崇祯身边再也无将可用。1644年春
: 节刚过，李自成就率领着20万以上的部队开始向北京进军。此时，崇祯最明智的选择就
| Z**********g
发帖数: 14173 | 3 崇祯这种长于深宫妇人之手的货色，是会不会逃得问题。还真以为宋末帝6岁小孩就学
会跳海了？
【在 d******a 的大作中提到】
: 崇祯殉国，比逃跑健将咸丰蒋介石毛泽东强一万倍
: ---明粉
| F**0
发帖数: 5004 | 4 迁都南京也守不住。
时代变了，火炮时代， 城墙已经不能坚守了。 | h***i
发帖数: 89031 | 5 迁都到了东林党的老巢，更加收不上税
【在 F**0 的大作中提到】
: 迁都南京也守不住。
: 时代变了，火炮时代， 城墙已经不能坚守了。
| Z**********g
发帖数: 14173 | 6 Keyi xue Shopping Deng
qiangliang
esi 3000wan
【在 h***i 的大作中提到】
: 迁都到了东林党的老巢，更加收不上税
| C*********X
发帖数: 10518 | 7 Apr 25 1644
End of Ming Dynasty
The collapse of the Ming Dynasty was a protracted affair, its roots
beginning as early as 1600 with the emergence of the Manchu under Nurhaci.
Originally a vassal of the Ming emperors, Nurhaci in 1582 embarked on an
inter-tribal feud that escalated into a campaign to unify the Jianzhou
Jurchen tribes. Later Nurhaci announced Seven Grievances and openly
renounced the sovereignty of Ming overlordship in order to complete the
unification of those Jurchen tribes still allied with the Ming emperor. With
superior artillery the Ming were able to repeatedly fight off the Manchus,
notably in 1623 and in 1628. However, they were not able to recapture their
rule over the Manchus and the region. From 1629 onwards the Míng were
wearied by a combination of internal strife and constant harassment of
Northern China by the Manchu; who had turned to raiding tactics so as to
avoid facing the Míng armies in open battle.
Unable to attack the heart of Míng directly, the Manchu instead bided their
time, developing their own artillery and gathering allies. They were able
to enlist Míng government officials as their strategic advisors. In 1633
they completed a conquest of Inner Mongolia, resulting in a large scale
recruitment of Mongol troops under the Manchu banner and the securing of an
additional route into the Míng heartland.
By 1636 the Manchu ruler Huang Taiji was confident enough to proclaim the
Imperial Qing Dynasty at Shenyang, which had fallen to the Manchu by
treachery in 1621, taking the Imperial title Chongde. The end of 1637 saw
the defeat and conquest of Míng's traditional ally Korea by a 100,000
strong Manchu army, and the Korean renunciation of the Míng Dynasty.
On May 26, 1644, Beijing was sacked by a coalition of rebel forces led by Li
Zicheng, a minor Ming official turned leader of the peasant revolt. The
last Ming, Emperor Chongzhen committed suicide when the city fell, marking
the official end of the dynasty. The Manchu Qing dynasty then allied with
Ming Dynasty general Wu Sangui and seized control of Beijing and quickly
overthrew Li's short-lived Shun Dynasty. Despite the loss of Beijing (whose
weakness as an Imperial capital had been foreseen by Zhu Yuanzhang) and the
death of the Chongzhen Emperor, Míng power was by no means destroyed.
Nanjing, Fujian, Guangdong, Shanxi and Yunnan could all have been and were
in fact strongholds of Míng resistance. However, the loss of central
authority saw multiple pretenders for the Míng throne, unable to work
together. Each bastion of resistance was individually defeated by the Qing
until 1662, when the last real hopes of a Ming revival died with the Yongli
emperor Zhu Youlang.
Source: Wikipedia Added by: Theo Skolnik
There are numerous causes for the decline and fall of the Ming despite the
auspicious start of the dynasty under the Hong Wu emperor. The most
immediate and direct cause of the fall of the Ming were the rebellions that
racked the country in the seventeenth century and the aggressive military
expansion of the Manchus. The decline of the dynasty, however, began much
sooner; history works more often in long patterns, and the decline of the
Ming can be dated as far back as the establishment of the dynasty.
Chinese historians largely believe that the Ming dynasty declined because
the virtue and the competence of the emperors gradually declined. The key
issue in this decline was the Ming political innovation of concentrating all
power in the hands of the emperor. Western historians also argue that the
quality of the emperors declined and this was exacerbated by the
centralization of authority.
There's little question that Hong Wu's centralization of government produced
disastrous results. Hong Wu himself was a dynamic and brilliant
administrator who dedicated himself to a grueling work schedule. He was
succeeded by his son, but his son was soon usurped by Cheng-tsu, who ruled
as the Yung-lo emperor from 1403 to 1424 (Yung-lo was responsible for moving
the capital back to Beijing). The Yung-lo emperor was also very active and
very competent as an administrator, but two problems immediately surfaced.
Because he had been opposed by the government ministers in his usurpation of
the throne, he reversed the Hong Wu emperor's insistence that the court
eunuchs be kept out of government. He also brought to the foreground
everyone's deepest fear about an absolutist imperiate: the emperor could do
whatever he pleased. The Yung-lo emperor, competent as he was, was perhaps
the cruellest emperor in the history of China. When he seized the throne, he
executed all the families of the men who opposed him, and throughout his
reign he executed thousands arbitrarily.
The major problem with an absolute emperor had been recognized long before
the Ming dynasty: concentrating power in the hands of the emperor would
spell disaster if the emperor were incompetent or disinterested in
government. When the emperorship became hereditary, the Chinese recognized
this and established the office of prime or chief minister. While
incompetent emperors could come and go, the prime minister could guarantee a
level of continuity and competence in the government. The Hong Wu emperor,
wishing to concentrate absolute authority in his own hands, abolished the
office of prime minister and so removed the only insurance against
incompetent emperors.
After the Yung-lo emperor, the Ming dynasty was one uninterrupted series of
unremarkable and frequently mediocre emperors. Raised in luxury, they did
not have the will or the mettle to administer the government with the same
zeal and concern that the founder of the dynasty had. They increasingly
neglected state affairs until, by the time of Shih-tsung, the Chia-ching
Emperor (ruled 1522-1566), the Emperor had completely retreated into
concerning himself solely with his pleasure and the life of his family.
Power at court vacillated between officials and the eunuchs. Power
eventually concentrated in the hands of the Grand Secretary who, although it
was illegal to assume the title, had become the equivalent of the prime
minister. Under the Chia-ching emperor, who took no interest whatsoever in
government, the Chinese government fell into an abyss of corruption and
abuse under the Grand Secretary, Yen Sung (1480-1568).
So base were the public scandals that grew up around Yen Sung and later his
son and successor, Yen Shih-fan, that the scholars in government banded
together to fight corrupt officials and the eunuchs for control of the
government. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, the government
split up into four factions fighting each other for control; eventually one
party, the Tung-lin, prevailed. But the Tung-lin party still had to contend
with the eunuchs, and the latter half of the rule of the Wan-li emperor (
1572-1619) was characterized by this struggle. The eunuchs eventually
prevailed, but the government had been torn to pieces in the process.
The Wan-li emperor was followed by the T'ien-ch'i emperor (1621-1627) who
spent all day playing with carpentry. Content to allow the young man to play
away, the eunuchs effectively ran the government for their own profit. By
the time the Ch'ung-chen emperor (1628-1644) took over, the government had
been decimated by the eunuchs. Ch'ung-chen was determined to avoid any more
problems by running the government all by himself; both Chinese and European
historians have been both fascinated and perplexed by this nearly insane
decision. During his seventeen year reign, the Ch'ung-chen emperor appointed
more than fifty Grand Secretaries.
The political decline of the Ming dynasty began as early as the fifteenth
century, but rebellions did not break out in the empire until the
seventeenth century. Largely to pay for extravagances at court and military
expeditions against the Mongols and ever-increasingly aggressive Manchus,
the imperial government exacted increasingly burdensome taxes on the common
people. As these taxes inspired rebellion, the quelling of these rebellions
by military force required more taxes; seeing the rebellions in China, the
Manchus pressed their advantage—in order to check the Manchus, the imperial
government had to—you guessed it—raise more taxes. It was a treadmill the
waning dynasty could not get off. Despite this, the constant rebellions and
fighting against the Manchus depleted the resources of the Ming so that by
1643 there was no money anywhere: all the treasuries in the country were
bare.
The greatest threat to the Ming, however, were the Manchus in the north. The
Manchus were a stock of the Jurched tribe who lived in Manchuria. In the
twelfth century, they founded a dynasty in Manchuria called the Chin ("Gold"
) dynasty; they were conquered a century later by the Mongols but became
semi-independent during the Ming.
Led by the dynamic and brilliant leader, Nurhaci (1559-1626), the Jurched
slowly became consolidated through a series of raids into a single political
unit. In 1607, he had become so powerful in the north that the Mongols gave
him the title, Kundulen Han, or "Respected Emperor." In 1616, with the
Jurched tribes consolidated under his rule, he declared a new state, the
Chin, to have been established with himself as emperor. He claimed the
Mandate of Heaven and set his sights on the whole of China, but died in 1626.
He was succeeded by Abahai (1592-1643), his second son, who first attacked
Korea and then marched on China. After looting Beijing, Abahai set up a
civil administration modelled after that of China; this administration,
however, was slightly different from the Chinese model. Each ministry (or
board) was not administered by a president and vice-president, but rather by
a Manchurian prince. Beneath Manchurian prince were five assistants of
which at least one was Mongol and one was Chinese. This, called by
historians the Manchu-Mongol-Chinese rule, became the model for Ch'ing
government until 1911.
Abahai also renamed his people, "Manchu," rather than "Jurched," and renamed
the dynasty from "Chin," which had bad connotations in China, to "Ch'ing,"
meaning "Pure." When Abahai died in 1643, the crown fell to his son, Fu-lin,
who was only six years old. The government, then, fell into the hands of
the regents, Jirgalang and Dorgan.
In the late 1630's, Abahai attacked North China; by this time, China wsa
falling apart with rebellion. The major rebel leader was Li Tzu-ch'eng (1605
-1645); he attacked Beijing in late April of 1644. Without much resistance,
he entered the city on April 25 and the last Ming emperor, the Ch'ung-chen
emperor, hanged himself. The glorious Ming dynasty, so promising at its
start, died on that afternoon.
Dorgan, meanwhile, proceeded towards Peking at the head of an army,
presumably to aid the Ming. Li burned part of the forbidden city down and
fled. Dorgan made a big show of burying the Ch'ung-chen emperor, but his
real scheme was to place Fu-lin on the throne of China. Li was eventually
hunted down and killed in 1645, but before then, Dorgan placed Fu-lin on the
throne. Thus began the last imperial dynasty in Chinese history: the Ch'ing
or Manchu dynasty.
【在 d******a 的大作中提到】
: 崇祯殉国，比逃跑健将咸丰蒋介石毛泽东强一万倍
: ---明粉
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